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MAPPING THE AXIOLOGY OF EUROPEAN WELFARE

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Mapping the axiology of European welfare

Luis Moreno, Inés Calzada and Francisco Javier Moreno-Fuentes*

Abstract

While welfare research on historical and institutional trajectories has been carried out extensively in recent decades, less attention has been paid to citizens preferences for social policies. On analysing welfare provision the self-interest and neo-institutionalist theories have often placed incentives and resources at the core of their explanations. But values can also play a very important role in the support and shaping of welfare arrangements. This article explores how values are present in European populations and to what extent variation can be related to the geographical distribution of the different types of welfare regimes. A classification of values associated with social categories, and an overview of the main axiological differences across Europe is therefore put forward.

1. Introduction

Esping-Andersen's path-breaking work on welfare regimes (1990) traces the historical roots of welfare arrangements against social risks and identifies three main worlds of welfare capitalism according to main contemporary ideologies (liberalism, socialism, conservatism). Following Esping-Andersen's taxonomy, there is broad agreement in the literature that the relative involvement of state, market, and family in the provision of welfare form a heuristic device sufficiently robust to describe the various worlds of welfare capitalism. Welfare states, and the social policies they implement, can be grouped according to what extent individuals are more or less dependent on the market (Esping-Andersen 1999), and/or the family (Orloff, 1993; Bambra, 2004), and which consequences such policies have for class and gender stratification.

European welfare states cluster around similar typologies to the ones Esping-Andersen put forward, to which some new types have been added. According to Arts and Gelissen (2002), Esping-Andersen's classification is a useful, provided that new typologies are incorporated and no single country represents an ideal regime type. A first group of welfare regimes was identified as follows: (a) Liberal Anglo-Saxon, characterised by State residualism in line with a strong individualism (citizens are main responsible for

their well being); (b) Conservative Continental regime, based on corporatism (state policies sanction and maintain status differentiations); and (c) Social-democratic Nordic welfare regime, characterised by universalism (redistribute state policies aimed at facilitating individuals' emancipation from the market and the family). An additional group of welfare regimes has also been conceptualised; (d) Familistic Mediterranean, where the interpenetrating role of the family is the crucial element characterizing welfare arrangements and outcomes in Southern Europe (Sarasa and Moreno, 1995; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Moreno, 2006); and (e) Ex-Communist East European where, arguably, the institutional inheritance of state intervention is determinant across the ex-USSR and ex-Communist European countries (Aidukaite, 2004; Deacon et al., 1992; Deacon, 2000; George and Manning, 1980; Manning and Shaw, 1998; Sotiropoulos et al., 2003).ⁱ

While research on historical and institutional trajectories has been carried out extensively, less attention has been paid to the preferences of citizens in welfare development. In general, there have been two main contending explanations with relation to citizens' preferences are and how these relate to the support for and the legitimacy of social policy-making; the theory of self-interest and the various versions of new institutionalism. These explanatory theories are often contrasted as being in opposition to one another. The theory of self-interest assumes that a certain objective position in the social conform individuals preferences. In turn, neo-institutionalist theories operate through path-dependency explanations and trace preferences back to previous policies, as these create their own structure of interests. Both self-interest and neo-institutionalist theories place incentives and resources at the core of their explanation (Pierson, 1993). Interests are regarded, accordingly, as a key variable to understand institutional variance.

In recent research a "revival" of culture as a key explanatory factor to understand the foundations of the individual's preferences is noticeable. However, "culture" is too broad of a term to be empirically assessed, as it involves a compound set of beliefs, values and practices that cements groups or societies. Indeed, valued principles can play a very important role in the support for different institutional arrangements and policies in welfare development (Bowles and Gintis, 2000; Lockhart, 2001; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Oorschot, Opielka and Pfau-Effinger, 2008; Jo, 2011). A crucial difference between

theories based on interests and theories based on culture is that in the latter an individual may support a policy that does not necessarily “benefit” him/her directly.

