

Unidad de Políticas Comparadas (CSIC)

Documento de Trabajo 02-10

# Spain: Poverty, Social Exclusion and 'Safety Nets'\*

Ana Arriba and Luis Moreno

[Arriba@iesam.csci.es](mailto:Arriba@iesam.csci.es)

[Lmorfer@iesam.csic.es](mailto:Lmorfer@iesam.csic.es)

Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)  
Unidad de Políticas Comparadas

European Project FIPOSC ('Fighting Poverty and Social Exclusion in Southern Europe: Dilemmas of Organization and Implementation')

Programme 'Improving the Human Research Potential and Socio-economic Knowledge Base',  
Research Directorate General, European Commission,  
HPSE-CT-2001-60020

September 2002

---

\* This report is based in previous texts elaborated by both authors: Arriba (1999, 2002), Moreno and Arriba (1999); and Moreno (2000a/b, 2001a/b, 2002a/b; & Sarasa, 1993). The authors express their gratitude to Teresa Buil for her assistance in data collection and the elaboration of appendices, tables and figures.

## 1. Introduction

The Spanish welfare state incorporates elements of both Bismarckian and Beveridgean traditions, and can be labelled as a *via media* with respect to other regimes of social protection. It combines universal and targeted access to services and benefits. The most relevant factor conditioning welfare development in Spain is the importance of decentralisation both at the level of planning and policy implementation. Decentralisation of social assistance and services has had much greater impact than privatisation in the last decades.

After a long hyper-centralist dictatorship (1939-75), a peaceful transition to democracy (1975-79), and an active involvement in the process of Europeanisation after its accession to the EEC (1986), Spain has undergone deep and far-reaching social transformations. In economic terms, Spanish development has been outstanding: in 1959 the Spanish GDP per head was 58.3% of the EU average; in 1985, 70.6% and, by 1998, 81.5%. Spain would match the EU mean by the year 2025 if the annual 'catching-up' rate of 0.8% were maintained. No other country in the group of the advanced industrial democracies has achieved a comparable rate of economic growth. However, economic problems, high levels of unemployment, a severe demographic imbalance and the abrupt decline of the traditional system of domestic care are now threatening the stability of the welfare settlement.

As a member of the Mediterranean family of nations, Spain shares with Greece, Italy and Portugal<sup>1</sup> similarities in historical background, value-systems, and institutional characteristics. The four Southern European countries constitute a distinct welfare regime alongside the well-researched Anglo-Saxon, Continental and Nordic (Sarasa and Moreno, 1995; Ferrera, 1996; Rhodes, 1997). The role played by the family in the Mediterranean regime constitutes one of its more characteristic traits. Within households, 'superwomen'<sup>2</sup> have in the last decades deployed a remarkable hyperactivity, which has been crucial for both social cohesion and economic growth of the Mediterranean countries (Moreno, 2002b).

Of singular importance regarding Mediterranean welfare development are the manifestations of its cultural-axiological dimension. This is reflected in a self-perception of differentiated needs and lifestyles (intra-familial pooling of resources, home ownership, and heterogeneity of social reproduction). Also noticeable is a compelling household micro-solidarity and a pre-eminence of values of family inclusion and life-cycle redistribution (gift mechanisms, processes of age emancipation, proliferation of family companies and jobs). Moreover, cultural choices and practices have structured their civil societies in a characteristic mode (social networking, patronage, clientelism, and group

---

<sup>1</sup> Although Portugal does not have a Mediterranean coast, and its formidable overseas expansion was historically carried out with an Atlantic mentality, its axiological resources belong to a high degree to the *Mare Nostrum* cultural world.

<sup>2</sup> By 'superwomen' we refer to a type of Mediterranean woman who has been able to reconcile unpaid caring work in the household and her increasing professional activities in the paid labour market. Cohorts of women in the age group 40-59 are, *grosso modo*, representatives of this type of 'superwoman'.

predation). However, common to other EU welfare regimes is the debate in Southern Europe concerning the promotion of social inclusion, and the fight against poverty and situations of citizens' precariousness and vulnerability.

Contrary to some views regarding South European countries as a mere 'Latin rim' extra-profiting of 'social dumping' practices, the evidence show that the countries of the Mediterranean regime are the only ones which have increased their overall social spending during the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1). Note that the difference between the welfare regime with the highest social spending in 1984 (Continental) and the average of the Mediterranean countries was 9.4 per percentage points. This figure was reduced in 1997 to 7.4 between the highest spender Nordic regime and the South European countries.

The welfare state in Spain represents today a fundamental structure for both social reproduction and political legitimisation (see Table 2). Since its integration in the European Community (1986), Spain has followed a pattern of welfare convergence with their European counterparts of a three-fold nature. Firstly, a generalisation of social entitlements (education, health, pensions). Secondly, a confluence in the pattern of welfare expenditure to the mean of its European partners. Thirdly, a diversification in the provision of social services by private and 'third sector' organisations.<sup>3</sup>

Spain social expenditure has noticeably increased during the 1980s and 1990s. This is more evident if we consider that OECD figures do not generally take into account social spending of the Spanish regional government, which has dramatically increased their share in the total aggregate of Spanish public expenditure (see Table 3). Note in this respect that already in 1992 Spain's total social expenditure reached the figure of 22.7% of the GDP (Rodríguez Cabrero, 1994)

As in other Mediterranean countries, the aggregate of public policies and interventions associated to 'safety nets' have developed in a fragmented manner. Indeed, Spanish welfare state expansion has been quite pronounced but it has generally been accomplished inductively on incrementalist bases. As a result, benefits and services are targeted on different collectives, which often do not have any correlation between them, although they sometimes share the same characteristics (Eardley *et al*, 1996). Note that other functional intervening factors, such as intra-familial transfers, community help, or altruistic help provided by NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) and 'third sector' associations, have greatly contributed to consolidate 'safety nets' although much research work is needed in order to systematise evidence in this respect. However, it is worth looking at the primary institutions of reference for the poor in Spain: more than 50% of all poor in Spain go first to either Caritas or the Red Cross in search of support (Table 4).

