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**Governments, equality and education policy:
a tentative study of the French case**

María Fernández Mellizo-Soto

Unidad de Políticas Comparadas
**SPRITE (Grupo de Investigación sobre Políticas de Innovación,
Tecnología, Formación y Educación)**

CSIC

This paper tries to evaluate to what extent egalitarian education policy in France was determined by the colour of the party in government. The conclusion is rather clear: the colour of the party had an almost insignificant impact on egalitarian education policy in France.

Este trabajo trata de evaluar el grado en el que la política educativa en relación con la igualdad en Francia ha estado determinado por el signo ideológico del partido en el gobierno. La conclusión es clara: el signo ideológico del partido ha tenido una importancia casi insignificante en la política educativa igualitaria en Francia.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH

This paper analyses the French egalitarian education policy. It is framed within my Ph.D. thesis which explores the relationship between governments (specially social democratic ones) and egalitarian education policy, paying special attention to the Spanish and French cases [1]. This paper is an initial attempt to study the French case within the concerns of the thesis. It is based on research on the evolution of egalitarian education policy followed from 1981 to 1997 by governments in France.

The objective of the research is mainly descriptive. Nevertheless, the starting point is a null hypothesis: the political colour of the party in government has an impact on the design and on the outputs [2] of the egalitarian education policy followed in France. This implies that the partisan impact could be at the level of design, but not of the outputs; or to the contrary, the partisan impact could be at the level of outputs even with marginal changes in the design. Therefore, implementation of design is important [3]. More specifically, the hypothesis is the following: the socialist party in government designs, implements, and has outputs that differ from those of conservative parties in government. This implies two kind of questions: do parties of different colours differ in the egalitarian education policy designed, implemented, and the policy outputs that produce?, And which are the models of egalitarian education policy that socialist, and even conservatives, have? A more concrete definition of the dependent variable, egalitarian education policy, will be provided in Section Two.

The starting point for the comparison is the egalitarian education policy followed before 1981 by the successive conservative governments. From 1981 to

1993 the Socialist Party governed for 10 years, the whole period except for two years of conservative government (from 1986 to 1988). After 1993 there was again a conservative government. But the partisan impact may be mediated by other possible variables that we will briefly revise in the following paragraph.

First, the partisan preferences [4] of egalitarian education policy can change in a party over time. Second, the electoral support of parties, i.e. the party control of government, varied. In France, leaving aside the periods of *cohabitation*, the PS only had a majority government from 1981 to 1986; from 1981 to 1984 it governed with the *Parti Communiste* (PC) although it did not have to do so. From 1988 to 1993 the PS had a minority government. There were two periods of *cohabitation*, when the socialist president of the French Republic (François Mitterrand, from 1982 to 1995) shared power with a Prime Minister and a government composed of other party/ies; the first period lasted from 1986 to 1988, and the second from 1993 to 1995. Both governments were based on a coalition between the *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF), a centre party with a liberal tradition, and a right-wing party from the Gaullist tradition, the *Rassemblement Pour la République* (RPR). These changes in the electoral support of the parties in government may also have an impact on electoral competition. Organization of parties (ideological factions, for example) and the degree of cohesion around egalitarian education policy could be other mediating factor. Third, societal variables such as the pressure of teachers, parents, students, the Catholic Church, as well as the influence of public opinion. And fourth, other institutional and international variables that unfortunately will scarcely be taken into account in this research. There are two groups of institutional variables: political, such as decision making procedures, bureaucracies, and so on; and other variables more specific to the educational field, such as the degree of connection and coordination of governments with teacher and student unions, and even with parents' organizations, Catholic organizations, and even the Church itself, the treatment of educational matters by the Constitution, the legacy of the education system, as for example the degree of private education, the decentralization of education policy, and so on. The international variable is important for the constraints it may impose on national budgets and the pressures to have competitive national economies.

The study of education policy towards equality in the French case is important in itself because, though there is an extensive body of literature on education and equality, the analysis is almost exclusively from a sociological perspective, therefore it does not incorporate a political perspective as this paper does. Two of the classic authors in the field of the sociology of education are French: Bourdieu and Boudon. The former, Bourdieu, defends the cultural thesis, which explains the inequality of educational opportunities in terms of different cultures in different social classes [5]. The latter, Boudon, defends the thesis that the different perceptions of costs and benefits of education that different social classes have are the main cause of inequality of educational opportunities [6]. The debate between these two authors has been, and still is, very important, and its relevance is not only restricted to France.

The paper is structured in four Sections and the Conclusions. The second section will concentrate on the theoretical framework: mainly the definition of the dependent variable, egalitarian education policy, and finally the presentation of the two models (social democratic and conservative) of egalitarian education policy. The third section will present data for member countries of the European Union (including France). The fourth section analyses egalitarian education policy, mainly the design and its implementation, of the governments of different colours of the French history. And finally, the fifth section shows time series data of egalitarian education policy outputs for the relevant dimension and indicators.

1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The significance of the study of the relationship between governments, education policy and equality derives from a number of factors: First, the analysis of education policy has not received much attention from political scientists. Castles notices this in terms of quantitative cross-national analyses [Castles 1989:432] [7], though his argument is valid for all kinds of studies. The lack of studies of education policy is evident in the literature on social and economic policy. For example, Skocpol and Amenta [1986] in their review of states and social policies do not pay much attention to education policies. Moreover, when the latter are considered, they are always examined through such broad indicators as aggregate public expenditure or attendance rates. At the same time, some of these studies have drawn conclusions with regard to government commitment to equality. No attempt has been made to re-think education policies in a way which would allow the creation of indicators that might explain the questions examined in this kind of research [8].

Second, studies of social democracy have paid little, if any attention to education policy; they have been more interested in welfare (without education) policies. Esping-Andersen's and Van Kersbergen's [1992] review of contemporary research on social democracy does not even consider education policy or the relationship between social democracy and education policy. Very recently Boix [1994] has examined education policy, arguing that it is an important component of governments' supply-side economic policies, and a distinguishing factor between social democratic governments and conservative ones because of its potential effects on equality. But he uses only aggregate public expenditure to test this hypothesis, and as said before, this is a very rough measure of equality in education. Maravall [1995] reviews the impact of social democracy on education policy, but he too uses mainly aggregate public expenditure and broad measures such as attendance rates to measure it, though he does mention the need to consider policy design in detail. I agree, and this is what my research intends to pursue.

Third, if the relationship between education policy and social democracy (in general, government ideology) has scarcely been studied, this is particularly true in the case of Southern Europe; there is virtually no work on this question with regard to social democracy in these countries. The main effort in Southern Europe, where these fields are not very developed, has been with the welfare state [See: Esping-Andersen 1994; Castles 1994]. For this paper I have chosen the study of French education policy. So, this study could contribute to the literature on social democracy and Southern European social democracy in particular.

As Castles [1989] points out, the absence of studies on education policy may be due to the separation of education from other aspects of welfare. Education plays a role in fostering opportunities for social mobility (equality of opportunities), whilst other aspects of welfare, such as pensions, or health care, promote equality of condition. But for this reason in particular, education policy must be considered more carefully in the future.

Fourth, both sociologists and economists have paid much more attention to education policy than political scientists, though in different ways. In relation to the subject of this research the two disciplines have centred on the following. Sociology has focused on social stratification or social mobility studies [see for the most recent studies: Blossfeld and Shavit 1993; Müller and Karle 1993; Allmendinger 1989; König and Müller 1986; for a very good overview see: Kerckhoff 1995]. Economists have mainly studied financial issues, and occasionally their relationship with equity (equality of access) and other dimensions of equality related to public expenditure [see, for example, the studies about different financial systems at university level: Wilson 1996; San Segundo 1994; studies of expenditure on education, whether public

or private: San Segundo 1995; James 1993; studies about the redistributive impact of public expenditure on education: Bandrés 1990,1993; studies of equality of distribution of educational resources: Mingat and Tan 1985; Le Grand 1982]. Neither sociological nor economic studies have taken into account the relationship between education policy and governments, as political science is supposed to do, and as this research intends to. Nevertheless, a profound knowledge of these economic and sociological studies, as well as of the way their findings interrelate with each other, should certainly aid the definition of the dependent variable, egalitarian education policy, in terms which go beyond mere aggregate public spending.

1.2.1. Education policy and equality

The main dimensions, and their indicators, of the dependent variable of this research, egalitarian education policy, have been built taking into account two fields: on one hand, the study of the role of education policy in the stratification structure, and the study of the micro-theories of educational choice, both studied by sociologists; as well as, on the other hand, the contribution of the study of the economics of education to the analysis of education policy [9]. In general terms, the study of the role of education policy in the stratification structure as studied by sociologists has contributed to the development of the first dimension of egalitarian education policy: the organizational features of social selection. The economics of education has contributed to the improvement of the second main dimension: the financial aspects that facilitate access to educational resources (the micro-theories of educational choice as studied by sociologists have been important for understanding the student choices along the educational life and the constraints imposed on these choices; for these micro-theories see mainly Gambetta 1987) [10].

The dimensions and indicators of the egalitarian education policy are as follows [11]:

First dimension: organizational features of social selection. Indicators:

- **Comprehensivity (number of years; or in other words, at what age tracking begins)**
- **Tracking (in different schools, in the same schools or curricular differentiation in the same classrooms; extent of differentiation for future occupation in the labour market)**
- **Opportunities for second thoughts (in the school system: segmentation between tracks and/or points of union among them; and in life after school: adult education)**
- **Compensatory education (rural, minorities, and so on)**
- **Special education**
- **Examinations, admission and orientation procedures, or other mechanisms that affect the general survival pattern (at what age they apply), or indicators such as years of compulsory education and enrolment rates at different levels and tracks**

Second dimension: financial aspects that facilitate access to educational resources. Indicators:

- **Public expenditure on education by levels and programs (compensatory and special education, for instance, as well as the funding for different education tracks)**
- **Compatibility of education and work (above all in higher education)**

- Grants at post-compulsory non-university level
- Indirect assistance to students (accommodation, books, restaurants, transport, and so on) by level of education: targeted or universal
- Financial system for university level (widespread subsidized access, grants and/or loans: criteria for repayment mechanisms, aim of support: fees, living costs)
- Homogenization of resources across regions and schools
- Public-private sector of education by levels and tracks (extent of subsidies and homogenization of standards; social composition of both sectors).

There is another very important dimension. This is the cultural capital-social capital dimension [12]. The policies that influence this, in general what have been called equality policies, or welfare state policies (though most obviously for the objective of this research those targeted to families with children rather than, for instance, those for pensioners), are important in order to fully analyse policies aimed at the equality of educational opportunities (i.e., equality both of access to and in the education system) [13]. So, an attempt to contextualize education policy within global considerations about equality and welfare state policies that those considerations imply is important for the aims of this research [14].

This model of egalitarian education policy is derived from Rivière's and Rueda's [1993] attempt to classify educational programs aimed at each dimension of equality (of access, conditions and results), and from its critique and development. These authors include the following indicators or programs in each dimension of equality: in equality of access they include two kinds of programs, programs for the distribution of educational resources across regions, and programs for giving grants to individuals; equality of conditions contains the program of comprehensivity, that is, the number of years the students spend in a common track; finally, equality of results is achieved through three measures of positive discrimination as compensatory education, special education and adult education. Compensatory education is intended to compensate for social disadvantages in general, but it is aimed in particular at some specific "problems": disadvantaged geographical location (rural zones), cultural minorities, drop-outs from compulsory education, failure at school in general, and so on.

The critiques and developments made to this model are briefly the following [15]: First, it is interesting to know at what level of education the different programs apply. Second, more important than comprehensivity is tracking. Tracking is the opposite of comprehensivity, in other words it is the "degree of differentiation within given educational levels" [Allmendinger 1989:233] or within the education system in general; for example the division between general and vocational branches of education. For tracking it is not only important how many years there is a common core; apart from identifying "when" different tracks occur, it is also important to discern "how", i.e. if tracking occurs in different schools, in the same schools or if there is curricular differentiation in the same classrooms, the extent of differentiation for future occupation in the labour market, if there are opportunities for second thoughts, in the school system, through segmentation between tracks or points of union among them, and in life after school, as in adult education [16]. Third, besides tracking, there are a number of other measures of social selection in the organizational structure of the education system. These are also treated in the sociological literature mentioned above (see for instance Müller and Karle 1993). These are examinations and general admission procedures, or other kind of mechanisms that affect the general survival pattern depending on the point at which they are applied in an educational career. They are important because, like tracking,

social selection is greater at lower levels than at higher ones; if this kind of selection, by, for example, admission procedures, occurs early in the educational process, social selection will be higher, and viceversa. Some specific measures such as the duration of compulsory education and enrolment rates (at different levels) can account for this. Fourth, compensatory and special education are also included among the organizational features of social selection (adult education was previously included also). The reason for this is that although the separation of equality of conditions and equality of results may be valid, I think they are interrelated as a result of the organizational features of social selection of education policy. Fifth, economists, as noted before, have frequently examined financial matters. There are two financial aspects that are of importance for this research: issues relating to public expenditure on education, and the distinction and/or interrelation between private and public sectors in education. In terms of the first issue, and as stressed throughout the paper, general public expenditure on education is obviously not considered in itself to be a factor of egalitarian education policy. However, the breakdown of this public expenditure into levels and programs does matter. And it matters mainly because of the redistributive impact those levels have (usually university education has a lower redistributive impact than primary or even secondary education) [17]. In this respect, it is important to know how university education is financed: through public subsidies for widespread access, through grants and/or widespread loans, and so on (loans, repayment mechanisms, as well as the purpose of support, fees and/or living costs, must certainly be taken into account) [18]. And it is important also to know the indirect assistance to students (such as accommodation, books, restaurants, transport) by level of education and the form it takes: whether targeted or universal. The programs for the distribution (and homogenization) of educational resources across regions (as well as across schools), and the programs for giving grants to individuals (as developed by Rivière and Rueda in its equality of access) are other financial aspects that facilitate access to educational resources related to public expenditure. The compatibility of education and work, above all in higher education, could be another indicator of this dimension, because it can compensate the opportunity costs of education. The second aspect, the distinction between the public and private sectors in education is important if it implies some kind of differentiation of standards (if the private sector is of a higher quality than the public one) and access to private education is class biased [19]. When a private sector exists, measures may be taken to homogenize quality (ratio of student per teacher, admission practices, and so on) in both sectors; most frequently when public money goes to private schools (subsidies).

