Documentos de trabajo » 2020

2020 (4) | 2019 (7) | 2018 (1) | 2017 (4) | 2016 (4) | 2015 (13) | 2014 (2) | 2013 (3) | 2011 (10) | 2010 (19) | 2007 (8) | 2006 (16) | 2005 (12) | 2004 (15) | 2003 (16) | 2002 (32) | 2001 (15) | 2000 (20) | 1999 (12) | 1998 (16) | 1997 (6) | 1996 (2) | 1995 (2) | 1994 (3) | 1993 (5) | 1992 (6) | 1991 (2)

Julio 2020


Alejandro Caparrós, Esther Blanco, Philipp Buchenauer and Michael Finus

Abstract: This study contributes to the recent experimental literature addressing the role of team formation in overcoming coordination failure in weakest-link games. We investigate the endogenous formation of teams in fixed neighborhoods in which it is not possible to exclude players from influencing the weakest-link. Our experimental results show that team formation helps in overcoming the coordination problem, raises equilibrium provision levels, but falls short of providing the Pareto-optimal contribution. As the problem of multiplicity of Nash equilibria in weakest-link games is...

Mayo 2020

Pledge and implement bargaining in the Paris Agreement on climate change

Alejandro Caparrós

Abstract: This paper analyzes a multilateral bargain game motivated by the Paris Agreement on climate change. Countries submit pledges, which can be revoked although this implies reputational costs. Pledges, which do not need to be accepted by other countries, detail intended abatement efforts and can be conditional or unconditional, according to whether they depend on transfers. As the process is repeated, incomplete long-term provisions are also considered. The analysis shows the conditions under which, despite its weakness, the Paris Agreement can bring the world to the first best, or...

Abril 2020


Raúl López-Pérez, Ágnes Pintér and Rocío Sánchez-Mangas

Abstract: People often extrapolate from data samples, inferring properties of the population like the rate of some event, class, or group ‒e.g. the percent of female scientists, the crime rate, the chances to suffer some illness. In many circumstances, though, the sample observed is non-random, i.e., affected by sampling bias. For instance, news media rarely display (intentionally or not) a balanced view of the state of the world, focusing particularly on dramatic and rare events. In this line, recent literature in Economics hints that people often fail to account for sample selection in...


Raúl López-Pérez and Eli Spiegelman

Abstract: A preference reversal (PR) refers to behavior that violates revealed preference or is simply incoherent – i.e., not explainable by a rational ordering. In a classical PR experiment, for instance, participants often exhibit greater risk aversion in a Choice-based revelation procedure than in an Evaluation-based one, i.e., choose the safer of two gambles but express a higher monetary valuation for the riskier. We conjecture that PRs are partly due to the interaction between attention and task mode, and explore three compatible explanations using eye-tracking techniques....