---

<sup>3</sup> Note that social services were already a domain for private intervention. The new scenario is precisely the building of public networks within which the third sector plays a subsidiary --in many cases publicly subsidised-- role.

This report analyses developments in Spanish welfare mainly with relation to policies dealing with poverty alleviation and programmes combating social exclusion. Core areas of observation are the so-called 'safety nets' of social protection, which have been 'under construction' in Spain during the last 15 years.

'Safety nets' aim at providing citizens and families with basic means that guarantee the satisfaction of minimum vital needs and facilitate civic integration. 'Safety nets' are bottom-lines of welfare provision and as such they adopt institutionalised expressions that vary in degrees and manners (Moreno, 2000b, 2001b). The complex task for the social scientist is to determine the constituent materials by which 'safety nets' are interwoven. Public programmes of social assistance provided on a means-tested basis are basic constituent elements. In many cases these programmes are not a social security responsibility, although they may be linked to contributory social services and subsidies.

In the following section of this paper a review of the historical background to the development of social policies in Spain is carried out. The evolution of poverty alleviation programmes is examined within the broader Spanish welfare state framework. A special incidence is made on the creation of regional systems of social services and the development of programmes of social assistance by both central and regional layers of government.

After analysing the compound nature of the Spanish 'safety nets', the third section concentrates on the latest developments and initiatives undertaken with reference to the 2001-2003 National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (NAPSI, or NAP/incl., as expressed in document of the European Commission).

As already pointed out, decentralisation is the single most important variable in the development of policies concerning social services and assistance in Spain. A greater regional say in areas of policy-making closer to citizens' perceptions, such as the 'weaving of safety nets', have often been claimed on cultural or identity considerations. But demands on the grounds that policy innovation and a more effective management are facilitated by the devolution of powers to regions and municipalities have also been put forward. Evidence supporting those claims can be tested by the implementation in Spain of minimum income schemes (*Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*).

In the light of the Spanish experience, it is concluded that more attention is to be paid on the increasing role of regional and local layers of government. These, in concurrence with central institutions of EU institutions and of member states, are key actors in order to promote social inclusion of those precarious citizens facing poverty or social exclusion.

## **2. Historical Background**

The development of welfare in Spain can only be understood in the context of the historical background prior to the transition from Francoism to democracy (1975-78). The peaceful democratic transition was made possible by the deployment of consensual politics among representatives, parties and social actors, who

accepted the fact that the reform-process had to take into account the previous institutional framework. Thus, the consolidation of Spain's welfare state had to evolve from the institutions and social protection policies developed during Franco's dictatorship (1939-75).

### **2.1. 1939-1967: The years of autarchy and the boom of 'desarrollismo'**

This period was characterised by an attempt to achieve total autarchy with no foreign interference. Social policy was largely neglected and oriented towards both charity and beneficence.

"Our State must be Catholic in the social", General Franco had already declared in 1937. The *Obra Social* was set up in order to "bring joy and bread to the Spanish families". The worker was regarded as a unit of economic production and, accordingly, was entitled to receive social protection against unexpected risks. In turn, he or she should be obedient and diligent. This kind of Catholic paternalism had been elaborated by the most reactionary sector of Spanish Catholicism, which advocated that income should correspond to social status.

A peculiar aspect incorporated in the *Fuero del Trabajo*, a constitutional Labour Act implemented by Franco's Government in 1938, concerned the social status of women. The Francoist State pursued the 'return' of women from the factory to the household. To this end a family subsidy was introduced within social security to encourage women to remain at home "taking care of their husband and children".

The National Institute for Social Provision (*Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social*) was the institution responsible for social insurance. It incorporated gradually and in a rather disorderly manner the administration of the various existing benefits and subsidies. In 1938, a Family Subsidy (*Subsidio Familiar*) was established. In 1942, the programme of *Plus Familiar* was also created. This subsidy was basically a complement to salaries. Unemployment insurance was established much later, in 1969, and was directed at the affiliates of the retirement and illness insurance schemes. In this indirect way wage restrictions were imposed on the beneficiaries (Guillén, 1992).

In 1939, an old-age subsidy was introduced to provide benefits for low-waged employees. This turned into the SOVI in 1947 (*Seguro Obligatorio de Vejez e Invalidez*, Compulsory Insurance for Retirement and Invalidity). In 1942, the Statutory Sickness Insurance was also implemented (SOE, *Seguro Obligatorio de Enfermedad*). Its duration was limited in time regardless of the health condition of the claimant, and its implicit aim was to 'encourage' the employee to go back to work as soon as possible.<sup>4</sup>

Along with the compulsory social insurance, the old system of mutual insurance was restored. This latter system was meant to be complementary to the former.

---

<sup>4</sup> Health services were delivered by both public and private institutions in agreement with the social security system. This latter arrangement secured the incomes of medical doctors, who in most cases also worked in the private sector. The pharmaceutical industry profited abundantly as well. In turn, the quality of the public health service was very poor (Moreno and Sarasa, 1993).

But both systems developed in an overlapping and duplicating manner . Labour *mutualidades* (mutual aid associations) were non-profit making associations, organised according to occupational and territorial criteria. They were financed by payroll taxes and developed according to a system of capitalisation. Their benefits were allocated to their members according to an income maintenance criterion.

Public intervention other than the labour population was paternalistic and provided along charity lines. Social services were very residual in the public sphere and were integrated in the local administration (mainly provincial administrations, or *Diputaciones*), and within the Home Ministry at the central level of government. Benefits were distributed by a Fund of Social-Charitable Protection (*Fondo de Protección Benéfico-Social*), which had a share of profits accrued by public lotto and games, and which also received private donations. Help and assistance to beneficiaries were provided in a rather discretionary manner in situations of visible need.