1.2.2. Governments, education policy and equality

As commented above, analyses of social democratic governments have paid little attention to education policy. When they have shown interest in this question, it has been at the level of aggregate public expenditure on education or other crude measures, such as enrolment rates. Maravall [1995:175], using data from the works of Castles [1982] and Stephens [1979], argues that social democratic governments (until the eighties) increased public expenditure on education [20]. He goes on to conclude that under social democratic governments "access to university education increased; the education system as a whole was democratized. In general, it seems that social democracy promoted the equality of opportunities in Western Europe and did not only understand equality in meritocratic terms, as education expanded beyond the requirements of efficient social selection and provided for disadvantaged collectivities". Maravall presents data for the eighties from Garrett and Lange [1991] and Garrett [1993] to conclude that although international economic competition pushed public expenditure down in every country, a distinctive feature of social

democratic governments was that they had higher social transfers and expenditure on civil consumption, including education. From this evidence, he concludes that social democracy tried to preserve "egalitarian principles" [Maravall 1995:183-184]. Boix [1994: 74-81] has recently presented further evidence in this respect. He argues that during the seventies government ideology, or partisanship, did not explain the evolution of public expenditure on education, but that, on the contrary, it did play a role during the eighties. On this evidence, backed up by reference to other supply-side economic policies, Boix claims that what differentiates left-wing governments from right-wing ones is their commitment to "equality": "Beyond preferences over prices and jobs, what distinguishes social democrats and conservatives is the extent to which they are concerned about equality" (p.307). This may be true for the other policies he studies, but this conclusion is not convincing for education. Public expenditure on education may be an indicator of a government's commitment to education, but it is by no means proof of a commitment towards equality in education.

Exploring the notion of equality (most explicitly, the idea of equality of opportunities that education refers to) as conceived by social democrats and conservatives, we may also identify some general characteristics of the two models of partisan preferences [21]. In a reflection on social democracy and equality, Maravall [1993:11-12] writes: "A meritocratic conception of equality of opportunities proves too narrow. The socialist view of equality of opportunities is a broader one: it is based on the assumption that everybody has the same right to personal development derived from the same human equality. (...). This conception of equality of opportunities does not overlook natural inequalities, it confronts the problem of differences in inherent capabilities, it does not take as given the rules of the game and its goals". Jonsson [1990:139] describes the motives of the reforms made by the social democrats in Sweden that began in the mid-fifties, under Olof Palme, as follows: "The most prominent equalization goals, relating to the individual, were: the possibility for every one to develop his/her inner capabilities (whether theoretical or practical), freedom of choice, e.g., the possibility to go into higher education irrespective of earlier choices, reducing certain handicaps by compensatory education, and, weakening of the dependence of educational attainment on socio-economic origin, regional background, and sex".

For Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón [1993:68-70], in a review of the conservative vision of equality, equality of opportunities is conceived in strictly meritocratic terms. He quotes the Napoleonic expression that conservatives defend: "*La carrière ouverte aux talents*", that implies that "every body must have the opportunity to reach the level his or her own capabilities allow" (p.70). So, in contrast to social democrats, conservatives do not try to compensate for natural inequalities, differences in inherent capabilities. This compensation can lead to "investment measures that penalize talented people, either by lowering general levels of general and vocational education, or by opting for the least gifted or advantaged, for the sole reason that they are so" (p.70).

In contrasting the dimensions and indicators developed for the egalitarian education policy with the different ideological views we can identify the following specific differences in their education policies:

First, social democrats, more than conservatives, design the organizational features of social selection in education policy with the following characteristics:

- tracks or branches at a later age in educational life,
- less differentiated tracks,
- more opportunities for second thoughts (in the education system or in after

schooling, through adult education),

- more compensatory education,
- more special education
- examinations and admission procedures, or other mechanisms that affect general survival pattern, at later ages, or indicators such as more years of compulsory education and higher enrolment rates at lower levels.

Second, social democrats, more than conservatives, design the financial aspects that allow for access to educational resources with the following characteristics:

- more public expenditure on compulsory, and even on non-compulsory secondary education (also in comparison to public expenditure on university education),
- more public expenditure on compensatory or special education, or in programs that lower social selection,
- compatibility of education and work allowed (above all in higher education),
- grants at post-compulsory education levels,
- indirect assistance to students on a targeted basis,
- grants and/or loans with flexible repayment conditions that cover opportunity costs of higher education,
- in case of the decentralization of education policy, mechanisms to homogenize resources across regions and schools.
- if a private sector exists, subsidies and homogenization of standards,

The starting point for the development of a social democratic egalitarian model of education policy seems to be "the same right to personal development derived from the same human equality" (in contrast to a conservative meritocratic model of education policy). I have argued throughout this paper that each educational level may imply different dimensions of equality, so it is important to break down the social democratic egalitarian model into levels. In this ideal model compulsory education can be rooted in the concept of citizenship that T.H. Marshall developed [22]. Having a determined level of education is conceived as a right-duty of every citizen. At the same time, as can be derived from Marshall statements, compulsory education has to be comprehensive, in order to avoid creating different kinds of citizenship (with different values attached). Different kinds of citizenship can also be derived from marked heterogeneity of educational standards by regions, schools or sectors (mainly with regard to public funding). Compensatory education has to apply at this level in order to assure that everybody reaches this compulsory level and to prevent students from dropping out before they complete compulsory education (failure at school). In post-compulsory education things become more blurred. Egalitarian arguments in favour of comprehensivity vanish the higher one goes up the educational ladder. There is another argument that applies to this post-compulsory (but not university) level; this is that too much comprehensivity increases drop-out rates from the educational system, with the social consequences associated with this. So some differentiation of branches can inhibit drop-outs from the educational system. Nevertheless, opportunities for second thoughts have to be guaranteed both in the education system and also after leaving it. In both post-compulsory non-university and university levels, a grants system (targeted on need), rather than universal publicly funded access, has to be the main financial tool. This has mainly been attempted at the university level, but empirically there is virtually no country that

has adopted this system. There is a "second best" optimum for social democrats, however; this consists of an egalitarian compulsory and post-compulsory system of education with correspondingly less social selection that leads to equality of access to university (assuring that the cost of opportunity, living costs, and so on, are covered in case of need at this later level). In this model public funding of university is not regressive, as university students come from different classes and not just from the higher ones. In this second scenario, and if it is necessary, compatibility of education and work has to be allowed in order to compensate for opportunity costs of studying.

2. FRENCH EGALITARIAN EDUCATION POLICY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The comparison of France with other countries, in this case the member countries of the European Union [23], is important in order to know with characteristics of French egalitarian policy are shared by the majority of countries, and which are peculiar to France or a subset of these countries that contains France.

For the organizational features of social selection the comparison is made from the lowest to highest level of education, containing a description of the main features and giving data whenever relevant. Table 1 shows the average duration of pre-school education and its theoretical duration for member states in 1992-93. In France children, attended pre-schools for 3.36 years on average, the highest average along with Belgium and Denmark. The United Kingdom and Greece had the lowest averages (around 1 year). If this is contrasted with the theoretical duration of pre-school education for every country we find some differences. In France the theoretical duration of pre-school education was 4 years, so its average duration was not very far from its theoretical duration. One of the most striking cases is Finland, that had a theoretical duration of pre-school education of 6 years and an average duration of 1.6 years. Sweden had the same theoretical duration of pre-school education as France, but its average duration was 2.5 years. These three countries (France, Finland and Sweden) had by far the highest theoretical duration. The lowest corresponds to the Netherlands (1 year), but its average duration (0.99) was higher than in other countries with higher theoretical durations; for instance Northern Ireland had an average of 0.39 years, when its theoretical duration was of 2 years.

Table 2 provides information about compulsory education (usually primary and lower secondary education) in every country in 1994 in order to know its length and the comprehensivity at this level, taking into account the age of initial assessment and guidance. It is comprised of: compulsory education, end of compulsory education and initial educational guidance. As regards compulsory education, countries differ in its duration. The maximum is Germany and North Ireland, with 12 years length (though in Germany it is from 6 to 18 years old and in North Ireland from 4 to 16 years old) [24]. The minimum is Italy and Spain pre-reform with 8 years length (from 6 to 14 years old) [25]. The earliest age for the beginning of compulsory education is 4 years old as in Northern Ireland or Luxembourg, and the latest is 7 years old, as in Denmark. The earliest age of finalising compulsory education is 14 years old, as in Spain pre-reform and in Italy, and the latest is 18 years old as in Germany (as before, in Belgium also, but from 15 years old has part-time education). France has average values: compulsory education from 6 to 16 years old, so 10 years length [26]. The forms of assessment at the end of compulsory education and the forms of initial educational guidance before or at the end of compulsory education are difficult to compare across member states because they differ greatly. The minimum age of initial guidance is 10 years old, as in Germany. In Luxembourg and Ireland it is 12 years old, and in the Netherlands 13 years old [27]. On the other hand, the maximum age of initial guidance is age 16 (in Denmark, though with optional guidance courses from the age of 14; in Spain post-reform; and in United Kingdom,

though with guidance courses between 14 and 16). In Spain post-reform and in Italy, the end of compulsory education coincides with the initial educational guidance age (in Denmark, Greece and United Kingdom it does too, but with the possibility to have guidance courses from an earlier age). In France this age is 14 years, again around the average, and as most other countries, before completing compulsory education. At the end of compulsory education there are countries, as for instance Denmark or Spain post-reform, where there are no general examinations and a school leaving certificate is given independently of the level attained by the pupil; and there are countries (the majority I should say) that by examinations and/or certificates differentiate between kind of students, as for instance Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg. France shows a considerable degree of tracking at the end of compulsory education, as in order to complete it, the last year has to be spent either in the traditional *lycée* or in a vocational *lycée*, and not in the *collège* (common for all) [28]. Table 3 shows a classification of countries of Europe depending of the organisation of its system of lower secondary education in 1993. The countries can be grouped in three categories: single continuous system, common core curriculum / common general education, and finally, differentiated branches or types of education. Within the first category, with the most comprehensive education systems, are the four Scandinavian countries. Within the last category, the least comprehensive education systems, are the countries of central Europe and Ireland. Within the second category, the not completely comprehensive education systems, are countries such as France, the other four Southern-European countries, the United Kingdom, and Iceland. Table 4 shows the forms of assessment in the member states by level of education in 1994. In France there is no final certificate or final examination in primary education, as in the majority of countries. The most extreme cases are Luxembourg and Northern Ireland, where there is a national examination in primary education for purposes of selection and guidance. For lower secondary education France has a final certificate with external examination. The assessment in lower secondary education in the rest of countries varies greatly. For upper secondary general education, France has a final certificate drawn up after external tests like the majority of countries [29]. Table 5 shows data for enrolment rates by age for member countries and for the year 1992. These data are interesting in order to know the general survival pattern in every country. The table can be divided into three parts: years from 2 to 7; years from 14 to 24; (years 22-25) and years 26-29. France has very high enrolment rates in comparative terms for years from 2 to 7. For 3 and 4 years old France had the highest enrolment rate of the member states, and for 2, 5, 6 and 7 years it was among the highest. For 2 years old it was only behind Belgium. There are some striking tendencies within these years among countries. The Scandinavian member countries, such as Sweden, Denmark or Finland, had very low enrolment rates in comparative terms for these years. For instance, whereas France and other countries had 100% enrolment rate or a figure near to this one at 5 years old, Finland had only 32% of the age group in education, Sweden 60.6%, and Denmark 61.1%. For the years from 14 to 24, France has enrolment rates more or less similar to the average of member countries. At 20 years old, less than the half of this age group was studying. The most striking facts for member countries are the following: the Scandinavian member states for these years do not behave in the same way; whereas Denmark and Finland have very high enrolment rates, the highest of member states (24.2% and 27% respectively for 24 years old), Sweden surprisingly has only 24.3% of 20 years olds studying. The most extreme case of reduction in number of students at these years is Great Britain. At 17 years old, little more of half (56.7%) of the age group is studying in this country. Greece also follows this pattern of a minority of students in higher ages; its enrolment rate at 17 years old was only 61.4%. Spain is also a perplexing country, because from 15 years old to 16 years old enrolment rates dropped from 91% to 75.6%; but then, from 20 to 24 years old this country is not among the countries with the lowest enrolment rates. The aggregation of enrolment

rates in two groups for the higher ages (22-25 and 26-29) only confirms the tendencies commented above. Denmark and Finland have the highest enrolment rates, France more or less the average, and United Kingdom and Greece the lowest. [Table 6](#) shows the data for general and vocational upper secondary education tracks in member states for 1992. With this table we can have an idea of the degree of tracking in every country. The EU average was 59.04% in vocational education and 40.96% in general education [\[30\]](#). But countries are very different in this dimension. France is little above the average for general education (44.72% in general education and 55.28% in vocational education). Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden have very high (above 70%) rates of vocational education. On the contrary, Ireland and Portugal show very high rates for general education (above 70%). Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal are the countries with more than half of the students at upper secondary education in the general track [\[31\]](#).