In this article, we explore how values are present in European populations and to what extent variation can be related to the geographical distribution of the different types of welfare regimes. We analyse values measured at the individual level and aggregated at the national level, so that countries may be clustered in groups similar to the welfare regimes. Our aim is limited and should be considered as an exploratory analysis from which further research could be pursued. Our research endeavour has not been aimed at establishing a causal analysis, but rather to detect correspondence between principles and rationales of the welfare regimes and the expressed values in citizens’ preferences. These analyses can be useful to substantiate future questions regarding the legitimacy of existing welfare policies.

The next section spells out the theoretical assumptions and analytical premises upon which our empirical analyses are based. A classification of values associated with social welfare processes and an overview of the main axiological differences across Europe is put forward in the subsequent section. Concluding remarks identified a number of potential lines for future research.

2. Theoretical assumptions

Durkehim and Weber acknowledged the importance of values to understand human behaviour and to explain differences between societies. American pragmatism also incorporated value-judgements in its theory of human action. But in spite of the attention that early contemporary social theory has paid to the role values, the same interest (albeit with some significant exceptions) has been absent recent decades. This is probably related to the predominance of rational-choice theory, as well as to the later importance acquired by the new institutionalist school of thought, both of which coalesced into the concept of *bounded rationality*.

The challenge posed by theories based on values is that they point to the idea that rationalities are not simply “bounded” but rather multiple. For Kluckhoh (1951; 1958), human beings do not just react to stimuli, but mostly to the interpretation of those very

stimuli. These interpretations derive to a large extent from the framing provided by the specific world-views of any given culture. Values can broadly be understood as “...a conception, explicit or implicit, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action” (1951: 395). Likewise, for Dewey “...values have both a cognitive and an emotional or affective component” (Dewey, 1923: 618; 1925).

Values constitute ideals with which citizens associate themselves, either as a means for achieving further goals or objectives, or as ends in themselvesⁱⁱ. As Worcester (1991; 1997) put it, values are the ‘deep tides’ of public mood, slow to change, but powerful: unlike opinions, which he saw as the ‘ripples’ on the surface of the public’s consciousness, often trivial and easily changeable. Attitudes were conceptualized by this author as the ‘currents’ below the surface, running deeper and stronger, and somewhat manifesting a linkage between both levels of values and opinions. Values encompass beliefs about moral standards concerning peoples’ well-being. According to Worcester’s analogy, the values that constitute the deep-rooted axiological convictions of an individual are relatively resistant to the ‘shallowness’ of media influences. Values are more abstract and hold a higher place in one’s internal evaluative hierarchy than attitudes (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004). They are the bases upon which our attitudes towards concrete social and political options will be expressed (Hofstede, 1998). Values can also be significantly differentiated from norms in that the former are trans-situational, whereas norms are attached to a specific situation. Norms capture an ought sense; values capture an ideal (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004: 361).

Sociologists and political scientists generally hold the view that values can be empirically assessed through the use of surveys that allow for international comparison. On the contrary, the idea that values may be measured provokes acute irritations among researchers in human sciences (Thome, 2008). Indeed, any classification and measurement of values imply difficulties. First of all, values are not part of an observable action; they form something intangible that lies at the basis of individuals’ preferences.ⁱⁱⁱ Secondly, research on values through the use of surveys is subject to the limitations implied in the methodology used to generate empirical evidence^{iv}. However, in the last decades significant efforts have been made to create a systematic measurement of values (Rokeach, 1973; Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz,

1992 and 1994). Using empirical evidence from large datasets including many countries, and through the use of factor analysis, a small number of value dimensions considered to be relevant for the study of social processes has been constructed^v.

Authors like Schwartz (2008) have made a distinction between individual and cultural values. The identification and operationalization of the index of values included in our analyses, however, is meant to be a study of social phenomena. By referring to ‘social values’ and elaborating indicators for them, we do not imply that these are something different from the values held by the individuals of a certain society. We assume that values are acquired and defined collectively. A different question is whether the predominance of certain social values may hide existing differences among subgroups within that larger society. But our theoretically assumption is that values are not an individual property, independently of the fact that we may measure them at the individual level. In other words, we measure the extent to which certain societal values (Haller, 2002) are more or less present among the populations of different European countries.