Given the scarce public intervention in programmes for poverty alleviation, subsidiary action was carried out by private organisations, mainly associated to the RC Church, and by foundations such as those of the Red Cross and some quasi-public Saving Banks (*obras sociales de las Cajas de Ahorro*). The fascist *Falange*, the only legal party in Franco's dictatorship, also developed an institution for social assistance (*Obra de Auxilio Social*). This was an authoritarian, para-state body, which was based upon the voluntary work (in many cases forced by a compulsory social service for women, along the lines of military conscription for men)

The period of economic '*desarrollismo*' (developmentalism) started with the implementation of the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, which marked the turning point for the progressive liberalisation of the Spanish economy. Technocrats of the *Opus Dei* held the key posts in Franco's government and imported models of 'indicative planning' from France.<sup>5</sup> Some steps were taken to implement a system of labour regulation that moderated somewhat its *dirigiste* nature. In 1958, for example, a Collective Agreements Act allowed employers and employees to negotiate wages (which had previously been regulated by the Ministry of Labour) at the factory level. In 1963 the Minimum Wage (*Salario Mínimo Interprofesional*) was legally established. Note that full employment was practically achieved at the cost of the emigration of a great proportion of the Spanish workers to central European countries.

In 1960, several funds for financing assistance were legally established, such as the National Fund for Social Assistance (*Fondo Nacional de Asistencia Social, FONAS*). This Fund had the aim of supporting charity institutions and of distributing subventions to develop some social services. In the late 1960s, the RC Church reinforced its subsidiary role according to the doctrine of Social Catholicism. This was evident in those activities of Caritas which pursued a more

---

<sup>5</sup> With the implementation of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan public expenditure was reduced, the Peseta was devalued, and investment controls were relaxed. Foreign holdings of up to 50% in Spanish companies were permitted. The results of the *desarrollismo* were impressive, with GDP growing by an annual 7% between 1960 and 1974.

comprehensive course of action away from those traditional charities of mere relief to the needy.

In 1963, the Basic Law of the Social Security (*Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social*) was put into effect. It had a universalistic vocation and went hand in hand with a timid fiscal reform. A peculiar model of economic development - vocationally neo-Keynesian but constrained by the rigidities of an authoritarian regime - attempted the transition from an agrarian society to a fully industrialised polity with some degree of success, modifying in this process the occupational structure of the country.

Social expenditure grew significantly during the 1960s: from a 35.5% in 1960 to 55.9% in 1970 of the total public spending. Note, however, that the increase was a meagre 3 percentage point of the GDP. Social assistance continued to play a secondary role in the system of social protection and income maintenance contributory programmes were the main priority in reforms which extended coverage to affiliated employees of the Social Security.

In sum, after the 1959 Stabilisation Plan, and in the absence of an entrepreneurial class, Franco's technocrats from the state institutions promoted a process of economic modernisation. However, public intervention was mainly geared at avoided social unrest by means of combining both paternalism and repression (Rodríguez Cabrero, 1989).

## **2.2. 1968-78: Late Francoism and the transition to democracy**

The opposition movement against Francoism became very active in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These were years of political and social turmoil that constituted the prelude to the transition to democracy after the death of Franco in November 1975. In 1969, don Juan Carlos had been appointed future head of state and, in 1970, a preferential treaty had been signed between Spain and the European Economic Community (EEC).

In 1972 reform of the Social Security, the Financing and Improvement Law (*Ley de Financiación y Perfeccionamiento*) was implemented with the aim of expanding social protection, especially concerning temporary labour incapacity, unemployment and old-age pensions. The linkage of workers' contributions to real incomes allowed for a significant increase of benefits in the contributory system. New special regimes of the Social Security (up to 20) were created and increased the fragmentation of the contributory system. Unequal social contributions and payroll taxes paid to the social security system favoured middle classes and large companies. Despite some improvements in the level of protection, these reforms underlined the negative level of internal equalisation within the contributory system (Cruz Roche, Desdentado and Rodríguez Cabrero, 1985).

With the implementation of the General Education Law (*Ley General de Educación*) in 1970 and the General Law of social security Law (*Ley General de la Seguridad Social*) in 1974, the level of public spending rose very significantly. Considerable wage increases also took place between 1974 and 1976. These factors set the basis for the subsequent climate of social consensus that

contributed to making the peaceful transition to democracy possible. The main bulk of social spending since the 1970s was devoted to retirement pensions and unemployment benefits.

At the end of the Francoist period in Spain, social assistance was characterised by a scarce public financing, a limited degree of social protection, and the important role played by some private or non-profit making institutions. The small supply of social services was provided by a variety of both public bodies and private institutions.

In 1977, the General Directorate for Social Action and Social Services was established within the Ministry of Health and Social Security. This governmental body took over those responsibilities of social assistance which had been previously attached to various departments of the central government (Home Ministry, principally). It run programmes such as those related to the Social Assistance Fund (*Fondo de Asistencia Social*), whose non-contributory benefits covered old-age and disability pensions. This was considered to be the principal instrument of social assistance at that time.

Within the contributory system of the social security, there were services for gainfully employees and their dependent family members. The social security system was re-structured with the grouping of old-age and disabled services into the Institute for Social Services (*INSERSO-Instituto de Servicios Sociales*), a quasi-autonomous public agency of the social security within the framework of the Ministry of Labour.

In parallel, local authorities (municipalities and provincial authorities) continued to run various programmes of social assistance, which were in many cases the inheritors of traditional public charities and beneficence. Private institutions also continued to provide charitable donations and some services, particularly those offered by RC Church organisations.

In the period of transition to democracy, renewed citizens' demands for the implementation of new social services were coupled with an active mobilisation of the social workers in order to develop a new framework of service provision (Sarasa, 1993; Casado *et al.*, 1994).