For the second dimension, the financial aspects that facilitate access to educational resources, comparative information and data on public expenditure, financial systems for university level as well as some indicators in order to know the importance of private education along the different countries of the European Union, are provided.

[Table 7](#) shows figures for public expenditure on education in member states in 1992. Public expenditure on education per pupil as a percentage of per capita GDP in France was well below the average of member countries; it only spends 31.1% of its GDP. France only surpasses Spain with 29.4% of its GDP. The countries with higher expenditure per pupil are United Kingdom (65.6%), Finland (59.7%), Ireland (56.9%), and the Netherlands (51.5%). [Table 8](#) breaks down previous figures by level of education. France spends more on secondary education than on other level; for instance, public expenditure on education per pupil as a percentage of per capita GDP was 29.3% for secondary education (followed by higher education with 23.7%, primary education with 15.5% and pre-primary education with 14%). Scandinavian member countries, above all Finland and Sweden score higher than all other member states in terms of public expenditure on education per pupil for every level (Denmark for pre-primary and primary education). Austria, contrary to Denmark, has higher percentages for secondary and higher education, and Italy only for secondary education. If we take into account that France was among the countries with far highest enrolment rates in pre-primary education, the conclusion at this level could be that France has much more pupils in pre-primary education than other countries but endow them with less public money (compare France that spends 14% of per capita GDP per pupil on pre-primary education with the Scandinavian countries, that spend an average of 38%).

[Table 9](#) shows data for the forms of revenue of higher education institutions in some of the member states, including France. In 1984 higher education institutions in this country received 89.5 % of their funds from public sources, 4.7 % from fees and 5.8 % from other sources. France is the country with the highest percentage of revenue of higher education institutions derived from public funds; the next country, Finland obtained 85% of revenue from public funds in 1987, and universities in United Kingdom in 1986-87, the lowest, with 55% of revenues from public funds. Nevertheless, the French figures for fees are not the lowest, as Germany did not get revenues from fees in 1986 and Finland obtained a minimum income from this source in 1986. The reason why this is so is that the percentage derived from other kinds of revenues is among the lowest in France, in comparison with Germany, for instance. In the mid-80s, in contrast, higher education institutions in Spain obtained 20% of their income from fees. [Table 10](#) shows the systems of financial assistance to students in higher education in France and in some member states. France shares with Greece and Portugal a system mainly consisting of subsidies and indirect assistance. Every

country differs in this respect. Compared to countries other than those of Southern Europe, France does poorly in terms of the other indicators of financial assistance to students. The percentage of this assistance of GDP is 0.08%, whereas in other countries it is at least above 0.1%, and United Kingdom spends 0.3% of its GDP on this kind of assistance. The maximum assistance per student is also low in comparison to other countries (2,009 dollars in France, as compared to the average of 4,000 in other countries in the table). The average assistance per student is low, with only 200 dollars, and the same occurs with the percentage of beneficiaries, only 18%, well below the countries other than the Southern European ones (except for Greece). The data on [Table 11](#) now refers to systems of grants at the higher level of education for member states and for the year 1993. In France there are tuition fees for students who go to university. The majority of member states also have tuition fees, except for Denmark, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg. France has a mix of grants and loans as the main form of financial support, as every member country has, except for Spain and the Flemish Community in Belgium, that only have grants. In France this support depends on the income of students, of parents, or of the spouse, depending on the case. This criterium is also applied in other countries, except for Denmark and the Netherlands (for the basic grant) where the percentage of all students receiving direct assistance is 100% or nearly 100% [\[32\]](#). In France direct assistance also depends on academic criteria, as in every member state with the exception of Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal. I have already commented on the percentage of students receiving direct assistance for the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark; except for these countries, in the rest the percentages are lower. In France it was only a +/- 18%, among the lowest (the lowest by far was Italy with 2.5% of students receiving direct assistance). In all countries, including France, the amount of direct assistance depends on income and/or place of residence. In France there are other social benefits such as exemptions from tuition fees in the public sector or tax allowances for travelling expenses. Every country has its own different social benefits of this kind, except for Denmark. Among the most popular are family allowances, tax allowances, and reductions in tuition. [Table 12](#) shows the existing student loan programmes in some member states. France has a repayment system, based on a mortgage loan, similar to the majority of countries (except for Sweden, that has an income contingent loan). For France, as for the other countries the purpose of support is living. But the main difference between France and the other countries is that the percentage of students with loans is only 1% in France, compared to 30% in Germany, or 44% in the United Kingdom. The average loan, as well as the year when the scheme began, differs in each country (unfortunately there is no data for France).

[Table 13](#) shows the enrolments in public and private education by level of education in member countries and for the year 1992. There are two kinds of indicators for this: the percentage of enrolments by institution and enrolments in private education as a percentage of total enrolments by level of education. The first indicator, the percentage of enrolments in public and private (grant-aided and non grant-aided) sectors, shows that France is among the countries with highest percentage of enrolments in public institution (Scandinavian countries are higher). On the contrary the Netherlands and Belgium have the least. With the second indicator, the enrolments in private education as a percentage of total enrolments by level of education, we can see for France a higher percentage of private education for secondary education (21%) than for primary education (15%) and for pre-primary education (12%). The member countries differed very significantly as regards this indicator. There are countries with very high proportions of private education for every level, such as Ireland (though there is no data for secondary education), the Netherlands, Belgium, and to a lesser extent Spain. There are countries with very low proportions of private education for every level, such as the Scandinavian member

countries: Finland, Sweden, Denmark, but not only them; the United Kingdom and Greece also had very low proportions. There are countries with remarkable differences between pre-primary education (very high proportions) and primary and secondary education (very low proportions) as is the case of Portugal, Italy and Austria. To conclude, [Table 14](#) shows data for the distribution of public expenditure by kind of institution and level of education in member states in 1992. The distribution of public expenditure by kind of institution is coherent with enrolments in public and private institutions. By level this distribution hardly varies. Higher education is the level at which public expenditure (in contrast to private expenditure) is highest (90.5%), in contrast to secondary education (82%). The other countries vary in this respect.

France presents a number of peculiarities that other member countries do not share, or at least the majority of them do not. Enrolment rates and the theoretical duration of pre-school education are very high in France, though public expenditure per pupil at this level is very low. In terms of compulsory education, France belongs to the set of countries with a medium degree of tracking; nevertheless, the final year of compulsory education has to be spent in different kinds of schools depending on the track: traditional (general and technological) and vocational. For upper secondary (not compulsory) education, the degree of tracking is lower than for lower secondary education. Public expenditure per pupil is very low. The revenues of higher education institutions principally consist of public funds, and to a much greater extent than in other countries, although fees are not among the lowest. Financial assistance to students is poor in comparison to other countries (except for the South European ones), as is evident in indicators such as the percentage of students with grants, the average assistance per student, and so on. The percentage of students with loans is also minimal. France is among the countries with the lowest percentage of enrolments in private institutions, and public expenditure by institutions (for private, grant-aided) is coherent with this indicator.

3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EGALITARIAN EDUCATION POLICY IN FRANCE

3.1. EDUCATION POLICY AND EQUALITY BEFORE 1981

When the *Parti Socialiste* arrived in power in 1981, the left had not been in power since the II World War. The IVth Republic and the “period of parties” in 1958 was followed by the Vth Republic. From this date until 1981, the President of the Republic was conservative, but the nature of the governments was not: they were mainly coalitions. This section will outline education policy towards equality within this long period; its relevance for this paper largely lies in the importance of the legacy left by these governments (as well as, if relevant, by earlier ones) to the governments of different colours in the eighties and nineties.

As regards the first dimension of education policy, organizational features of social selection, this period is very important [\[33\]](#). During this period France transformed its dual and selective system into a comprehensive-unified one [\[34\]](#). Its education system became “democratic” [\[35\]](#). The previous system was a dual one; one non-selective track (for the masses), and another selective track (for elites). There was early selection for entry into the elite sector [\[36\]](#). In the non-selective track, primary schooling covered more than elementary education [\[37\]](#). The *Certificat d'Études Primaires* (primary schooling certificate) was followed by the *Enseignement Primaire Supérieur* (higher primary schooling) in *Écoles Primaires Supérieures* (EPS) (senior primary schooling) or in *Cours Complémentaires* (complementary courses). In the selective track, children entered *lycées* for the elementary education and continued there in secondary education [\[38\]](#). From the age of six onwards, the more

affluent classes sent their children to the *lycées*, while the children of working classes attended primary schools. The move from primary schools to *lycées* was possible, but normally took place at the age of eleven, or not at all. Children of humble social origin usually stayed in elementary schools for the higher primary certificate, or transferred to short-cycle vocational programs (complementary courses). Secondary education overlapped and competed with the primary schools. The teacher of primary education had the last word with respect to working class children trying to go on (if they were successful in the exam) to secondary education (*lycées*) or continuing in primary schools [39].

After 1958 onwards [40], the first fundamental reform was in 1959, the first of a number of reforms in the structure of the education system. This reform, the so-called Debré-Berthoin Law, attempted to create a common core and an observation cycle (trying to unify primary schools and *lycées*, though keeping them as separated establishments). Two decrees after the 1959 Law created a two-year observation cycle in the 6th and 5th grades [41], paving the way for a gradual extension of the school-leaving age to 16 (rather than 14). Within this observation period, the differentiation between “classical” and “modern” tracks was introduced almost from the beginning (the second semester of the first year). Moreover, the observation cycle took place in the same establishments as the “common core”, either in primary education, secondary education or in the complementary courses, renamed *Collèges d’Enseignement Général (CEG)* (colleges of general education). The exam for transition from the primary school to the *lycée* was abolished. In 1963, with the Fourchet reform, a comprehensive lower secondary school was created, putting back the moment of decisive orientations for two years. Between the observation cycle and the decisive threshold in the 2nd grade (first year of upper secondary education at age 16), the 4th and 3rd grades constituted an “orientation cycle”. These two cycles took place alongside each other in autonomous establishments, though there was a difference between the *CEGs*, assigned to primary education, and the new *Collèges d’Enseignement Secondaire, CES* (colleges of secondary education), that formed part of secondary education. The *CES* had four parallel streams: classical, long modern, short modern, and another for students with difficulties. The *CEG* had only the last three branches.

The definitive unification at lower levels of education took place with the Haby Law in 1975, the completion of a unifying process from 1963, that largely abolished tracking by ability in the *collège*, at least in law if not always in practice. From 1963 to 1975 the students were progressively separated by ages, and not as previously by classes; primary education in *écoles élémentaires*, lower secondary education in *CEGs* and *CESs*, gradually more similar, and upper secondary education in *lycées*. The law unified the *CEGs* and the *CESs*, abolished all distinctions between them, and converted both into simple *collèges* (for lower secondary education). The technical *baccalauréat* was created in 1971 [García Garrido 1993:238].

As regards higher education, the *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUT)* were created in 1966, these were vocational short courses included in universities, though of a selective nature, in competition with other non-selective university long studies [García Garrido 1993:238].

For the second dimension, the financial aspects that facilitate access to educational resources, this period is specially significant as the relationship between public and private sectors of education is profoundly reshaped. The characteristics of the private sector of education and its relationship with the public sector were defined in this period through a number of laws and measures [42]. At the end of the IVth Republic in the fifties, the private sector of education was in crisis, mainly due to the lack of teachers from the religious orders (the majority of private schools were religious) and the increased costs that these schools faced in paying the salaries of

secular teachers [43]. The first and most important law affecting this field came in 1959, the Debré Law. This law gave private establishments the possibility of joining the public sector. This meant specifically two kinds of contracts: the contract of association (*le contrat d'association*) and the simple contract (*le contrat simple*). The difference between the two was related to the degree of subsidies (more in the first type) and the extent of regulation of education (again greater in the first type). In associated schools the teachers were under the direct control of the state and the schools had to meet a “recognized educational need”. With both types of contracts, parents had to pay a school fee, which was higher in the case of schools under simple contracts than in schools under association contracts, where, moreover, there was a limit imposed by the state. The second type of contract was intended to disappear gradually. Nevertheless, in 1971, under the presidency of Pompidou, the simple contract was allowed to continue and even promoted. The culmination of this process came in 1977 with the Guermeur Law, that loosened state control of contract schools and enhanced funding to these schools [44].

3.2. THE FIRST SOCIALIST PERIOD

The Socialist Party won power in 1981. Though they had been allied with communists during the election campaign, they won a majority of votes. The Socialist party enjoyed full control of both the executive and legislative branches of government; nevertheless, from 1981 to 1984 it governed with the *Parti Communiste* (PC), although it did not have to do so. The objectives of the PS for education in 1977 defined its first goal as “the fight against social and educational inequalities” [Savary 1985:11].