3. Research purpose

This article attempts to shed light on the relationship between social values and welfare regimes. Far from focusing our efforts on elucidating the direction of causality, our aim is to empirically study the correspondence that may exist between the values citizens express and the welfare regime of the country in which they live. Following the analytical framework set up by Rokkan’s typological-topological ‘model of Europe’ (Flora, 1999), we intend to map out the geographical distribution of social values.

We have selected *egalitarianism*, *achievement*, *age empathy*, *gender traditionalism*, as the main theoretical values conditioning welfare arrangements. To these, we have added two value dimensions that the literature has identified as being crucial for social policies: *religiosity*, *trust and multiculturalism*. Finally we have individualized as a key social value the support, or otherwise, for *tax progressiveness*. Arguably, the latter does not constitute a value in itself, but we contend that it reflect adequately the degree of (un)willingness by the members of the polity to support the financial sustainability of

institutionalized welfare. In what follows, a succinct review is made on the connection between social values and welfare;

Egalitarianism. This value is at the core of democratic theory and presupposes that democracy cannot work without equality and that, as a consequence, the government should intervene in order to reduce differences among the rich and the poor.

Achievement. It is associated with the assumption that there must be a difference in the valuing of some people over other people, normally based on merit or previous efforts. This value can also be associated to the contributory principle, according to which citizens participate in social insurance systems and obtain social benefits and welfare entitlements according to the contributions made during their working lives.

Age empathy. Respect and a high esteem for those age groups more vulnerable in society (the young and the elderly) can be related to forms of solidarity across age-groups.

Gender traditionalism. The valuation of the family has been historically associated with a gender division of tasks within the households and a parallel segmentation of the labour market by gender.

Religiosity. Arguably religiosity *per se* may not have a clear relationship with the welfare state. However, every religion entails basic notions of social justice with crucial effects on welfare institutionalization. The higher or lower degree of religiosity expressed by citizens can correlated with stronger or weaker attachments to the values transmitted by that religion.

Trust. Interpersonal trust can be regarded as a firm basis of support for the provision of public welfare. Recent empirical evidence, however, shows that levels of trust vary across welfare regime types (van Oorschot and Arts, 2005).

Multiculturalism. This value implies openness to living with population coming from different countries and having different cultures.^{vi} Given the increasing relevance of the debate, we presuppose multiculturalism to have important varying effects across different welfare regimes in Europe.

Tax progressiveness. The idea that those who enjoy a wealthier position in society should contribute more to the common good lies at the heart of the financial viability of the European welfare states. This value is adequately reflected in the articulation of progressive taxation systems.

Table 1 reproduces synthetically the main ‘principles’ and “rationales” characterising each welfare regime, as well as the main ‘social values’ that citizens in those welfare regimes are expected to hold. For the purpose of clarity, we have made a parsimonious characterisation of those welfare regimes based on the existing relevant literature. Thus, Table 1 stylizes our expectations regarding the connection between welfare regimes and values.

Table 1. Regimes, principles and values.

Welfare regime	Principles and rationales	Social values
Nordic	Statism (state support of individual autonomy), Solidarity.	Egalitarianism, (Tax progressiveness), low levels of Gender traditionalism.
Continental	Insurance for income maintenance, corporatism.	Achievement, Gender traditionalism.
Anglo-Saxon	Economic liberalism (state residualism and individualism) and social liberalism.	Liberalism, Multiculturalism.
Southern	Insurance for income maintenance, Familialism.	Achievement, Age Empathy Gender traditionalism.
Central-Eastern	Statism, mix of residualism and income maintenance.	Egalitarianism, Authoritarianism.