Outside the contributory realm, Francoism left a very meagre system of social assistance, reduced coverage of unemployment, absence of welfare cash benefits, insufficient social services with a high degree of institutional dispersion, a prevalence of beneficence criteria and approaches, and a paramount concern towards keeping the social order. Both the RC Church, benefiting from large state subsidies, and the family (namely women's caring activities), played a crucial subsidiary role during Francoism (Arriba, 1999).

### **2.3. 1978-1987: The establishment of the regional systems of social services**

An historical review of the reforms implemented in Spain since the inception of the democratic Constitution of 1978 has to acknowledge the fragmented and



inductive nature of the reforms implemented during the transition to democracy. The 1978 Constitution inaugurated the period of institutionalisation of the social services in Spain and the activities within the social assistance realm.

According to the Spanish *Carta Magna*, social assistance is a regional power of the 'exclusive competence' of the 17 Autonomous Communities (art. 148; 1.20). Powers concerning the basic legislation and the economic regime of the social security system remained within the domain of the central government. However, the *Comunidades Autónomas* (Autonomous Communities) could exercise executive powers in the running and managing of contributory programmes which could be decentralised to them (art. 149; 1.17).

The constitutional provisions neither defined nor regulated the non-contributory realm of social assistance and social services. Furthermore, all those powers and responsibilities which were not listed as 'exclusive competence' of the central government could be claimed and exercised by the Autonomous Communities (art 149.3).

As a consequence of the flexibility of the constitutional provisions, all Autonomous Communities claimed in their Statutes of Autonomy (regional constitutional laws) a large number of services and functions concerning social assistance, social services, community development, social promotion and welfare policies in general. The only services, which remained outside the request of the mesogovernments, were those of the INSERSO. However, and as we will analyse below, during the 1990s the executive powers for the running of practically all INSERSO social services have also been transferred to the *Comunidades Autónomas*.

During the period 1982-1993, the Autonomous Communities took the legislative initiative in their regional parliaments, and passed acts which established regional systems of social services. In these pieces of legislation there were no references to social assistance as such. The implicit assumption was that, according to a comprehensive interpretation, social assistance was an 'exclusive' power of the Autonomous Communities, alongside with the social services. In this period the main concern for the Spanish mesogovernments was to request and receive as many powers from the central administration as a flexible interpretation of the 1978 Constitution could allow. The *Comunidades Autónomas* subsequently made extensive use of their constitutional prerogative for purposes of institutional legitimisation.

In order to develop an integrated network of social services, a common claim in the legislation adopted by the regional parliaments was the principle of decentralisation. According to this, local governments would carry out the bulk of service provision,<sup>6</sup> but the powers of legislation, planning, and co-ordination with the private and altruistic sectors would rest upon regional executives and legislatures.

---

<sup>6</sup> Responsibilities in the provision of social services for municipalities of more than 20,000 inhabitants had already been established by the Basic Law for Local Government passed by the Spanish Parliament in 1982.

All regional laws envisaged the social services as an integrated public system, open to all citizens without discrimination. Universal access and equal treatment were, thus, the two ideological foundations of the regional legislation on welfare provision. Traditional public beneficence was to be 'updated' so that stigmatisation of beneficiaries could be avoided. All things considered, the aim was one of modernisation of the social services in line with other experiences of welfare provision in Western Europe. Such aspirations were to be in tune with the aim of rationalising the provision of new services. To this end inputs of a comprehensive, equal and public nature put forward by a new generation of trained social workers were very important.

The idea of the welfare 'mix' was also embraced enthusiastically by most Spanish mesogovernments so that social intervention could be optimised. Non-profit organisations, in particular, were incorporated in the general provision of social services, and many of them were subsidised by the regional public bodies.

The processes for the implementation of regional systems of social services in Spain were not developed without a degree of friction with the central government. In 1986, a decision of the Constitutional Court (146/1986) established that, despite the 'exclusive' powers of the Autonomous Communities in this field, the central government could also develop programmes of social assistance guaranteeing an equal treatment to all *Comunidades Autónomas*.

Among the initiatives taken by the central government during this period, the passing of the *LISMI* Law (1982) is to be underlined. This piece of legislation provided guaranteed benefits to citizens with disability (65% or higher). In the years 1983-84, the Socialist Government also attempted unsuccessfully to enact a National Act of Social Services. This Law would aim at integrating all 'scattered' social services within the contributory system of the social security into one institutional framework, centrally managed. But the Spanish mesogovernments remained as the main protagonists in the area of welfare development, a logical consequence of the home-rule-all-round process of decentralisation (Casado *et al.*, 1994).

#### **2.4. 1988-2000: The expansion and consolidation of welfare programmes**

The year 1988 can be identified as the beginning of a cycle of major developments concerning social services in Spain, and of a big expansion of social spending. The establishment in 1988 of the Ministry of Social Affairs<sup>7</sup> aimed at the development of a social policy, and area of public intervention which had been 'hidden' within the organisational structure of the Ministry of

---

<sup>7</sup> The Ministry was formed by the General Directorate of Social Action, the INSERSO, and the Institutes for the Women and the Youth, and the Board for the Education and Care of the Disabled. It took also the responsibility of supervising the activities of NGOs, such as the Red Cross, the Blinds' Organisation, and other non-profit private charities.

Labour. However, central intervention was somewhat conditioned by the consolidation of the regional systems promoted by the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas*. Some views were expressed against the establishment of a Ministry which would lack of many powers already decentralised to the mesogovernments (Beltrán, 1992).

But the newly created Ministry of Social Affairs pursued a course of action of co-ordination with the mesogovernments in the development of General Plans such as those concerning Old-age, Drug Addiction, Equal Opportunities, or Youth. These Plans were not passed as pieces of legislation by the Spanish Parliament. They were agreements aiming at making functional the structures of welfare provision in the whole of Spain. In particular, they paved the way for the future transfer of the social services of the INSERSO to the regional systems of social services.