As regards the structural dimension [45], one of the first egalitarian measures the government took was to launch a compensatory education program that provided extra resources to disadvantaged areas with special necessities *Zones d'Éducation Prioritaire*, *ZEPs* (education priority areas). This was almost the only egalitarian reform that was successfully implemented by the first Minister of Education, Alain Savary. Apart from the most obvious defeat of the measures with respect to private education that this Minister suffered, which will be commented below, the Savary proposal for the reform of higher education in 1983 was another story of failure. This reform contained measures trying to unify higher education, emphasizing the assimilation of elitist branches such as the *Cours Préparatoires aux Grandes Écoles* (*CPGE*) and *grandes écoles* into the university structure, as well as revitalizing continuing and professional education. These measures, specially the former were dropped from the final law. This impasse of the reform of the organization of the French education system was clearly against Savary's will. Some reports highlight the fact that there were some organisational features of the education system that he wanted to change [García Garrido 1993:240-241]. In early 1983, the Legrand report “*Pour un collège démocratique*” (for a democratic lower secondary school) pointed to the need to unify further the educational system [46]. In late 1983, the Prost report “*The lycées and their study at the threshold of the XXI century*” pointed to the need to improve the education for every body [47]. But these reforms were not implemented [48]. In 1985 the Carraz Law created the professional *bac* (*bac professionnel*), which was further defined in a decree in 1986 [see Conseil de l'Europe 1988:68-70]. The second Minister of Education, Jean-Pierre Chèvenement, after the defeat of his predecessor in 1985, took a different approach. He did not continue with the measures that Savary had tried but failed to implement, and he even ignored the compensatory policy to the *ZEPs*. But he started to phase out the short-cycle vocational programs right from the beginning, and launched the slogan of the “80% age group at the level of *bac*”. This slogan was just an expansionist target, which was not very significant in itself for equality goals. He started revamping many technical

secondary school programs and creating a host of new professionally-oriented programs within the universities [Ambler 1995/96?:222] [49].

As regards the financial dimension of equality in French education policy, this socialist period is very interesting, above all for the relationship between the state and private education and the configuration of the public-private system of education in France [50]. When the socialists came to power, Savary, the Minister of Education, had the task of integrating the private sector of education inside the public sector. Historically the PS adhered to the secular premise “*à l’école publique, fonds publics; à l’école privée, fonds privés*” (public funds for public schools, private funds for private schools) [Savary 1985:12]. The objectives for the PS in education policy in 1977 contained the following aim: “the creation of a public, single, and secular service of national education gradually integrating through negotiation subsidised private schools” [Savary 1985:11]. As Savary himself declared, this proposition, as well as the rest, “were not prepared and written by the education delegation inside the Socialist Party, but by the team in charge of writing the presidential campaign, people characterised by an encyclopaedic view without being informed of educational problems” [Savary 1985:14]. During the presidential campaign in 1981 the opposition of Mitterrand diffused among the private schools the fear that if he won he would cut subsidies to private schools and close them. In a letter during the campaign Mitterrand reaffirmed the principle of creating a public, single, and secular service of national education, and stated clearly that this was going to be gradually adopted and as a result of negotiation (“through persuasion and not compulsion”), with guarantees for private schools [Savary 1985:15-16]. So Savary, a skilled diplomat of the socialist party, was in charge of persuading and not compelling. He spent two years talking, listening and, negotiating with different groups of the educational spectrum, above all with private and religious education groups. Savary presented five proposals as the basis for negotiation [Ambler 1985a:130-131]: first, lay teachers from subsidized private schools would be incorporated into the civil service, along with public schools teachers, but the clergy would continue to teach under contract; second, these private schools would be incorporated in the *carte scolaire*, an overall plan for the creation and location of schools; third, these *établissements d’intérêt public* (establishments of public interest) would be run by administrative councils representing the state and local government, as well as the sponsoring association, which would continue to own the buildings; fourth, families would be allowed to choose freely from all schools in the area, subject to review by a committee of school principals, teachers and parents; and fifth, each school (or set of schools) would be allowed to select a particular focus, spiritual, cultural, or athletic [51]. After the negotiations, in the project prepared for the Savary Bill there were some concessions to the private schools, or at least the radical sector of education that was pro “private funds to private schools and public funds to public schools” perceived it in this way. For this reason, the National Assembly added tough amendments to the bill. Savary warned that these amendments could destroy any chance of compromise with Catholic education groups. In 1984, after demonstrations in favour of private schools, François Mitterrand withdrew the amended Savary bill. After this defeat Savary left the ministry and was replaced by Jean-Pierre Chèvenement [52]. He was instructed to “restore peace” [Ambler 1995/96?:215], which meant abandoning almost every measure that Savary’s project had contained. Public opinion studies revealed a majority in favour of subsidized private schools, often even among the socialist electorate. The political costs of incorporating subsidized private schools into the public system were too great to continue with the old socialist and secular promise that most members of socialist party and their militants had supported [53].

3.3. TWO YEARS OF CONSERVATIVE COALITION IN GOVERNMENT: 1986-1988

In March 1986 a coalition between the *Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF)*, a centre party with a liberal tradition, and a right-wing party from the gaullist tradition, the *Rassemblement pour la République (RPR)*, won power (Jacques Chirac being the Prime Minister). The President of the Republic was still a Socialist, François Mitterrand. It was a period of “cohabitation”. The Minister of Education in this period was René Monory.

Right at the very beginning of his mandate, Chirac confirmed the target of achieving 80% of the age group at the level of *baccalauréat* announced at the end of the previous Socialist government [Conseil de L’Europe 1988:77-78]. The Minister of Education, Monory, lowered this target in his “Plan for the national education” to 74% of the age group at the level of *baccalauréat* by the year 2,000 [García Garrido 1993:241; Ambler 1995/96?:201]. So, this government was also in favour of expansionist measures in education as socialist government had been. As regards more specific egalitarian measures in education, the ideas of this government can best be exemplified by the following quote from Michèle Aliot-Marie, secretary of state in the Ministry of Education in this period: “...our present system is very egalitarian. It levels and excludes, in some way, those who are failing and those who should be progressing faster” [54]. René Monory, like his socialist predecessor, Chèvenement, ignored compensatory education (the programs aimed at ZEPs) [Ambler 1995/96?:218]. This period was not very fruitful in specific measures in education; one of these was the Devaquet Bill, in 1986, which took its name from Alain Devaquet, delegated Minister of research and higher education. The Devaquet Bill allowed individual universities to set admissions requirement beyond the *bac*, which gave them a very powerful instrument to choose their own students [Ambler 1995/96?:219; Coseil de L’Europe 1988:82]. This law was followed by student protests because, in what corresponds to this structural dimension, at the same time as it allowed universities to choose their students, the diplomas of different universities were allowed to be different. In this sense students considered that the introduction of degrees that would differentiate the better students trained at the more prestigious campuses from other students would be unfair [Zirakzadeh 1989:228-230]. After these protests the Bill was withdrawn in late 1986.

Among the first objectives the government of Chirac had for education policy was the issue of the relationship between the public and private sectors of education, the relationship between the state and private education. There are three specific points: the equal treatment of private and public schools, freedom of choice in education for families, and fiscal deductions for private universities [Conseil de L’Europe 1988:77-78 and 82]. Apart from the third, the first two measures are rather vague. Nevertheless, these measures were not transformed into legal action. There was a consensus among the political elite that continued reform of higher education was needed for reasons of economic development. The Devaquet Bill previously commented on in terms of its structural dimension also contained financial reforms, establishing a moderate increase in university tuition and supplementary fees [55]. Some students feared that the rise would impose an unbearable financial burden on working-class and low-income families; in short, that the principle of free and equal access to education (higher education) would be violated. As commented above, the Devaquet Bill led to demonstrations by students, who saw how the economy was in crisis and youth unemployment had grown from the 13% in 1979 to 39% in 1986 [Zirakzadeh 1989:228-230].

3.4. THE SECOND SOCIALIST PERIOD: 1988-1993

After the very short period of centre-right coalition government, the 1988 elections gave power again to the Socialist party, but in this case it had a minority

government. Rocard replaced Chirac as Prime Minister. Lionel Jospin was the Minister of Education in this new era of socialism in France, and was only replaced in 1992 by Jack Lang. The Socialist Party organized several meetings about the education situation during its period in opposition. One of these meetings took place at the Sorbonne in May 1987, with the title “*L’avenir des lycées et de l’enseignement supérieur*” (The future of upper secondary and higher education). The future Minister of Education in 1988, who closed the debate, highlighted the classical egalitarian principles that might guide education policy, though in very vague terms. He emphasized some specific measures such as the diversification of “*formes de l’excellence*” in secondary and higher education (diversification of good quality secondary and higher education) but put great emphasis on allowing the reversal of past decisions. One example of this was to encourage links between universities and *grandes écoles* by establishing “footbridges” between them, through third cycles or research centres in common [Jospin 1987:3-6]. Jospin was in favour, as he declared in other places, of more systematic selection as the only way to decrease failure rates and to improve the prestige of universities [Ambler 1995/96?:219-220].

Right after taking office in the Ministry of Education, Jospin launched a package of measures for urgent action. In first place was the following aim: “taking into account differences in order to promote equality of opportunities” [Conseil de L’Europe 1988:109-111; García Garrido 1993:242-244]. This general aim was followed by some specific actions. The actions towards the organisation of the education system were the following. The main measure in this field taken by the Socialist was the 1989 Law, “*La Loi d’Orientation sur L’Education*” (Law for orientation in education). The law contained egalitarian aims, but it was rather disappointing in terms of its concrete measures, with no organisational changes of much significance with respect to equality. Surprisingly, the emphasis was once again placed on an expansionist target: 100% of students of an age group should leave the education system with at least a secondary education certificate, at least the *CAP (Certificat d’Aptitud professionnelle)*, a vocational aptitude certificate, or the *BEP (Brevet d’Études Professionnelles)*, a vocational studies diploma; 80% of the students should study the *bac*; the guarantee of a school place for children aged three and over [56]. This law also contemplated the creation of *IUP, Instituts Universitaires Professionnalisés* (Professionalized University Institutes) [OCDE 1996?:; García Garrido 1993: 242-244; Ambler 1995/96?:201].

The financial aspects of equality in education are not so central to the education policy in the second Socialist period as they were in the first Socialist period. Above all the debate around private education and the state in France was much less intense in comparison to the early eighties. Anyhow, there are some measures of what the Socialist did within this period from 1988 to 1993. I turn to this dimension now.

The 1989 Law also referred to subsidized private education, which progressively became more similar to public education [OCDE 1996:?.]. In 1990, with Jospin as Minister of Education, there were demonstrations of students in France against the education policy of the government; specifically the demonstrations were to demand more funds for staff and to maintain overloaded secondary schools [Ambler 1995/96?:206; García Garrido 1993:242-244]. In 1991, still under Jospin, there was a project called “*Universités 2000*” (Universities 2000) that included the intention to build 7 universities, 20 *IUTs* and the new *IUPs* introduced in the French university system in 1989 with the orientation law [García Garrido 1993:243]. But students demonstrations were very intense and Jospin was replaced by Lang in 1992. In 1992 Jack Lang reached an agreement with the Catholic education sector over outstanding disagreements on financing [Ambler 1995/96?:215] [57].

3.5. THE SECOND CONSERVATIVE PERIOD: FROM 1993 TO 1997

In the 1993 elections the same kind of conservative coalition as in 1986 won power again. It was the second period of coexistence in the eighties and nineties with a socialist President of the Republic, François Mitterrand. At the beginning of this period François Bayrou was appointed Minister of Education.

François Bayrou declared in 1993 that “standards can be maintained, and students properly taught, only with traditional teaching methods and through placement of children in appropriate tracks, from the middle school onward”. He continued : “The *collège unique* (...) [the common school] was in fact the *collège inique* -the iniquitous or unjust college, for it failed to distinguish pupils according to ability” [Ambler 1995/96?:218]. In 1993 the government enacted a “*Loi quinquennale sur l’emploi, le travail et la formation professionnelle*” (Law for employment, the work and the vocational education). This law regulated the right of every student to some kind of vocational education before leaving the education system [OCDE 1996: ?]. In 1993, just when the new government came to power, the expansionist target (of 75% or 80% of the age group at the level of the *baccalauréat*) held by every government since the final years of first Socialist government (with Chèvenement) was taken as given, not discussed, and maintained [Ambler 1995/96?:201]. In 1995 after the demonstrations against the government proposal to limit the number of students in *IUTs*, this kind of measure was withdrawn [Ambler 1995/96?:206].

As regards the financial dimension of equality in education, the most remarkable event was the government’s bill in 1993-94 that *de facto* repealed the ancient Falloux Law (which restricted local government funding of private school construction), since it relaxed the restrictions on this. The left reacted to this measure and the bill was sent to the Constitutional Council and at the beginning of 1994 the Council declared this law unconstitutional [Ambler 1995/96?:215,221] [58].