We should expect welfare regimes to be congruent with the widespread diffusion of those social values coherent with their organising principles and rationales. The following section deals with data, indicators, and the methodology used to assess the relationship between values and institutionalized welfare.

4. Data, indicators and methods

Our analyses are based on data from the 2008 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS). Among the 31 countries included in the original data set, five have not been finally included,^{vii} which leaves a final sample of 50,082 individuals in 26 countries.^{viii}

Attitudinal questions that are expected to express the underlying values we seek to explore have been selected. Factor analyses with pair-wise selection (to diminish case loss) were used to test the validity of our social values classification.^{ix} To elaborate empirical indicators of these social values, different items of the ESS 2008 questionnaire that tap into each value have also been chosen (see Appendix to see the wording of questions). As it is often the case, the main constraint for the operationalisation of these values has been the lack of survey questions matching “perfectly” the main dimensions of each value. All the values included in our axiological classification are richer and more complex than the indicators used to account for them. Nevertheless, attitudes expressed in the answers given to those questions can serve as good proxies for the social values we aim at analysing.

The questions related to the measurement of *age-empathy* differ from the others because of their sociotropic nature. They are indicative of a perception of a social norm rather than a personal opinion on specific age groups. This is not particularly problematic when mapping values across Europe, because of the necessary coherence between social norms and widespread values (e.g. in countries where social norms postulate respect for the elderly, positive values towards this age group should clearly prevail).

Table 2. Factor analysis. Rotated factor matrix (Varimax)

	Component									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Please tell me how likely it is that most people in [country] view those in their 20s as...friendly	,775									
...competent	,815									
...having high moral standards	,846									
...with respect	,800									
How religious are you?		,868								
How often attend religious services		,851								
How often pray apart from religious services		,879								
Immigrants make countries better or worse place to live			,870							
Country cultural life undermined or enriched by immigration			,849							
Immigration bad or good for country economy			,853							
Please tell me how likely it is that most people in [country] view those in their 70s as...friendly				,733						
...competent				,692						
...having high moral standards				,797						
...with respect				,769						
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful					,818					
Most people try to take advantage out of you, or try to be fair					,847					
Most of the time people helpful, or mostly looking out for themselves					,812					
Gay free to live their lives as they wish						,594				
Women cut down paid work for family						,725				
Men should have more right to a job than women						,793				
Schools should teach children to obey authority							,609			
People who break the law should							,718			

receive harsher sentences than today	
Keep terrorist in prison until police satisfied	,784
Higher earners receive higher pensions	,864
Higher earners larger unemployment benefits	,867
For a fair society, differences in the standard of living should be small	,906
Tax progressiveness	,993
Principal component analysis. Rotation: Varimax with Kaiser.	

After including those questions in an exploratory factor analysis pooling data for the 26 countries (see Table 2), they show the pattern of association expected for all values (NB. *Age Empathy* split into two indicators: *Empathy with the elderly* and *Empathy with the young*). This result suggests that a sole indicator suffices to measure eight out of the nine social values we include in our analysis, but two are required to adequately measure *age empathy*. Accordingly, the nine social values classification is finally operationalised through ten indicators. The factor model explains almost 70% of the total variance.^x The strong association coefficients of the questions included in each factor support the idea that they are not isolated attitudes to particular topics, but actual manifestations of more profound values.

Overall, the resulting classification of social values may be simple and non-exhaustive, but it is stable in time and across countries.^{xi} This stability allows us to use the scores of the factor analysis as indicators of a set of nine social values that are meaningful to all European societies and that can be theoretically linked to key aspects of welfare development.