The most important agreement between the three layers of governments had already taken place in 1987 with the approval of the 'Concerted Plan for the Development of the Basic Provision of Social Services by the Local Authorities' (*Plan Concertado para el Desarrollo de Prestaciones Básicas de Servicios Sociales de las Corporaciones Locales*). This intergovernmental agreement has resulted in an administrative co-operation between central, regional and local governments. The aim is that of providing services at the municipal level for the following purposes: (a) information and counselling; (b) social and day care services for the disabled and elderly; (c) refuge for abused women, single mothers, orphans or mistreated minors, and shelter housing for the homeless; and (d) prevention and social insertion.

This network of centres constitutes the basic level for primary attention in Spain, and was supported by all Autonomous Communities except the Basque Country.<sup>8</sup> The annual financing of this Plan is met on equitable terms by the three layers of governments. This agreement was the first in a model of intergovernmental relations characteristic of the process of federalisation of politics in Spain. Its implications for other policy areas have been of no little significance (Agranoff, 1993; Moreno, 2001c).

Also in 1987, Spain had joined the EEC II Programme of Fight Against Poverty. This involvement enabled the collaboration of various private and public institutions at the different level of government. Comparisons with the situation in other European countries were drawn. As a result, a growing concern on poverty was noticeable at the various institutional levels and cognitive domains (intervention and research).

During this period the major reform carried out by the central government concerning low-income citizens was the universalisation of old-age and disability pensions. These pensions have become a fundamental component in the weaving of the Spanish 'safety net'. In 1990, the Law of Non-Contributory Pensions of the Social Security (26/1990) put into effect the awarding of means-

---

<sup>8</sup> The Basque government did not join this general agreement because it did not accept categorical financing.

tested benefits for old-age and disabled citizens outside the social security system. The 26/1990 Law also established the awarding of means-tested benefits to low-income families for children under 18 years and handicapped (see Table 9), and to which both families in the contributory and non-contributory systems were entitled to claim.

The most relevant developments regarding assistance and non-contributory benefits were implemented during this period. All things considered, the single most innovative contribution in the construction of 'safety nets' in Spain has been made possible by the process of decentralisation of power to the 17 *Comunidades Autónomas*. These have developed an active role regarding the implementation of policies directed to fight poverty and social exclusion. Let us remind that the executive responsibilities for the running of the INSERSO services were also handed over to the Autonomous Communities.

In parallel, and mostly during the 1990s, the regions decided to implement their programmes of minimum income for insertion (*Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*). These are programmes of minimum income guaranteed for low-income families, which aim at facilitating social insertion of the recipient families (along the lines of the early principles established by the French RMI). These minimum income benefits filled in a hole in the social protection system or, in other words, helped to complete the 'weaving' of the Spanish 'safety net' as it stands now. Such benefits were intended to provide monetary resources to those citizens potentially active in the labour market confronting situations of need. Elaboration and implementation of these programmes by the Spanish regions took place between 1989 (first programme introduced in the Basque Country) and 1995 (last one implemented in the Balearic Islands). In chapter 4 main features of these programmes will be analysed. Let us point out now that, despite their common initial purposes, they are diverse as regards protection intensity, coverage or means to achieve social integration of programme beneficiaries.

This period of expansion for social assistance and services took place precisely when the Ministry of Social Affairs was subsumed in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs after the victory of the Popular Party in the 1996 General Elections. The former Ministry's powers and competencies were integrated in the lower ranked *Secretaría General de Asuntos Sociales*. Also in 1996 the INSERSO changed its name with the assumption of competencies concerning migration. It was renamed as IMSERSO (*Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales* – Institute for Migration and Social Services). Since then, it has kept minor executive programmes regarding services for emigrants, as well as some functions of co-ordination with EU programmes.

The considerable expansion of both regional social services and social assistance programmes has resulted in a *de iure* segmentation between the contributory (social insurance system for 'insiders' and gainfully employed) and social assistance realms of welfare provision (for those excluded from the formal labour market). However, both domains are intertwined in an aggregate of social provision. This has been inspired by the general principle of social

citizenship and has, thus, expanded the 'grey zones' between both social insurance and welfare assistance realms (Moreno and Sarasa, 1993).

Note that in the period 1980-92, the total number of pensioners rose by 2,5 million (2,1, contributory, and 0,4, non-contributory), from 4,7 to 7,2 million. The total expenditure increased from 5.9% (5.8%, contributory, and 0.1%, non-contributory) to 8.6% (8.1 contributory, and 0.5 non-contributory) as a percentage of the Spanish GDP. Average social security pension benefits increased from 66.5% of the minimum salary, in 1980, to 93.3% in 1992, and 100%, in 1995. Non-contributory pensions amounted to 53.3% of the legal minimum salary in 1992 (Cruz Roche, 1994).<sup>9</sup>

After this period of expansion reforms have concentrated in the consolidation of the general system of social protection, especially as concerns financing. This course of action has been based on the consent of the main parliamentary parties and social agents (trade unions, principally). The Report on the 'Proposal for the Analysis of the Structural Problems of the Social Security System and of the Main Reforms to be Accomplished' (*Ponencia para el Análisis de los Problemas Estructurales del Sistema de la Seguridad Social y de las Principales Reformas que deberán acometerse*) was approved by the Congress of Deputies (Spanish parliamentary Lower House) on April 6, 1995, and has since then been known as the *Pacto de Toledo*.<sup>10</sup> Among the main objectives pursued two can be underlined:

(1) A clear division between contributory social insurance and universal non-contributory benefits. This implies that benefits and services of a universal nature (health and social services), and assistance subsidies (pensions' supplements, non-contributory pensions and cash benefits for dependent children) are to be financed by transfers from general taxation revenue. Contributory benefits, in turn, are to be met by both employers and employees.

(2) Pensions (contributory and non-contributory) are to be up-rated annually in line with price increases (and retroactively).