The model of partisan preferences of egalitarian education policy is not confirmed in the light of the evidence presented in this section, at least in terms of the historical development of laws, programs and measures by governments of the two colours. Since this research places special attention to social democratic parties, from the experience of the French Socialist Party we cannot confirm the model of social democratic preferences of egalitarian education policy. In the long period of the IVth Republic, a high degree of tracking in the education system was abolished. This period saw the introduction of the most important measures towards the comprehensivity of the French education system. The President of the Republic was always a conservative, though the governments were coalitions. The Debré law, that tied subsidies to private schools to state control of schools, was also introduced in this period. Nevertheless, it is true that other measures towards private schools were more coherent with the model proposed. We can make two important remarks with respect to the first socialist period: first, in Mauroy’s government there are problems not of design but of implementation of the egalitarian education policy designed by Savary, except for compensatory education; and second, in Fabius’s government there is a change in preferences in almost every point [59]. One of the most clear changes in the design of the organization of the education system was the substitution of concrete measures to diminish social selection as Savary intended, by the expansionist goal Chèvenement launched when he substituted Savary. This change in preferences was not complete, and the implementation of (more timid) measures was sometimes more effective. Chèvenement made the education levels up to the level of *bac* more comprehensive through a variety of measures. In any event, the preferences of socialists, both before and after their change, about tracking are not clear; Chèvenement introduced more tracking in higher education, whilst in complete contrast Savary introduced tracking at the level of *baccalauréat* (for example, the creation of the vocational track of the *bac* was in 1985). As regards the

public-private issue, the change of preferences is evident. Again, initial government preferences are coherent with the model (taking public funds to private schools as given, subsidies imply a state control of private schools). Implementation of the state control of private schools failed and under the second government there is a change of strategy. The Chirac government did not substantially change the egalitarian education policy of socialists; the main lines were continued (for instance the target of the 80% of the age group at the level of *baccalauréat*). This is perhaps not very surprising given that this was a period of coexistence with a socialist President. Nevertheless, there are some aspects of the design of this conservative government that differed from the previous socialist period, and some of these are coherent with our model of partisan preferences, though as before, they met problems of implementation: the failure to give fiscal deductions to private universities, or to increase fees in universities (this last measure could be coherent with the model of conservative preferences of egalitarian education policy as nothing is said about a parallel increase in grants). The second period of socialism studied again does not confirm our model of socialist preferences. The socialist government continued with what the conservative government had done (again the expansionist target for *baccalauréat* is adopted). In any event, the electoral support of the socialist government from 1988 to 1993 was weak, it had a minority government. Some measures of this government were, nevertheless, different: it introduced more tracking at the higher level of education (against our hypothesis of partisan preferences); and, private education was increasingly more similar to public education through this period (coherent with our hypothesis). And finally, the last conservative government also continued the previous line (above all the expansionist targets). The changes it introduced were merely marginal, as they have been in previous periods, and they ended as implementation failures. These consisted of the attempt to limit students in the selective vocational track of higher education and to increase public subsidies to private schools (both in accordance with our hypothesis).

4. QUANTITATIVE FIGURES OF EGALITARIAN EDUCATION POLICY IN FRANCE

The egalitarian dimensions and indicators of education policy that have been developed through the paper, are presented now as time series data with the aim of finding possible tendencies of egalitarian education policy outputs in France and, whenever possible, making comparisons between ideological periods.

For the first dimension, the organizational features of social selection, some indicators of tracking in secondary and higher education are presented. Data for secondary education and for the years from 1960 to 1994 is in [Table 15](#). In upper secondary education and *baccalauréat* the students are divided into two tracks: general and technical on one hand, and vocational on the other. The first one is selective and prestigious, unlike the second one. In upper secondary education the percentage of students in the prestigious track increased steadily, and that of the students in the non prestigious, vocational, track decreased constantly throughout the whole period. Between 1985 and 1988 the increase was greater than in other periods (60% of the students in upper secondary education were in the prestigious track in 1985, whereas this figure increased to 67% in 1988). In complete contrast, at the level of the *baccalauréat* the vocational track increased its share steadily (mainly from 1990, or even 1988, to 1995; it increased from 2% of total number of students in the *bac* in 1988 to 15% in 1995). There are two facts that show the general survival pattern in the French education system: first, the lower the level of education, the narrower the difference between tracks; second, the higher the level of education, the lower the number of students. The *bac* is a powerful filter to select students.

[Table 16](#) shows the tracks in higher education. There are four main tracks in

higher education: university (excluding *IUT*) of a non-selective character, *IUT* (university short vocationally oriented courses of a selective character), *STS* (non-university short vocationally oriented courses in *lycées* of a non-selective character), *CPGE* (preparation classes for *Grandes Écoles* in *lycées*), and *Grandes Écoles* (a highly selective and prestigious non-university sector). University is by far the track with the highest percentage of students, followed by the track of *grandes écoles*. The percentage of students in university (without *IUT*) increased considerably from 1960 to 1970 (from 69% of total students in higher education in 1960 to 75% in 1970). From 1970 to 1993 this percentage decreased continuously, from 75% in 1970 to 63% in 1995. The other non-prestigious track, *STS*, experienced the opposite tendency, as the percentage of students in this track increased constantly throughout the whole period (except for the last year), rising from 2% in 1960 to 11% in 1993. The percentage of students in *CPGE* decreased from 1960 to 1980 (from 7% to 3%) and then remained around this figure with ups and downs. The percentage of students in *IUT* experienced little variation; there was a tiny increase from 1970 to 1986 (from 3% to 5%), and also a tiny decrease from 1986 to 1993 (from 5% to 4%). The percentage of students in *grandes écoles* varied during the course of the period. It experienced a general decrease (from 21% of students in higher education in 1960 to 18% in 1993). So, while the percentage of students in every track decreased throughout the period, that in the *STS* track, the vocational non-prestigious education, increased.

So, as regards tracking the model of partisan preferences that has been developed in the theoretical framework appears to be of dubious validity, as the socialists in France have not clearly reduced tracking, and when they have done it, as in upper secondary education, previous and following conservative governments did the same. This expansion of vocational tracks, such as the vocational *bac* or the vocational non-prestigious track in higher education may respond to the “diversification of ways of excellence”, but concrete measures to increase the prestige of vocational tracks and concrete measures to form footbridges between the different tracks have been notable only for their absence.

In terms of the second dimension, the financial aspects that facilitate access to educational resources, some indicators of grants and social assistance for higher education, of the distribution of resources across regions in France, and of the relative weight of public and private sectors in the French education system through time, will be provided. Some data for grants as contained in the volume *Géographie de l'École* edited by the French Ministry of Education. The percentage of students receiving grants fell after 1970; in 1970 they accounted for 40% of students, in 1980 for 28% of students, and in 1990 for 27% of students. This percentage for 1990 varied in accordance with the level: 1 student out of 4 in secondary education and 1 student out of 7 in higher education; in accordance with the track (in secondary education): 37% in vocational second cycle, 25% in technological second cycle and only 17% in general second cycle. This figure also varied in accordance with the kind of institution: 30% in the public institutions and only 16% in private institutions and in accordance with the programme: more than 50% in special education. [Table 17](#) shows the percentage of students receiving a grant based on social criteria by type of grant [\[60\]](#). The percentage of people in the highest types of grants (the most needy) is always bigger than the other categories (see mainly type 9). Between 1975 and 1980, and even 1981, the percentage of students with grants in higher types (less wealthy students) increased whereas that of students in lower types decreased. The system was more progressive in 1980 than in 1975. From that date the picture changed completely; students in higher types decrease and students in lower and middle types increase. In 1987 the system was more regressive than in 1980, and similar to 1975. [Table 18](#) shows the percentage of students with grants in higher education by track from 1981 to 1987. The percentage of students with a grant in universities is throughout the period always inferior to the percentage in *IUT* or in *STS* (the

percentage in *IUT* always being superior to the percentage in *STS*). From 1981-82 to 1985-86 the percentage of students with grants in universities (*IUT* included) rose by 1.9 points, and the percentage of students with grants in *IUT* and *STS* diminished, by 2.5 and 0.8 points respectively. So the increase in the universities would be greater if students from *IUTs* are excluded. From 1985-86 to 1987-88 the previous trend for *IUT* and *STS* changed, as the percentage of students with grant in these tracks increased, though more for *STS* than for *IUT*. In 1987-88 the percentage in both tracks is similar (31.7% for the selective and 30% for the non-selective), whereas in 1985-86 the former was higher than the latter (30,9% and 24.2%). The percentage in university continued its upward tendency.

Table 19 shows the funds devoted to social assistance to students in higher education. Social assistance can be divided into two components: first, direct assistance, that is, grants and assistance for studying, and second, indirect assistance, mainly comprising university preventive medicine, university buildings, accommodation (*Cité Internationale Universitaire de Paris*), and social security for students. Social assistance was mainly created under the *Front Populaire* [61]. From 1975 to 1981, the percentage of direct assistance (the progressive component of social assistance, in contrast to indirect assistance) decreased from 49% of total assistance in 1975 to 42% in 1981. From 1981 to 1989 the picture changed completely, as the percentage of direct assistance increased (from 42% in 1981 to 71% in 1989).

Therefore, again we cannot conclude that the hypothesis of partisan preferences is confirmed. The percentage of students receiving grants diminished from 1980 to 1990, after seven years of socialist government (it is also true that it diminished less than in the period of conservative governments between 1970 and 1980). During the first socialist period the system of grants became gradually more regressive (and the following conservative government continued this tendency). Grants during this first socialist period were not given to prestigious tracks. And finally, although during the socialist period (specially the first period) direct assistance increased more than indirect assistance (the system of social assistance is more progressive), the same tendency was followed by the Chirac government.

The data presented now refers to the homogeneity of educational resources across regions. **Table 20** shows the proportion of students in secondary education by track in different regions in France in 1992/93. As regards this indicator, 44% of students were in general education in France. But if this figure is disaggregated by regions we find differences. The lowest was in non-continental France, where this figure was only 36% in general education. But within continental France there were also differences. The most evident were, in general terms, between the North (where the percentage of general education was lower, around 42%; in *Nord-Pas-De-Calais* it was 40%) and the South (where this percentage was higher, around 46.5%; in the *Méditerranée* it was 48%). The exception in the North was the *Île de France* with a percentage of students in general education of 50% (but the *Bassin Parisien* had 42%). In the volume *Géographie de l'École* we can also find the following data (or tendencies) of interest for this paper. Though the percentage of students from 15 to 24 years old increased in every French region between 1968 and 1990, the differences, mainly between the North [62] and South of France, were persistent (even if there were larger populations under 25 years old in the North than in the South), as for example is obvious if we compare enrolment rates at 18 years old through regions [*Géographie de l'École* ?:20-21]. As regards the expenditure on education per inhabitant under 25 years old in 1990 by the *MENC (Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Culture)* there were also great differences between the North, where it was lower, and the South, where it was higher [*Géographie de l'École* ?:24-25]. The average number of students per class depended on the level and track of education. From 1980 to 1991 this average increased for the *collège* and the

lycée général et technologique (but was more equal across regions) and decreased for the *lycée professionnel* (but regions were less equal than before). The percentage of classes with many students (depending on the level) was higher for the North than for the South for primary and lower secondary education [*Géographie de l'École*?:32-35]. The percentage of students receiving grants varied across regions, the North benefitting greatly from grants in comparison with the South [*Géographie de l'École*?:36-37]. Compensatory education, reflected in the ZEPs, was also targeted towards the most needy regions; more in the North than in the South, but in general they also varied in accordance with the level and track of education: 12% for primary education, 15% for lower secondary education, 9% for vocational upper secondary education, and 2% for general and technical upper secondary education [*Géographie de l'École*?:38-39]. Access to the *bac* increased in every region between 1975 and 1991, and a very strong effort was made for the regions in the North, where disadvantages relating to this indicators persisted but were less acute than 15 years earlier [*Géographie de l'École*?:46-47]. The percentage of students in special schools decreased from 1980-81 to 1991-92, but was still different by regions (there was a tiny increase in differences between the North, more students in these schools, and the South, less students in these schools) [*Géographie de l'École*?:58-59]. The proportion of foreign students in primary education increased from 9.2% to 9.4% between 1980 and 1991; the same figure for secondary education was 5.7% in 1980 and 7.3% in 1991. The inequalities, mainly between the East (the lowest proportion) and the West (the highest proportion) diminished between these two dates [*Géographie de l'École*?:60-61]. The proportion of students in private education in 1991-92 was higher in the South-West than in the North-East, for primary education and secondary education. The private effort in 20 years has been notable for the North-East [*Géographie de l'École*?:62-63]. The entrants in higher education were more numerous in 1990 than in 1982 in France, and differences between the South-West (higher) and North-East (lower) have been diminished [*Géographie de l'École*?:66-67].

So, although after the two socialist periods there are still regional inequalities, mainly between the North and South of France, in some educational indicators, inequalities have diminished in general terms from 1980 to 1990 (though not every indicator; and not only “outcomes”, “outputs” such as differences in expenditure on education of the *MENC* and indicators of the quality of education such as the average number of pupils per class are persistent).

Finally some indicators for the public-private sectors of education are presented. [Table 21](#) reveals that, except for higher education, the higher the level of education, the more important the role of private education. In 1985 the percentage of private education was 13% for pre-primary education, 15% for primary education, and 24% for secondary education (for higher education was 11%). For all levels of education the percentage of private education was 18%. These figures did not change between 1985 and 1992, except for higher education, for which it slightly increased, and pre-primary education, that also decreased smoothly. Finally, [Table 22](#) shows the enrolments in different tracks in the second cycle of secondary education by type of institution. The table shows that the percentage of private education is higher for vocational education than for general and technical education. This is more obvious between 1960 and 1980, after 1980 the percentage of private education in both tracks was similar. Public subsidies to private education did not vary greatly from 1980 to 1988 (its percentage of total public expenditure on education is 12.4% in 1980 and 12.5% in 1988), though it did rise slightly between 1975 and 1980 (from 11.7% to 12.4%) [[63](#)].