In order to analyse the main lines of variation in the distribution of social values across Europe, we have computed the national average for each factor, and have performed a cluster analysis in which those averages constituted the aggregation variables, and


countries have operated as the units to be clustered. The resulting grouping can be interpreted as a basic classification of countries regarding the social values held by their populations. For our topological purposes, we have made use of the geographical software ArcGIS to elaborate maps where shades of colour indicate the extension of each value.^{xii}

5. Findings

The mapping of similarities and dissimilarities among countries with relation to citizens' values has been carried out after computing national means using Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA).^{xiii} This type of analysis associates countries with similar value patterns through a step by step procedure: the most similar countries are grouped first, and in subsequent steps other more dissimilar cases are added to the existing groupings. The advantage of this technique lies in the 'theory-blind' nature of the final clustering structure, which can be read as a tree diagram where countries extending from the same branch are more similar in terms of 'social values' than those located in different branches. Figure 1 presents the clustering of countries in a dendrogram^{xiv}:

Figure .1. Clustering of countries along proximity of social values.

Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



There is a main cleavage between North-Western countries, and Southern and Eastern European countries. The Nordic countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are clustered in a rather homogeneous group. Belgium and France appear very close in terms of values, and such is also the case of Switzerland and Germany. While the Southern-Eastern group is composed of nine countries from Eastern Europe and three of the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal and Cyprus), only Slovenia among the Eastern European countries clusters together with the Western block.

There is a much higher degree of heterogeneity in the group of Southern and Eastern European countries, where three small sub-groupings are distinguishable: the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal), a second group composed of Poland, Romania, Croatia and Slovakia and Cyprus, and a third one comprising Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Ukraine and Latvia. The Czech Republic and Bulgaria fit within the Southern-Eastern bloc, but are cases showing dissimilarities with the sub-groups just mentioned. An overall similarity within the general Eastern European pattern of values has therefore some peculiarities. Greece appears as the main outlier of this scheme, reflecting its relatively extreme scores in several of the social values of our analysis (i.e. highest scores in *empathy with the young*, *egalitarianism* and *religiosity*, while it ranks the lowest position in terms of *trust* and *multiculturalism*).

HCA provides a picture with the main lines of variation in social values across Europe. Nevertheless, a look at the national means is also necessary in order to determine the values that are more predominant in Europe as a whole, as well as to compare which values characterise more appropriately each specific area. Likewise, maps showing the distribution of social values have been elaborated to illustrate visually the clusters presented in the previous dendrogram.^{xv}


As a whole, European countries present high levels of *egalitarianism* (a mean of 3.7 in a range between 1 and 5), and medium to high levels of support for *tax progressiveness*. (2.4 mean in a range between 1 and 3). Such evidence suggests certain values associated to social justice are still widely held in the Old Continent. On average Europeans are highly egalitarians and supportive of social justice. Looking at the distribution of such values, it strikes to some extent that the Nordic countries are not necessarily those

leading scores on egalitarian values as one might have expected. *Egalitarianism* scores are especially high in Southern Europe, followed by Eastern European countries. Support for *tax progressiveness* is more heterogeneously distributed, with highest levels corresponding to Spain, Switzerland, Slovenia and Finland.

On reviewing the geographical distribution of the nine values used in our study, it has to be underlined that the Nordic countries score highest levels of *trust*, and rather high regarding *multiculturalism*.^{xvi} Citizens in the Nordic countries express low levels of *authoritarianism*, and together with the Netherlands and France, have a value profile characterised by lower than average levels of *religiosity* and *gender traditionalism*.

Continental Europe has a medium position concerning most social values, and it shares with the Nordic countries low levels of *religiosity*, *gender traditionalism* and *authoritarianism* (NB. Germany has the lowest levels as regards the latter). But scores on *multiculturalism* and *trust* are lower than in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands.

Figure 2 Distribution of Trust




* The absolute indicator for Trust ranges from 0 (Very low) to 10 (Very high).

As stated earlier, Southern-Eastern countries form a notably heterogeneous group. While citizens on Eastern European countries express lower levels of *trust* and higher levels of *authoritarianism*, Southern European countries score highest levels of *egalitarianism* of all countries under study. The latter countries also score high levels of *empathy with the elderly* and *empathy with the young*. This characterized them in a different manner from Eastern European countries, many of which score low levels of *age empathy*.