Another main line of reforms has been the gradual orientation towards the activation of policies targeted on claimants potentially active in the labour market. This has been coupled with the adoption of a somewhat restrictive criterion towards access to benefits and unemployment subsidies. Access to the

---

<sup>9</sup> However the minimum salary decreased from 77.5% of the per capita GDP, in 1980, to 52.4%, in 1992.

<sup>10</sup> Following its parliamentary approval, on October 9, 1996 the main Trade Unions (CCOO and UGT) and the Government signed the 'Agreement for the Consolidation and Rationalization of the Social Security System' (*Acuerdo Consolidación y Racionalización del Sistema de Seguridad Social*). The Law 24/1997 on 'Consolidation and Rationalization of the Social Security' (*Ley de Consolidación y Racionalización de la Seguridad Social*) was based on the previous 'Proposal' and 'Agreement'. The Trade Unions had given their consent until 2000. In April 2001 a new 'Agreement for the Improvement and Development of the System of Social Protection' was signed among Government, Employers' Associations (CEOE and CEPYME), and CCOO. The other main Trade Union, UGT, disagreed with some of the contents of the text and refused to sign.

latter has been restricted even further regarding previous contributory requirements and benefit duration.<sup>11</sup> Insertion goals included in the regional programmes of minimum income have been the most visible orientation of this activation approach. However, this workfare development has also extended to unemployment subsidies (e.g. active income for insertion, requirements for both agrarian unemployment and general unemployment subsidies, or schemes for 'flexible' retirement). Furthermore, programmes targeted to favour access to the labour market are also taking into account incentives for workfare activation of those sectors of population socially excluded.<sup>12</sup> This approach is meant to optimise both policies of labour activation by employment services and those carried by social services for purposes of social insertion.

Some policies for a limited family support have been also implemented in recent years. An instance of this is the Individual and Family Minimum benefit (*Mínimo Personal y Familiar*) according to the 1998 Income Tax Act (40/98). This *Mínimo* was defined as the disposable income of the taxpayer to comply with his/her basic needs and with those of his/her dependent family members (see Table 7). *Mínimo* amounts are not only tax deductible, but differences up to the annually established minimum threshold can be claimed by the taxpayers from the Spanish central treasury.<sup>13</sup> Other measures have been aimed at facilitating conciliation between family and labour lives (*Ley por la Conciliación de la Vida Laboral y Familiar*, 39/1999), and some of them implicitly favouring a pro-natalist policy.<sup>14</sup> According to Decree-Law (1/2000) the already low benefits for family protection were slightly increased.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, new cash benefits were to be awarded for the birth of a third and successive child, as well as in the case of multiple births (they are small one-off payments as reproduced in Table 9).

The process of decentralisation of policies and services has been deepened and reinforced in recent times. However, the principle of decentralisation put forward by the regional legislation has often brought about a certain re-centralisation of the policy-making process on the intermediate layer of

---

<sup>11</sup> In April 2002, the Government made public its proposals to reform unemployment provisions, which have been highly contested by the trade unions and the opposition parties. Among other conditions, the proposals were set to require beneficiaries to accept jobs distant up to 50 kilometres from his/her place of residence. Likewise, beneficiaries would lose their right to the benefit after refusing for the third time to take on a job offered to him/her considered as suitable by the state employment or manpower office (*INEM*).

<sup>12</sup> Law 12/2001 makes provisions for tax breaks in social contributions to newly hired employees in needy situations (e.g. beneficiaries of minimum income schemes). It also awards status of insertion companies, alongside some fiscal privileges, to those hiring low-income workers. Note that despite the support provided by social agents to the establishment of these 'productive' businesses, no legal provisions have so far been implemented to regulate their activities.

<sup>13</sup> However, the amounts are rather low, and potential claimants often lack of information resources as to file petitions under this scheme. Others who work in the 'underground economy' simply prefer not to 'complicate things'.

<sup>14</sup> These policies have a markedly pro-natalist orientation and are reactive to the very low birth rate in Spain and the increasing participation of women in the labour market.

<sup>15</sup> At current, and further to the deductions related to the *Mínimo Personal y Familiar*, other tax breaks are available for working mothers with children under 3 years of years. However, discounts for school material for children between 3 and 15 years have been phased out.

government (i.e. regional). Important political decisions regarding the minimum income schemes, and the organisation and planning of the services developed according to the *Plan Concertado*, have reflected not only a higher degree of political dynamism by the *Comunidades Autónomas*. They have also underlined the subsidiary role played by local councils dependent to a great extent on regional financial sources and regional political concerns.<sup>16</sup> Only the big cities have been able to challenge the mesogovernments as main protagonists in the development of social services.

### 3. Poverty, social exclusion and 'safety nets' today

During the 1960s and 1970s, analyses on poverty were generally carried out within more general research studies on social structure and change in Spain.<sup>17</sup> In the mid-1980s, and on the request of Caritas, the study on 'poverty and marginalisation' carried out by EDIS (1984) had a considerable impact not only in the media. It also provoked a wide debate in the public opinion. The study estimated that around 8 million of the Spaniards were poor (i.e. having less than 50% of the income mean). The findings of the EDIS study allowed Caritas to initiate a campaign of demands to the public authorities. Following this debate the number of studies on poverty increased considerably (Arriba, 1999; Susín, 2000).