So, it seems that public subsidies to private education increased more under conservative governments than under socialist ones. Nevertheless, as regards

enrolments in private education the party in power did not have any impact, as this indicator is constant throughout the whole period.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this paper we have tried to evaluate to what extent egalitarian education policy in France was determined by the colour of the party in government. The conclusion is rather clear: the colour of the party had an almost insignificant impact on egalitarian education policy in France.

The evidence presented in the comparison of countries of the European Union shows that though there are some general features of egalitarian education policies shared by all countries or at least by the majority of them, there are also a number of characteristics that vary greatly across countries. This points out to fact that there is no homogeneity of egalitarian education policies, at least among member countries of the EU. France presents an egalitarian education policy similar to other countries, or to the majority, in some respects, but with some peculiarities that the rest of countries do not share, or are only shared by a minority of them.

From the historical development of laws, programs and measures by socialist and conservative governments, it is clear that the hypothesis of the impact of parties in egalitarian education policy is not confirmed, with some, but few, exceptions. Neither socialists nor conservatives have different and distinctive egalitarian education policies, there is continuity from the early eighties to late nineties. The changes the two kinds of governments made are rather marginal, not sufficient to profoundly reshape egalitarian education policy. The models presented for socialists and conservatives in the theoretical framework do not apply to the French parties. Three important remarks should be made here: first, the implementation of the policy is as important as its design (the evidence tells for this case that when a government tries to do some actions coherent with its partisan preferences, they are not implemented, and vice versa, there is success in the implementation of actions against partisan preferences); the history of egalitarian education policy in France is full of implementation failures. Second, the changes of preferences within the same party are also very important (this applies to the socialist party). Third, sometimes partisan preferences are not clear.

The same kind of conclusions are reached for the time series of egalitarian education policy outputs. The starting hypothesis is not confirmed. Data either goes against the model or, when is coherent with the model, there is continuity between socialist and conservative governments, though with exceptions (sometimes, due to the characteristics of data, it is not possible to distinguish between governments).

Taking this evidence into account, there are three possibilities to continue with the research (here we are mainly referring to the study of the French socialist party): First, the model is wrong, it has to be changed or at least revised. Second, as we only have a case, the model has to be contrasted with other cases, and it may be a valid one. The French socialist party could be an exception to the social democratic model. And third, mediating variables may have been very important for the overall explanation.

The behaviour of the conservative party has been less paradoxical, as electoral support was in the two periods rather weak, and continuity was more coherent with its partisan model as the socialist governments were not adopting great measures against the ideological preferences of conservatives.

Therefore, the evidence highlights the fact that partisan variables had very little impact on egalitarian education policy. May be other kind of theories, such as Hall's [1986] thesis that stressed the role of institutional variables in the explanation of

(economic) policy could be more powerful for this case.

Electoral support is important but not determinant. When the socialist party had a parliamentary majority it failed to develop the reforms they had in mind, possibly due to social pressures (of groups, such as the catholic groups, for example) or divisions within the party around aspects of the policy, and this may also have been due to other kind of institutional variables (hardly studied in this paper). After this failure there is a change of strategy mainly consisting of withdrawing what has been done or planned. In the second period, in late eighties, the socialists did not have the electoral support to relaunch the reforms.

Notes

[1] “Governments, Equality and Education Policy: The Spanish and French Social Democratic Governments”, Juan March Institute (CEACS), Madrid, November 1996.

[2] This hypothesis could be extended to outcomes of egalitarian education policy. Unfortunately, outcomes are not going to be developed in this paper.

[3] The term “implementation” is used in this paper as the success in adopting government plans to design policy, and/or the success in the transformation of the design into outputs.

[4] See below for a concrete definition of partisan preferences.

[5] See: [Bourdieu 1997; Bourdieu and Saint Martin 1987]. For explanations of this author see: [Accardo and Corcuff 1986; Harker 1990].

[6] See: [Boudon 1974; 1979; 1990]. For explanations of this author see: [Murphy 1990;1992; Cohen 1990].

[7] The only reference Castles can find for a quantitative cross-national study of education policy is Verner [1979].

[8] See Esping-Andersen [1990] for a similar critique of the use of social expending (welfare effort) as an indicator of the welfare states commitment to equality. His attempt to re-think welfare states in a more sociological way is of great interest to this paper.

[9] The contribution of these fields of sociology and economics to this research are not going to be extensively treated in this paper. This discussion is contained in my thesis proposal mentioned before.

[10] Kerckhoff [1995:327] also alludes to these two dimensions as the most significant institutional arrangements in the education system.

[11] Due to lack of data and/or space some indicators are more developed in the paper than others, both in their historical account and in the tables. For both dimensions it is obvious that the specific factors can be different depending on th educational level at which they apply. In next section, when commenting on the social democratic ideas about education this point will be further developed.

[12] See above for the discussion of Bourdieu.

[13] The main prescription for those accepting cultural capital-social capital to be the main cause of inequality of educational opportunities is equalizing social classes, not in terms of equality of educational opportunities, but in terms of social and economic equality.

[14] See for example: [Korpi 1995; Ambler 1991b]. Unfortunately this dimension is not going to be developed in the paper.

[15] For a more extense account of the Rivière and Rueda’s model as well as of the critiques and developments done see my thesis proposal.

[16] T.H. Marshall [1950] placed in tracking much emphasis, specially in the opportunities for second thoughts. Ralph H. Turner [1960] also did. In contemporary sociology of social stratification the phenomenon of tracking is very much explored, though almost exclusively from the point of view of its impact on social stratification.

[17] Since social selection usually occurs below the university level, the proportion of “wealthy” students far outweighs that of the “poor” ones at this level. Universal access to university subsidized through public expenditure could be, and in fact usually is, regressive [see Le Grand 1982].

[18] See for example Wilson [1996] for different mechanisms used to support university students.

[19] This idea is taken from the classical distinction Titmuss [1974] drew between “marginal social policy” and “institutional social policy”. The later implies that in order to “push” middle classes to state schools, these “should be so good that member of all classes will want their children to attend” [Erikson and Aberg 1987:6].

[20] Maravall cites three studies presenting evidence that social democratic government limited their reforms to the introduction of meritocratic changes, leaving the stratification system and the selective character of education system unaltered: Parking [1972], Scase [1977], Hewitt [1977]. But he states that the evidence that social democratic governments increased public expenditure on education and enrolment rates far outweighs the counter-evidence presented in the three studies. The problem is that both statements do not refer to the same point.

[21] The term “partisan preferences” is taken from Boix [1994]; it refers to different ideological conceptions in economic policy of the relationship between equality and efficiency and the possible trade-offs of stressing more one or the other (it is against the idea that governments of different families of parties stress either equality or efficiency). The idea that equality of opportunities is embedded in a larger vision of the good society, for instance ideologies, and is broader than just the traditional concept of meritocracy is from Galston [1986].

[22] Marshall himself considered education to be a component of social citizenship, an individual (social) right [1950: 107].

[23] The selection of these countries for comparison is justified in terms of geographical proximity and the quality of available data. The comparison has usually been made for the latest available date.

[24] Belgium has compulsory education from 6 to 18, but from 15 years old it is part-time education.

[25] In Spain after the reform the duration of compulsory education is from 6 to 16 years old, a total of 10 years.

[26] Primary education in France is from 6 to 10 years old and is studied in primary schools. Lower secondary education is from 11 to 16 years old and is studied in *collèges* (these are theoretical durations).

[27] In the traditional type in the French and German-speaking communities in Belgium, this age is 12 years old; in Greece educational guidance courses are between 12 and 14 years old; in the Flemish Community in Belgium, vocational education begins at 13 years old.

[28] *Lycée* is where upper secondary education is studied.

[29] Upper secondary education is studied in France in *lycées*. It is clearly divided in two tracks: one selective, comprising general and technical education, and one vocational. Its theoretical duration is three years for general and technological education (from 16 to 18) and two or four years for vocational education (from 16 to 17 or 19 years). The last year of upper secondary education is called *baccalauréat*. The tracks are the same as for upper secondary education. At the end there is an exam and a certificate, different for every track. The organizational structure of higher education differs greatly among countries. France has a peculiar system of higher education. There are four main tracks in higher education: university (excluding *IUT*) of a non-selective character, *IUT* (university short vocationally oriented courses of a selective character), *STS* (short vocationally oriented courses of a non-selective character in *lycées*), *CPGE* (preparation classes for *Grandes Écoles* in *lycées*), and *Grandes Écoles* (a highly selective and prestigious non-university sector). *IUT*, *STS* and *CPGE* last two years. Duration for university and *grandes écoles* is variable.

[30] The porcentual base is the total of pupils in upper secondary education, which means that there is a number of people (more or less depending on the case) already outside the education system, taking into account that this level is usually not compulsory.

[31] It is striking the comparison of these figures with those of [Table 3](#) that show the tracking for lower secondary education. The Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden, present a degree of tracking higher for upper secondary education than for lower secondary education.

[32] The exception here is United Kingdom, where 76% of students have grant and 28% a loan.

[33] Basic references for the analysis of this period are: [Prost 1990; Ambler 1985a; 1995/96?; Ambler and Neathery 1996; Leclercq 1993; OCDE 1996]. The most detailed and accurate information is contained in Prost [1990].

[34] This clearly contradicts the model of partisan preferences of egalitarian education policy, because the education system was transformed from a dual to a comprehensive one when throughout this period the successive Presidents of the Republic were conservative, though it is not that clear that the governments may be considered as such.

[35] It is also true that during the *Front Populaire* there were a few minor measures and projects to

integrate higher primary education schools into *lycées* [Prost 1990:38-39 and 46; Leclercq 1993:?), that is, the non-selective track into the selective one. Some authors [Ambler 1985a:117-122; 1995/96?:217-220] state that the “idea” of the unitary school came from the left in France, but that the right carried out the specific reforms. For the explanation of previous reforms, see below.

[36] For descriptions of the previous system see: [Ambler 1995/96?:203; Leclercq 1993:?: Prost 1990:38-42].

[37] Elementary education is similar to what is now called primary education. Therefore, primary education in the present system is different than primary education in the old one.

[38] At this level there were also *collèges*, municipal institutions similar to, but less prestigious than, *lycées*. With the passage of time these *collèges* were progressively associated with *EPS*.

[39] See the recently published and unfinished brilliant book by Albert Camus, *The First Man*. It tells the story of a working class child (himself), and one of the central parts of the book is his experience through the education system in France (Algeria). One of the most striking things the book tells is the extraordinary role the teacher had in orientating (working class) children from primary schools to *lycées*.

[40] In 1941, under the Vichy government, the Minister Carcopino enacted an important measure to transform *EPS* into “modern *collèges*” and integrating them into secondary education [Prost 1990:42].

[41] In the French education system the lower secondary education comprised four grades, from 6th to 3rd, the 6th being the lowest and the 3rd being the highest grade (the corresponding normal ages were from 11 to 14).

[42] For this part the main references are: [Savary 1985:35-42; Ambler 1994b:194-198; 1994a:457; 1995/96?:213-214; Monchambert 1993; EURYDICE 1992:41-44; OCDE 1996:?).

[43] This was so in spite of the Marie Law of 1951 that made it possible for students in private schools to get general education grants (*bourses d’enseignement général*), and the Barangé Law also of 1951, that introduced education subsidies for schools -*allocations scolaires*- (but depending on the number of students in each year).

[44] The Debré law contradicts the partisan model presented in the introduction. Two questions are relevant at this point: why the Debré Law sought to regulate and even integrate private schools into the public education sector?, and why not simply fund them outside the state control? Nevertheless, after the Debré law, the following measures were more on the line proposed in the model.

[45] The main references for this part are: [Magliulo 1982:113-124; OCDE 1996:?: García Garrido 1993:239-241; Ambler 1985a:120-141; 1995/96?:3-4].

[46] See also Conseil de L’Europe [1988:27-30].

[47] Although this is merely an expansionist target, not necessarily related to equality.

[48] The question here is why, when the socialists won power, they were only able to implement the reform on compensatory education (*ZEPs*) and other minor ones, and experienced some failures such as the attempt to integrate *CPGE* and *GE* into the university system? Their objectives were coherent with the partisan model proposed in this paper, but not the measures (or non-measures) adopted, that is, its implementation.

[49] Another question is why, when Chèvenement was appointed to the Ministry of education in 1984, he abandoned every line of reform Savary had tried. He even neglected compensatory education that Savary had implemented successfully. He merely launched an expansionist goal [Ambler 1995/96?:218].

[50] See mainly: [Savary 1985; Ambler 1985a:129-132; Ambler 1995/96?:215; García Garrido 1993:239-241].

[51] See also Conseil de l’Europe [1988: 24-27].

[52] Education policy was very important for French politics, as for instance is the fact that not only Savary was removed from his place, Pierre Mauroy was also; he was replaced by Fabius.

[53] There are two interrelated questions relevant here: what led the socialist party to choose the strategy of compromise in the public-private issue of education?, and why did the socialist party, through Savary following the directives of the President of the Republic and the Primer Minister, not withdraw the subsidies to private education following the old secular principle that the PS accepted? The final result after the default of the Savary bill and the replacement of Savary by Chèvenement, is against the model of partisan preferences of egalitarian education policy, as private schools receive public funds but they are not strongly controlled by the state, in order to homogenize standards.

[54] Quoted in Ambler [1995/96?:218]. Discourse at the National Assembly in July 1989.