Eastern and Southern countries (especially Greece and Portugal, but not in the case of Spain) have the highest levels of *religiosity* and *gender traditionalism*. This latter value seems to be especially high in Eastern European countries, a finding which may explain the tendency towards “maternalism” in social policy-making in ex-Communist Eastern Europe, as has been observed in several case studies (Glass and Fodor, 2007; Saxonberg, 2007; Teplova, 2007).

Figure 3. Distribution of Gender Traditionalism




*The absolute indicator for Tradition ranges from 1 (Very low) to 5 (Very high).

The cluster analysis did not group the four Mediterranean countries together, most probably because in some respects Greece and Cyprus are closer to Eastern European

countries (for example in their low levels of *trust* and *multiculturalism* and high levels of *religiosity* and *gender traditionalism*), and in others they are closer to the other Southern countries (Spain and Portugal), as in *egalitarianism* and *empathy with the young*.

Figure 3 shows a quite clear-cut East-West on *gender traditionalism*. The North-South axis, which could, in principle, be expected (with the Nordic countries are less traditional than the Mediterranean ones), although Spain shows a level of *gender traditionalism* similar to that of countries like Germany, Belgium or Great Britain. In general, the Southern-Eastern region appears as more religious, traditional, and authoritarian than the West. This former block is also more egalitarian, but lesser multiculturalist. The Northern-Western cluster appears as the mirror image, instead (less religious, traditional and authoritarian, and showing higher levels of *trust* and *multiculturalism*).

Figure 4. Distribution of Egalitarianism



*The absolute indicator for Economic Universalism ranges from 1 (Very low) to 5 (Very high).

Comparing the results of our analysis with the values that we presupposed in Table 1, some unexpected results emerge. *Egalitarianism* is not a salient characteristic of the Nordic countries, which have a medium position on this value^{xvii} contrary to the value of *trust*, highest in all the data analyzed. According to the preferences expressed by the surveyed, *achievement* is a value quite extended throughout not only in Continental countries, but also in Portugal and Spain and parts of Eastern Europe. It does not seem to be as important in France, and it is also of low importance in Great Britain. Despite that Esping-Andersen's regime typology associates the Conservative regime with the maintenance of traditional gender and class divisions, neither *gender traditionalism* nor *religiosity* are more salient in continental welfare states than in liberal or social democratic ones. On average, the citizens of Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus) express higher levels of *empathy with the young and the elderly* than in the rest of the European countries. This pattern can be interpreted as being in correspondence with the familistic rationale attributed to this welfare regime. Regarding Eastern European countries, higher scores of *authoritarianism* and *egalitarianism* seem to match with the historical organisation of their welfare systems after WWI. Finally, support for *tax progressiveness* appears to be too heterogeneously distributed across Europe. Our exploratory analysis does not confirm a perfect accordance between welfare regimes and citizens' values. Certainly, they open up new avenues and for further research.

5. Conclusion

A clear relationship between the values expressed in attitudes by the citizens and the principles theoretically associated to each welfare regime is difficult to establish. Nordic populations do not stand out for its *egalitarianism*, but they do have the highest levels of *trust*. *Egalitarianism* is a value especially high in Southern and Eastern European countries. In turn, Eastern European countries show high levels of *gender traditionalism* a value increasingly low in West Southern countries. The latter give high levels of *age empathy*, which could well attributed to a familialistic model of inter-generational solidarity.