The main source of empirical evidence has been provided by the Spanish Survey on Family Accounts (*Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares*), which does periodical research on household consumption patterns and establishes various standards for measurement. It provides, among other indicators, data concerning increases in the cost of living.<sup>18</sup>

In recent times, however, there has not been a systematic production of indicators and data. A look at Table 5 (included in the Spanish NAPSI) shows the wide disparity of figures concerning the Spanish poor population in the 2000 according to different indicators.<sup>19</sup> Considering, for instance, a poverty threshold of 60% of the median income, the number of Spanish poor reached the figure of more than 7 million. However, and according to the criteria set by the FOESSA Report of 1998, just half a million of Spaniards were in a situation of 'extreme poverty' (i.e. having less than 15% of the total average income). Note that around 200,000 was the number of beneficiaries of the regional minimum

---

<sup>16</sup> Articulated not only by nationalist and regionalist parties, but also by the increasingly important regional and federated branches of the main Spanish political formations (PP, PSOE, and IU) (Arriba, 1999). Internal processes of power accommodation within the Spanish parties have also greatly contributed to the internalisation by Spaniards of the federalisation of politics and policy-making (Moreno, 2001c).

<sup>17</sup> Exception made of the FOESSA Reports under the auspices by Caritas (1967, 1970, 1975, 1983).

<sup>18</sup> On this EPF Survey, as well as on the evolution, various sources, problems and limitations of the studies carried out on poverty in Spain, cf. Bazaga, Ramos and Tamayo (2000).

<sup>19</sup> Quantitativist views on poverty have been criticised because often falsify social reality and provide with lots of data that can be used to delay concrete action to improve living conditions of the destitute (Casado, 1990).

income benefits targeted to needy citizens with no other access to public subsidies.

Data provided by the successive findings of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) on household income is detailed and allows longitudinal studies and cross-country comparisons. However, a major limitation of the ECPH data in the case of Spain is that it does not provide territorially desegregated data at the regional level.

As regards regional economic disparities, it should be observed that in Spain there is no such an abrupt North-South divide, as is the case of Italy. Traditionally the hinterland around the capital Madrid has been an economic periphery (both Castilles, Extremadura and part of Aragon), while the geographical periphery in the North (Basque Country), and the East (Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Valencia) has had important growth poles and industrial zones. Andalusia in the South and Galicia in the Northwest have remained as poorer areas.

Diverse estimates carried out on the evolution of recent regional and individual economic disparities in Spain have confirmed that a reduction of inequalities concerning the per capita family income among *Comunidades Autónomas* has taken place during the 1990s. Evidence has shown that territorial unbalances account for only around 10 per cent of the personal inequalities and has tended to decrease during the 1980s. Personal redistribution produced by the impact of direct taxation, social contributions and monetary transfers has greatly reduced regional disparities in Spain by between 25 and 34 per cent (Moreno, 2002c).

On comparing gross and disposable regional incomes, a small but significant change could be noted ten years after generalisation of the decentralisation process. In poorer regions the difference between disposable per capita income and gross per capita income was positive, while in richer regions the results were negative. These data seemed to corroborate the assumption that public sector transfers have considerably contributed to reduce regional inequalities (Ayala, 1994).

As shown in Table 6, in 1995 the *Comunidades Autónomas* with the lowest rates of poverty were the Basque Country, Madrid, Navarre (around 10% of the total population). These were followed by Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Catalonia and La Rioja, a group with poverty rates around 15% but still lower than that of the Spanish national mean. In percentages close to the national mean there was a group of regions comprising Aragon, Galicia and Valencia. Finally, Andalusia, Canary Islands, Castille and Leon, Castille-La Mancha and Murcia has poverty rates above the national mean without reaching the 30% of their respective total populations. The 'outlier' region concentrating the highest poverty rate was Extremadura with 37.5%.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Note, however, that in the period 1980-90, gross available income in Extremadura rose by four percentage points with respect to its comparison with the richest region in Spain, Madrid (Moreno, 2001c).



Turning into the functional dimension of poverty, analyses can be drawn from a study recently carried out and based upon ECPH data of the years 1994, 1995 and 1996 (García Serrano, Malo and Toharia, 2001). As in other similar studies, findings relate to rates of relative individual poverty using indicators of equivalent income (according to OECD equivalent scales).<sup>21</sup> In Table 7 rates of relative poverty according to different thresholds are compared for the period 1994-96. Note that rates of relative poverty (both at 50% of mean and 60% of median income) decreased in such period. In 1996, 17.5% of the Spanish population was below the threshold of 50% relative poverty. In 1996, 2.7% of the population was facing severe poverty (25% of mean income), or 1.5% (using as threshold 25% of median income).

Table 8 reproduces information about profiles and characteristics of individuals living below the threshold of relative poverty (50% of mean income). In the first column, there were percentages of poor grouped according to social groups. The ones at both age ends of the active population included higher rates of poverty (24.4% for the 16-24 years, and 20.1% for the 45-54 years). According to legal status, there were more divorced and widows living in poverty (24.9%) and among singles (20.1%). Poverty rates were also higher among individuals with low levels of formal education (21.4%). As regards types of household, rates were higher among larger ones (26.4% in households of 5 members, and 30.6% in households of 6 or more members). Poverty rates of households with 3 dependent children were 32.2%, and those with dependent children and one single parent reached 24.7%. Among the unemployed rates were also higher (38.3%), the same as happened with trainees (26%), self-employed (20%) or employed with family help (27%). Poverty rates were higher among workers with part-time jobs of 14 or less weekly hours (20.5%). Taking into account the sources of income, poverty rates were much higher in those groups of individuals living in households where their main sources of income were unemployment benefits (64.4%), followed by those receiving other type of social subsidies (36.6%), and by those living out of capital gains (20.7%). Such differences among social groups were confirmed by the distribution reproduced in the second column of the same Table 8.

These data provides with a concise overview of poverty figures in Spain, but they offer a rather distorted situation. Beyond the establishment of static thresholds for the calculation of the various definitions of poverty, one consideration that is often missed in the analyses of poverty is the importance of family and households in peoples' attitudes, expectations and decisions. In Southern European countries, severe poverty rates are lower due to the role of the family as a 'clearing house' in the distribution of material resources. Note that, individually considered, 36% of the total Spanish population was severe poor in 1993 (having less than a quarter of the mean equivalent household income per head), but they amounted to only 5% of the aggregate population living in households (Carabaña and Salido, 2002).