[55] As regards our model of governments and egalitarian education policy this rise in university fees is striking, taking into account the conservative nature of the coalition in government. Nevertheless, there is no reference to a parallel increase in grants for this level of education.

[56] There is an outstanding questions here that is against our partisan preferences model: why the Socialist Ministry of Education continued to stick to expansionist targets and did not propose other kind of egalitarian measures within this dimension?

[57] The question here is: why there was also inaction in the financial measures in this period?

[58] There are two implementation failures in this period: one, the government proposal to limit the number of students in *IUTs* (a selective track of higher education), and two, the government proposal to increment subsidies to private schools. And the question is why.

[59] This change of preferences has been studied mainly for economic policy: there is a first attempt to implement electoral promises, followed by a change of direction, intensified by the following conservative government of Chirac in 1986.

[60] There are ten different types of grants. Students in the tenth type get more money than students in the 1st type, which implies that students in the 1st type are wealthier than those in the 10th type.

[61] Social Security for students was created later, in 1948.

[62] Always with the exception of *Île de France*.

[63] Data from EURYDYCE [1992:46].

Tables

Table 1. Average duration of pre-school education and its theoretical duration for member states (1992/93)		
	Average duration ¹ (years)	Theoretical duration (years)
Belgium	3.37	3,5
Denmark	3.26	3,5
Germany	2.73	3
Greece	1.07	2
Spain	2.52	3
France	3.36	4
Ireland	2.16	2
Italy	2.89	3
Luxembourg	1.88	2
Netherlands	0.99	1
Austria	2.08	3
Portugal	1.66	3
Finland	1.6	6
Sweden	2.5	4

England and Wales	1.14	2
Northern Ireland	0.39	2
Scotland	0.79	2

Sources: [EURYDICE 1996:29 and 145].

1. The average duration of pre-school education is obtained by adding the rates of pre-school attendance for the various ages.

Table 2. A comparative analytical summary of education pathways (assessment and guidance: compulsory education) in member states (1994)

	Compulsory education	End of compulsory education	Initial educational guidance
Belgium	- from age 6 to 18, part time from age 15 - 12 years	- certificates awarded by the school and later approved by a Commission	- at age 12, at the beginning of secondary education, in the traditional type, at age 14 in the reformed type in the French and German-speaking Communities - at age 13, for vocational education, in the Flemish Community
Denmark	- from age 7 to 16 - 9 years	- no final general examination - possibility of taking examinations in certain subjects chosen by the pupil	- at age 16, after the <i>Folkeskole</i> ⁴ - optional guidance courses from the age of 14
Germany	- from age 6 to 18 - 12 years	- internal examination	- at age 10, at the end of the <i>Grundschule</i> ⁵ - but in some <i>Länder</i> , guidance is given in the 5th and 6th years
Greece	- from age 5 ½ to 15 - 9 ½ years	- leaving certificate, depending on results - otherwise an examination is organised for pupils who are not awarded this certificate	- at age 15 and educational guidance courses between age 12 and 14
Spain	<u>pre-reform</u> ¹ : - from age 6 to 14 - 8 years <u>post-reform</u> : - from age 6 to 16 - 10 years	<u>pre-reform</u> : - leaving certificate without examination, provided the 3 cycles of the general basic education have been successfully completed <u>post-reform</u> : - a school leaving certificate, whatever the level attained by the pupil	<u>pre-reform</u> : - after the <i>EGB</i> , at age 14 <u>post-reform</u> : - at age 16, at the beginning of the <i>Bacchillerato</i> ⁶ course
France	- from age 6 to 16 - 10 years	- in order to complete compulsory education, pupils must have one year of full-time education, either in the traditional <i>lycée</i> ³ or in a vocational <i>lycée</i>	- at age 14, in 3rd year of the <i>collège</i> ⁷
Ireland	- from age 6 to 15 - 9 years	- national examination with two levels of difficulty (Ordinary and Higher) for Junior Certificate (since 1992)	- at age 12
Italy	- from age 6 to 14 - 8 years	- final examination to obtain the <i>Licenza Media</i> ² , administered by the school - guidance counselling	- at age 14

Luxembourg	- from age 4 to 15 - 11 years	- certificate at the end of compulsory education, without examination, on the basis of results	- at age 12
Netherlands	- from age 5 to 16 - 11 years	- internal and national examination	- at age 13 (transition year from age 12 to 13)
Portugal	- from age 6 to 15 - 9 years	- no examination - certificate	- at age 15, after the 3rd cycle of basic education - educational guidance courses from age 14
United Kingdom (England, Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland)	<u>England, Wales and Scotland</u> : - from age 5 to 16 - 11 years <u>Northern Ireland</u> : from age 4 to 16 - 12 years	- national examination	- at age 16 in principle - educational guidance courses between age 14 and 16

Sources: [EURYDICE 1994:23-25].

1. The reform, contained mainly in the *LOGSE (Ley Orgánica de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo)* passed in 1990.
2. *Licenza Media* means the diploma given at the end of lower secondary education.
3. *Lycée* means upper secondary education.
4. *Folkeskole* means compulsory education.
5. *Grundschule* means primary education.
6. *Bachillerato* means upper secondary education.
7. *Collège* means lower secondary education.

Table 3. Organisation of systems of lower secondary education in some countries in Europe (1994)	
Single continuous system	Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway
Common core curriculum / common general education	Spain, Portugal, France , Italy, Greece, United Kingdom, Iceland
Differentiated branches or types of education	Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland

Source: [EURYDICE 1994:29].

Table 4. Assessment in the member states ³ by level of education (1994)			
		Continuous local assessment without external tests	Local assessment with external tests standardised or not
Primary	Final certificate with examination	Belgium, Italy	
	Final certificate without examination	Greece	
		Germany, Denmark, Spain,	

education	No final certificate or final examination	France , Luxembourg, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland, United Kingdom	
	National examination for purposes of selection and guidance		Luxembourg, Northern Ireland, Netherlands (optional at the end of last year)
Lower secondary education	Final certificate with examination	Belgium, Italy, Greece	France , Ireland, Netherlands (LBO, MAVO ¹), United Kingdom
	Final certificate without examination	Denmark (optional examination), Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal	
	No final certificate or final examination	Netherlands (HAVO, VWO ²)	
Upper secondary general education³	Final certificate	Belgium, Greece	Denmark, Germany, France , Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland
	Final certificate without examination	Spain, Portugal, Sweden	

Sources: [EURYDICE 1994:37-38.]

1. *LBO* means vocational lower secondary education and *MAVO* means general lower secondary education towards vocational (upper) secondary education.

2. *HAVO* means general upper secondary education towards vocational higher education and *VWO* means upper general secondary education focused towards university.

3. Sweden, Austria and Finland are included at this level because it is the only level contained in [EURYDICE 1996:56].

Table 5. Enrollment rates (%) by age (years) in member states (1992)

	2	3	4	5	6	7	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Austria	1	29	66.3	86.2	98.4	100	n.d.										
Belgium	38	97.7	99.3	97.7	99.8	99.1	98.9	98.7	97.2	90.6	75.2	59.6	43.9	31.1	20	11.5	6.6
Denmark	14.3	37.9	53.6	61.1	96.4	99.7	93.4	97.8	92.4	73.8	68.5	53.1	41.2	34.7	31.2	26.3	24.2
Finland	14.8	24.3	28.1	32	57.6	99.5	99.8	99.8	94.5	85.2	81.7	39.9	36.3	40.3	40.1	33.2	27
France	34.7	98.8	101.4	101.5	100.6	100.2	94.3	94.1	92.1	84.9	77.9	64.6	46.6	33.5	32.8	15.8	10.1
Germany ¹	0	78.5	68.5	78.5	115.1	97.5	93.9	93.1	95.3	81.7	82.8	61.1	41.2	31.1	36.8	18.7	18.4
Greece	0	11.2	48.9	85.2	102.5	95.6	94.2	86.1	88.4	61.4	44.7	44.6	25.6	18.1	8.1	6	3.7
Ireland	0	1.2	55.7	100	99.1	100.5	97.6	94.3	87.5	76.5	57.5	39.1	29.6	19.4	11.1	6.1	4
Italy	0	91.8	97.5	99.9	100	100	n.d.										
Luxembourg	0	0.02	89	99	100	100	n.d.										
Netherlands	0	0	98	98.8	97.7	100	98.7	99	97.3	74.7	73.4	61.5	48.5	38.7	28	21.6	16.2
Portugal	0	22.4	28.6	32.3	100	100	n.d.										

Spain	8.3	37.2	95.8	100.4	103.2	103.8	100.4	91	75.6	67.3	53.8	44.8	42.7	34	27.9	19.3	14
Sweden	0	45.2	50.8	60.6	99.9	97.5	99.7	95.6	89.2	86.9	60.8	24.3	16.5	16.1	27.9	13.7	12.5
United Kingdom	0.01	37	90.1	98.9	98.5	98.8	99.6	98.9	75.3	56.7	33.6	23.9	19.5	13.7	8.1	5.2	3.7

Table 5 (continuation): Enrollment rates (%) by age (years) in member states (1992)

	22-25 ²	26-29
Austria	n.d.	n.d.
Belgium	8.3	1.2
Denmark	21.4	9.8
Finland	23.4	11
France	14.9	4
Germany ¹	13.3	7.7
Greece	4.7	0.9
Ireland	n.d.	n.d.
Italy	n.d.	n.d.
Luxembourg	n.d.	n.d.
Netherlands	13.6	3.9
Portugal	n.d.	n.d.
Spain	15.2	5
Sweden	13.1	6.2
United Kingdom	5.7	2.5

Sources: [EURYDICE 1996:26-27; OCDE 1995a:131-155].

1. Germany means ex-Federal Republic of Germany.

2. Higher education only.

Table 6. Percentages of pupils in general and vocational upper secondary education in member states (1992/93)

	General	Vocational
Belgium	46.41	53.59
Denmark	44.93	55.07
Germany	20.67	79.33
Greece	63.86	36.14
Spain	58.77	41.23
France	44.72	55.28
Ireland	75.38	24.62
Italy	28.03	71.97

Luxembourg	37.23	62.77
Netherlands	29.54	70.46
Austria	21.76	78.24
Portugal	81.16	18.84
Finland	48.76	51.24
Sweden	28.64	71.36
United Kingdom	44.57	55.43
Average EU	40.96	59.04
Sources: [EURYDICE 1996:46 and 150].		

Table 7. Public expenditure on education in member states (1992)	
	Public expenditure on education per pupil as a % of per capita GDP
Belgium	36.4
Denmark	38.1
Germany (ex-FRG)	32.2
Greece	n.d.
Spain	29.4
France	31.1
Ireland	56.9
Italy	33.7
Luxembourg	n.d.
Netherlands	51.5
Austria	32.3
Portugal	n.d.
Finland	59.7
Sweden	42.9
United Kingdom	65.6
Sources: [OECD 1995a: 92].	

Table 8. Public expenditure on education by levels in member states (1992)	

	Public expenditure on education per pupil as a % of per capita GDP			
	Pre-primary education	Primary education	Secondary education	Higher education
Belgium	10.3	13.2	28.5	21.2
Denmark	35.8	24	28	26.4
Germany (ex-FRG)	16.5	14.7	30.5	25.7
Greece	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Spain	16.3	15.9	21.8	19.5
France	14	15.6	29.3	23.7
Ireland	13.7	13.9	21.7	17.6
Italy	18.9	23.3	27.1	25.7
Luxembourg	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Netherlands	13.2	15.1	19.5	17.6
Austria	18.2	22.2	35.6	30.5
Portugal	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Finland	43.4	26.6	33.3	30.1
Sweden	36.5	29.1	36.4	32.8
United Kingdom	11.8	19.7	27.8	23.9

Sources: [OECD 1995a: 88-91].

Table 9. Forms of revenue of higher education institutions in some member states (for different years)			
Country (and year)	Public funds (%)	Fees (%)	Other kind of revenues (%)
Finland (1987)	85	(minimum)	15
France (1984)	89.5	4.7	5.8
Germany (1986)	68.5	0	31.5
Netherlands (1985)	80	12	8
Spain ¹ (middle 80')	80	20	n.d.
United Kingdom	- Universities: 55	13.7	31.3

(1986-87)	- Polytechnic Colleges (England only): 72.4	16.2	11.4
Sources: [OCDE 1990:102].			
1. Data only for universities.			

Table 10. Financial assistance to students in higher education in some member states (for different years)

Country (and date)	Form of assistance ²	Percentage of GDP	Maximum assistance per student (in dollars)	Average assistance per student (in dollars) ¹	Percentage of beneficiaries
Denmark (1986-87)	subsidies + loans	n.d.	- -22 years old students: 5,266 - 22 or +22 years old students: 5,869	n.d.	n.d.
Finland (1987)	loans/subsidies	0.19	4,157	1,782	the majority
France (1986-87)	subsidies and indirect assistance	0.08⁴	2,009	200³	18
Germany (1986)	loans	0.12	n.d.	608	n.d.
Greece (1987)	indirect assistance/ subsidies	0.1	n.d.	209	n.d.
Netherlands (1988)	subsidies loans	0.2 ⁵	4,856	412	95 45
Portugal (1987)	indirect assistance and subsidies	n.d.	n.d.	57	8
Spain (1986)	subsidies	0.05 ⁶	n.d.	115	n.d.
United Kingdom (1984-85) (1988-89)	subsidies subsidies	0.3 ⁷	3,648	1,467	82

Sources: [OCDE 1990:98 and 104-105].