A look at our findings could provide interpretations for the renewed debates on the role of modernisation in the definition of the socio-political structures and predominant

social values of contemporary societies. The value cleavage between a set of North-Western European countries (societies characterised by being less religious and conformant, more benevolent and culturally universalistic, but less economically universalistic), and a more heterogeneous Southern/Eastern Europe cluster (more egalitarian in economic matters, less so in cultural terms, and more religious, traditional, and conformant in the Central-East) could be regarded as effects of the different ‘stages’ of modernization of these geographical areas (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

A diachronic understanding of the interactions between values, institutions and political processes in each society could shed light on a better understanding of the relationship circularity between values and institutions. Such a relationship is difficult to establish theoretically, as it can be only analysed empirically in concrete historical processes. The prevailing values of a given society when welfare institutionalisation began to take shape conditioned subsequent developments following a complex process of ‘iteration’. It may have reached a level of axiological saturation. A point in case would be the interpretation on why citizens of the universalistic Nordic regime express lower levels of *egalitarianism*, something which could be explained as a by-product of decades of implementing strong redistributive welfare policies. In turn, citizens of societies with decades of weak and/or inefficient redistributive policies, such as those in Southern and Eastern Europe, manifest a strong preference for reducing inequalities. All things considered, the following are but some of the various routes for future research on welfare and values to be further substantiated:

(1) Convergence or divergence between social values and welfare arrangements and the legitimacy of the institutions. Liberal democratic theory is based on the axiom that political institutional arrangements, as well as public policies, should be grounded on the preferences of the citizenry. Evidence shows that the translation of that general will is not linear, as it is mediated by the framing of ideas, institutional inertia and the structure of political representation (advocacy coalitions, bureaucracies, political parties, social actors, veto players, and electoral systems, to name just a few). However, a degree of congruence between values and welfare institutions can be interpreted as a normative proviso for preserving the social cohesion of European societies.

(2) The change in values over time, and the differences in values held among generations. This study has focused on value differences across countries, given that these are still the main spatial units from which policy decisions are carried out. Nevertheless, further research needs to compare value differences and to detect possible value cleavages among different social groups - ethnic, class-based or gender based. Among this, a comparison of the values held across generations may be of especial importance to elucidate possible generational cleavages.

This study has interpreted the available evidence as a legitimate claim for the grounding of a 'European social model' in a common European welfare axiology. The polysemic nature of this notion will be nevertheless strongly conditioned by the ideas, institutions and interests at the national arenas, where a strong linguistic and media segmentation still persists.

Notes

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ⁱ Eastern European countries still have much in common regarding social policy (Aidukaite, 2009), but some authors identify two trends of development: (a) a trend towards institutional partnership, with some countries grouping around a variant of West European welfare state combining a mix of Bismarckian-style social insurance and Scandinavian-style tax financing. Aidukaite (2003) exemplifies this trend with the Slovenian case. Potucek (2004; 2008) analyses the Czech Republic to conclude that this country has turned to the historical Bismarckian model that preceded the communist experience; and Deacon (2000) widens the group including in it not only the former two countries, but also Hungary, Poland and Estonia; and (b) a trend towards economic liberalism and residualisation of the WS, which impels growing sections of the population to rely on private welfare. Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia would be illustrative of this path (Aidukaite, 2003; Deacon, 2000; Fenger, 2007).

ⁱⁱ According to Swidler (1986), culture is not composed of a series of beliefs and values, but rather of large organized capacities for action, or in other words, of a series of practices. Her sharp critique to the values approach, based on Bourdieu, is useful to understand at the micro level why some social groups do not behave as the values they express. Nevertheless, our research focuses on the values that predominate in a society and which are consequently a referent for action of most social groups living within that society, independently of what their actual practices are.

ⁱⁱⁱ Several authors had precisely rejected research on values given the difficulties they posed for empirical observation. Ayer (1946), representing the argument of logical positivists, denied their relevance for scientific purposes and declared them nonsensical. From a more nuanced position, legal positivists recognised the importance of values and their role in society, but considered the possibility of an enquiry into their nature and repercussions beyond the scope of scientific knowledge (Kelsen, 1967; Khoshkish, 1974).

^{iv} Among others, that: (a) the measurement typically is by self-report and thus it is subject to the same biases as other self-report methods; (b) The context may be important in influencing how people fill out value surveys; and (c) longitudinal work is needed to assess the stability of the issues at stake (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004).