1. The average is calculated taking into account every student.

2. Indirect assistance is included in this column when it represents an important part of the total assistance. It is excluded from the rest of the table.

3. Data is from 1988.

4. Data includes loans also (date is 1984).

5. Data for both subsidies and loans (date from 1984).

6. Data is from 1987.

7. Data is from 1983.

Table 11. Systems of grants at the higher level of education in member states (1993)

	Tuition	Form of main financial	Depends on income of student/	Depends on academic	Percentage of all students receiving direct	Amount variable according to income and/or	Other social benefits
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	fees	support	parents/ spouse	criteria	assistance	place of residence	
Belgium	yes	- French Community: grant + loan - Flemish Community: grant	yes	yes	- Fr. Com.: 20% - Fl. Com.: 23%	yes	- family allowances paid until age 25 - tax allowances - reduced tuition fees - concessionary fares
Denmark	no	grant + loan	no	no	100% (78%) ¹	yes	no
Germany (ex-FRG)	no	grant 50% loan 50%	yes	yes	33% (West) 90% (East)	yes	- family allowances until age 27 - tax allowances
Greece	no	grant + loan	yes	yes	7%	yes	- family allowances - free medical services - concessionary fares - free course material
Spain	yes	grant	yes	yes	+/-20%	yes	grants: - travelling expenses - public transport - accommodation - exemption from tuition fees - course material
France	yes	grant + loan	yes	yes	+/-18%	yes	- exemption from tuition fees (in the public sector) - tax allowances travelling expenses
Ireland	yes	grant + loan	yes	yes	+/-34%	yes	- reduced tuition fees
Italy	yes	grant + loan	yes	yes	2.5%	yes	- family allowances paid until age 26 - exemption from tuition fees
Luxembourg	no	grant + loan	yes	no	80%	yes	- family allowances paid until age 27
Netherlands	yes	grant + loan	no (for the basic grant)	no	100%	yes	- family allowances - tax allowances - free pass for public transport
Portugal	yes	grant + loan	yes	no	10 to 15%	yes	- reductions on price of educational materials; free medical care, sports and cultural activities
United Kingdom	yes	grant + loan	yes	yes	76% grant 28% loan	yes	- remission of tuition fees

Sources: [EURYDICE 1993:4]; data for percentage of all students receiving direct assistance (grants) for Austria 13%, Finland is 59% and Sweden 67% [EURYDICE 1996:78].

1. In parenthesis data from [EURYDICE 1996:78].

Table 12. Existing student loan programmes in some member states (for different years)					
Country (and date)	Repayment mechanism	Purpose of support	% of students with loans	Average loan (value \$US)	Year scheme began
Denmark (1985)	mortgage loan	living	n.d.	3,700	1975
Finland (1987)	mortgage loan	living	n.d.	2,200	1986
France (n.d.)	mortgage loan	living	1	n.d.	n.d.

Germany (1987)	mortgage loan	living	30	1,500	1974
Netherlands (1989)	mortgage loan	living	n.d.	200	n.d.
Sweden (n.d.)	income contingent	living	n.d.	5,828	n.d.
United Kingdom (1993)	mortgage loan	living	44	750	1990
Sources: [Wilson 1996:117].					

Table 13. Enrolments in public and private education by level of education in member states (1992)

	% of enrolments ¹ by institution			Enrolments in private education as a % of total enrolments by level of education		
	Public	Private grant-aided	Private non-grant aided	Pre-primary education	Primary education	Secondary education
Belgium	20.7	33.2	n.d.	57	56	66
Denmark	51.4	3.5	n.d.	10	10	16
Germany (ex-FRG)	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Greece	47	n.d.	3	5	7	4
Spain	40.4	12.1	4.4	36	35	31
France	47.1	n.d.	n.d.	12	15	21
Ireland	55.8	0.7	n.d.	100	100	n.d.
Italy	46.7	n.d.	3.6	29	7	7
Luxembourg	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	1	n.d.
Netherlands	14.4	40.4	n.d.	68	69	76
Austria	47.2	3.3	n.d.	26	4	8
Portugal	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	58	8	8
Finland	58.5	2.2	n.d.	2	1	5
Sweden	49.5	0.7	0.1	8	2	2
United Kingdom	44.3	3.7	3.9	6	5	9

Sources:[OECD 1995a:12%] for the first indicator; [UNESCO 1995:157] for the second indicator.

1. % of 5 to 29 age group.

Table 14. Distribution of public expenditure by kind of institution and level of education in member states (1992)

	Pre-school education			Primary education			Secondary education			Higher education			All levels of education		
	Public	Private grant-aided	Private non grant-aided	Public	Private grant-aided	Private non grant-aided	Public	Private grant-aided	Private non grant-aided	Public	Private grant-aided	Private non grant-aided	Public	Private grant-aided	Private non grant-aided

Belgium	n.d.	38.2	61.8	0	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.								
Denmark	98.7	1.3	0	94.6	5.4	0	94.7	5.3	0	100	0	0	93.5	3.4	3
Germany (ex-FRG)	62.2	37.8	0	99.4	0.6	0	64	4.8	31.2	98.7	1.3	0	75.2	6.2	18.6
Greece	n.d.														
Spain	64.2	5.2	30.6	71.3	24.5	4.2	80	11.5	8.5	92.2	0	7.8	79.6	11.3	9
France	89.1	10.7	0.2	88.1	11.7	0.2	82	17.3	0.7	90.5	6.7	2.7	85.9	13.2	0.9
Ireland	98.3	0	1.7	98.5	0	1.5	99.7	0	0.3	99	0	1	99.1	0	0.9
Italy	n.d.														
Luxembourg	n.d.														
Netherlands	32.9	67.1	0	32.4	67.6	0	20.6	79.4	0	56.1	43.8	0	34.6	65.4	0
Austria	94	6	0	99.6	0.4	0	99.3	0.7	0	91.9	8.1	0	96.9	3.1	0
Portugal	n.d.														
Finland	100	0	0	98.7	1.3	0	91.8	8.2	0	95.6	4.4	0	93.4	6.6	0
Sweden	100	0	0	99.3	0.7	0	98.9	1.1	0	98.9	0	1.1	99.2	0.6	0.2
United Kingdom	100	0	0	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	22.2	77.8	0	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.

Sources: [OECD 1995a: 79-82 and 84].

	Upper secondary education		Baccalauréat	
	General and Technical	Vocational	General and technical	Vocational
1960	421,900 (52%)	383,200 (48%)	-	-
1970	848,600 (57%)	650,6 (43%)	167,299	-
1980	1,102,600 (59%)	773,200 (41%)	222,400	-
1985	1,207,600 (60%)	805,800 (40%)	253,050	-
1988	1,444,200 (67%)	711,100 (33%)	306,107 (98%)	7,555 (2%)
1990	1,571,000 (69%)	696,000 (31%)	359,847 (94%)	24,750 (6%)
1993	1,529,000 (69%)	682,000 (31%)	n.d.	n.d.
1994	1,500,000 (69%)	683,000 (31%)	389,058 ² (85%)	70,771 ² (15%)

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	Total
1975-76	-	-	-	11,487 (11%)	12,498 (12%)	9,612 (9%)	17,792 (17%)	8,845 (8%)	41,345 (40%)	2,081 (2%)	103,660 (100%)
1980-81	-	15,409 (13%)	-	5,767 (5%)	9,946 (8%)	7,031 (6%)	14,368 (12%)	7,567 (6%)	56,739 (49%)	-	116,827 (100%)
1981-82	-	13,726 (12%)	-	5,963 (5%)	8,754 (7%)	8,396 (7%)	12,309 (10%)	10,447 (9%)	59,085 (50%)	-	118,680 (100%)
1985-86	8,924 (6%)	7,250 (4%)	9,149 (6%)	8,057 (5%)	13,078 (8%)	11,381 (7%)	19,989 (12%)	10,718 (7%)	71,264 (45%)	-	159,810 (100%)
1986-87	9,579 (6%)	7,490 (4%)	10,043 (6%)	8,699 (5%)	14,171 (8%)	11,801 (7%)	21,962 (13%)	11,423 (7%)	76,365 (44%)	-	171,533 (100%)
1987-88	10,256 (5%)	8,567 (4%)	11,168 (6%)	9,531 (5%)	15,789 (8%)	13,146 (7%)	24,359 (13%)	12,185 (6%)	83,176 (44%)	-	188,177 (100%)

Sources: [OCDE 1989:41-42].

Table 18. Percentage of students with grant in higher education by track in France (1981-1987)

	1981-82	1985-86	1986-87	1987-88
Universities (with IUT)	13	14.9	15.8	16.6
IUT	32.4	30.9	31.1	31.7
STS	25	24.2	26.5	30

Sources: [OCDE 1989:34].

Table 19. Funds for social assistance to students¹ in higher education in France (1975-1989)

	Direct assistance ²	Indirect assistance ³	Total social assistance
1975	421.7 (49%)	429.8 (51%)	851.5
1980	414.4 (44%)	535.5 (56%)	949.9
1981	391.8 (42%)	545 (58%)	936.8
1985	628.4 (53%)	552.9 (47%)	1,181.3
1986	653.6 (61%)	421.2 (39%)	1,074.8
1988	808.3 (68%)	378.9 (32%)	1,187.2
1989	973.8	395.1	1,368.9

	(71%)	(29%)	
Sources: [OCDE 1989:44-45].			
1. In millions of constant Francs, with 1975 base; in parenthesis the percentage of direct and indirect assistance from the total of social assistance			
2. Grants and assistance for studying (translation of <i>Bourses et secours d'études</i>).			
3. University preventive medicine, university buildings, accomodation (<i>Cité Internationale Universitaire de Paris</i>) and social security for students.			

	Proportions of pupils in general and technical/vocational upper secondary education			
	General	Technical/vocational	Total	% of general
Île de France	217,795	221,523	439,318	50
Bassin Parisien	199,051	269,898	468,949	42
Nord-Pas-De-Calais	79,935	120,384	200,319	40
Est	93,146	130,844	223,990	42
Ouest	161,819	211,287	373,106	43
Sud-Ouest	110,725	136,281	247,006	45
Centre-Est	135,474	158,964	294,438	46
Mediterranee	123,683	136,277	259,960	48
Departements D'Outre-Mer	27,675	48,188	75,863	36
France	1,149,303	1,433,646	2,582,949	44

Sources: [EURYDICE 1996:151].

	Pre-primary education		Primary education		Secondary education		Higher education		All levels of education	
	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private
1985	2,196,645 (85%)	328,969 (15%)	3,499,350 (85%)	627,010 (15%)	4,275,425 (76%)	1,388,577 (24%)	1,182,263 (89%)	150,822 (11%)	11,369,437 (82%)	2,573,073 (18%)
1986	2,233,978 (87%)	329,486 (13%)	3,430,125 (85%)	616,133 (15%)	4,305,800 (76%)	1,400,429 (24%)	1,199,495 (88%)	158,402 (12%)	11,383,388 (82%)	2,581,496 (18%)
1988	2,208,435 (88%)	310,167 (12%)	3,464,602 (85%)	616,877 (15%)	4,319,666 (75%)	1,406,782 (25%)	1,231,401 (88%)	170,729 (12%)	11,434,259 (82%)	2,579,526 (18%)
1990	2,226,834 (88%)	309,121 (12%)	3,482,810 (85%)	613,005 (15%)	4,327,970 (75%)	1,424,916 (25%)	1,389,507 (88%)	195,782 (12%)	11,629,843 (82%)	2,617,598 (18%)

1992	2,241,573 (88%)	317,162 (12%)	3,445,037 (85%)	601,816 (15%)	4,360,078 (76%)	1,396,328 (24%)	1,594,929 (87%)	245,378 (13%)	11,835,617 (82%)	2,634,540 (18%)
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Sources: [OECD 1995b:138, 140, 144, 146, 150, 152, 156, 158, 162 and 164].

1. Enrolments in private institutions and public institutions as a % of the total number of enrolments at every level of education.

Table 22. Enrolments in different tracks in the second cycle of secondary education by kind of institution (1960-1992)¹

	General and technical education		Vocational education	
	Public institutions	Private institutions	Public institutions	Private institutions
1960-61	326,300 (77.3)	95,600 (22.7)	256,200 (66.9)	127,000 (33.1)
1970-71	653,300 (77)	195,300 (23)	480,000 (73.8)	170,600 (26.2)
1980-81	850,000 (77.1)	252,600 (22.9)	601,200 (77.8)	172,000 (22.2)
1985-86	925,900 (76.7)	281,700 (23.3)	619,500 (76.9)	186,300 (23.1)
1987-88	1,059,500 (78)	298,500 (22)	559,600 (75.8)	178,800 (24.2)
1988-89	1,137,800 (78.8)	306,400 (21.2)	538,800 (75.8)	172,300 (24.2)
1990-91	1,243,548 (79.2)	327,428 (20.8)	534,192 (76.7)	165,555 (23.3)
1992-93	1,224,800 (78.9)	328,000 (21.1)	524,100 (77.3)	153,600 (22.7)

Sources: [Duran and Prinborgne 1991:28] for the years from 1960 to 1988; [EURYDICE 1992:44] for the year 1990; [EURYDICE 1995:175] for the year 1992.

1. In number of students in each track and each kind of institution and percentage of public and private in each track (in parenthesis).

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