^v For Hofstede (1980) the main dimensions to be considered are individualism versus collectivism, power distance, masculinity/femininity, and uncertainty avoidance; while for Inglehart (1997), who bases his work on modernization theory, the main dimensions of analysis are his well-known transition from materialist to post-materialist values, to which he recently added the Weberian dichotomy between traditional and rational-legal forms of legitimacy. Schwartz' team has dedicated several years of research to develop a universal classification of human values, which has been empirically tested and used by other authors. He gives the following classification: Power, Achievement and Hedonism (forming the dimension self-enhancement), Stimulation and Self-direction (Openness to Change), Universalism and Benevolence (Self-transcendence), Tradition, Conformity and Security (Conservatism).

^{vi} Immigrants tend to be considered the least deserving among potentially needy groups (Van Oorschoot, 1998 and 2008; Appelbaum, 2002). Following this hypothesis it is expected that negative images of immigration and immigrants could in the long run undermine support for public policies in Europe. Arguably, this perception could undermine support for the European welfare state much in the same way as the negative images of Afro-Americans in the US (Gilens, 1999). Against this view, empirical research has shown that in Europe left politics supports cross-ethnic solidarity (Taylor-Gooby, 2005).

^{vii} The 26 countries included in our analyses are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Russian Federation, Ukraine. Five countries are not included: (a) Austria, Ireland, and Lithuania because data was not available; and (b) Turkey and Israel were not included because they would not fit accurately within our theoretical framework. Unfortunately, Italy did not participate in this wave of the ESS and we were

not able to take into consideration data from this important Mediterranean country. Although the data used comes from the 2008 wave, information from the previous waves (2002, 2004 and 2006) has been taken into account to check for the temporal stability of the proposed classification of social values.

^{viii} Although the quality of the data is generally high, small biases were detected in some national samples. To account for the potential deviations, all the analyses were done using weighted data.

^{ix} We chose to rotate the factor structure orthogonally (Varimax). This method ignores possible correlations between factors but, as an advantage, factor independence allows the inclusion of all factors in regression models without concerns for multi-collinearity.

^x Overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO): 0.79. Explained variance with 10 factors: 69.4%.

^{xi} The robustness of the proposed analytical model was tested using three complementary strategies: we verified its stability over time by replicating the analysis with previous ESS waves (2002/2004/2006); we confirmed the comparability of the instrument across countries by repeating the analysis in each individual country, and finally we checked the construct validity of our indicators by adding different questions to the factor model and looking at its correlations with each of the factors. The results of all three tests were satisfactory (see Web Appendix for more details).

^{xii} ArcGIS can apply different algorithms to select the cut points that better reflect the data structure. Maps were elaborated using Jenks's 'natural breaks' algorithm. This method constitutes the implementation of the Jenks optimization procedure made available in ESRI's ArcView GIS software. As Brewer & Pickle (2002) point out, the (Jenks) optimization minimized within-class variance and maximized between-class variance in an iterative series of calculations. ESRI's documentation did not explain the specifics of their algorithm, but the ArcView natural-breaks method produced the same class breaks as did the Jenks algorithm that minimizes the sum of absolute deviations from class means'.

^{xiii} Countries are the units to be grouped, and national means in each value (i.e. in each factor) are the aggregation variables. Average linkage (Between Groups).

^{xiv} Cluster structure shall be not taken at face value but as a guide to look at our data. Recall that it has been performed including all nine values, though some of them may be more interesting or relevant than others for theoretical interpretation.

^{xv} The advantage of elaborating maps instead of computing means of values across welfare regimes lies in the fact that maps are unconstrained by theory, allowing us to see the fits and misfits between theory and data. The differences between countries that these maps show proved to be statistically significant using ANOVA.

^{xvi} This finding is coherent with those interpretations on welfare regimes and social capital carried out by Van Oorschot and Arts (2005).

^{xvii} This finding does not necessarily imply a "lack of tune" between policy makers and citizens. For recent empirical research on the reforms carried out in Nordic countries, cfr. (Kildal and Kuhnle, 2006).

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