### **3.1. Low-income benefits**

---

<sup>21</sup> This study does not deal with an increasingly area of interest related to children poverty (under 16 years-o-age).

A look at the Tables 9, 10 and 11 is illustrative of the various types of benefits and subsidies (both contributory and non-contributory) which composed the public 'safety net' in Spain. Benefits for low-income citizens can be grouped as follows:

(A) Supplementary Social Security Benefits<sup>22</sup>

-Social Security Minimum Pension Supplements (*Complementos de Mínimos de Pensiones de la Seguridad Social*). These are benefits whose function is to top up already provided pensions to a minimum threshold that is established legally. Claimants' monthly income (excluded the amount received as pension) must not be higher than a limit fixed annually. The Minimum Supplements reach little more than 30% of the total contributory pensions (2,402,321 in the year 2000). In recent years the number of supplemented pensions has gradually decreased due to the longer contributory biographies of the new pensioners. They mostly relate to survivors' pensions, as well as those in the Agrarian and Domestic Regimes of the Social Security.

-Social Assistance Benefits for the Unemployed (*Subsidios de desempleo*): (a) the means-tested *Subsidio por Desempleo* is available to unemployed whose contributory benefit has finished (NB. Especially targeted for those with dependent children, or those over 52 years of age with difficulties to re-enter the labour market). During the year 2000, the mean figure of monthly beneficiaries was 367,851; (b) the *Subsidio de Desempleo Agrario* is available to unemployed workers included the Special Agrarian Regime within the Social Security system, and living in the poorer regions of Andalusia and Extremadura (224,170 monthly beneficiaries),<sup>23</sup> and (c) the *Renta Activa de Inserción Laboral*, a benefit introduced in 2000 on an annual basis, which aims at facilitating labour insertion for long-term unemployed workers over 45 years of age, and who are in needy situations subject to means testing. This *rentas activas* had a limited impact in 2000, when they were implemented (3,966 beneficiaries). However, it meant the adoption of an insertion criterion for unemployment subsidies similar to that of the regional minimum income schemes.

(B) Non-contributory Social Security benefits

-Non-contributory Social Security Pensions (*Pensiones no Contributivas de la Seguridad Social*, or PNCs), Assistance Pensions (*Pensiones Asistenciales*), and LISMI subsidies for the elderly and disabled (*Subsidio de Garantía de Mínimos*, LISMI) (NB. The latter in a gradual process of phasing out). The non-contributory pensions are benefits targeted on households of low-

---

<sup>22</sup> Note that access to these benefits is only possible if there has been a previous contributory trajectory of the beneficiary, despite the possibility that this might have been insufficient to sustain the entitlement.

<sup>23</sup> Unemployment reform proposals put forward by the Spanish Government in the year 2002 also include the gradual disappearance of the Agrarian subsidies (PER-REASS), and its substitution by a contributory regime for all eventual agrarian labourers similar to the general provisions for the unemployed.

income population of +65-years and the disabled (with a 65% of invalidity). Beneficiaries have not been contributory members of the Social Security system during their working life. During 2000, the monthly mean figure of non-contributory pensioners was 471,275. Note that both Assistance and LISMI subsidies are subject to a gradual phasing out after the implementation of the PNCs in the year 1990 (Law 26/1990). They are still available for those beneficiaries who had access to LISMI before 1990 and were not included in the provisions of the PNCs. However, during 2000 there were 68,058 and 83,471 Assistance and LISMI pensioners, respectively, whose benefits would be lower if they were to perceive the later implemented PNCs.

-Family Benefits of the Social Security (*Prestaciones Familiares de la Seguridad Social*). They are low intensity benefits for dependent child/ren under 18 years-of-age awarded to low-income families either with or without contributory biographies (see Table 11). They are slightly more generous in the case of handicapped children. Benefits amounts are higher in the case of children over 18 year with serious disability, and in this respect they can be considered as non-contributory pensions although its concession is incompatible with any other non-contributory benefit. During the year 2000, amounts were increased and other benefits such as one-off payments for the birth of third and successive children, as well as for multiple birth, were also implemented. Their impact in the non-contributory benefits awarded by the Social Security is very limited.

#### (C) Regional Minimum Income Schemes (*Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*)

They are non-contributory programmes regionally implemented by the 17 Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* with different characteristics but with the same general aim of social insertion for low-income or no-income families. Amounts of minimum income guaranteed vary according to the 'generosity' of each region. Access to these programmes and benefits is available for families whose income is lower than established thresholds by each region (in some of them there is an annual budgetary limit for the total amount of benefits to be awarded). Programme eligibility and continuity for beneficiaries is conditioned on their engagement in activities of social insertion. According to data collected by the Spanish General Directorate of Social Action, Minors and Family (*Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de la Familia*), 78,645 families were receiving monthly these benefits in 2000 (for a more detailed analysis see chapter 4).

### **3.2. A fragmented 'safety net'**

Despite its fragmentation, an organising rationale can be identified in the configuration of the public 'safety net' protection in Spain. Figure 1 illustrates the various levels and itineraries of this basic social protection.

Note that all benefits for the low-income are means-tested, although how this criteria is applied vary in some aspects. For instance, some benefits are paid to people already receiving contributory pensions (Social Security Minimum Pension Supplements), or to unemployed who exhausted their contributory

unemployment benefit period (Social Assistance Benefits for the Unemployed). Benefits in cases of the Non-contributory Social Security Pensions, Family Benefits of the Social Security and Regional Minimum Income subsidies can be claimed with no previous contribution to the Social Security system. Most of these cash benefits take into account the aggregate level of all-family income (or household) as a criterion for eligibility. Further to this, some subsidies are differential benefits that increase existing income to an established minimum, whereas others are provided as final amounts.

All these benefits provide cash amount which are lower than the legally established minimum wage (Tables 9 and 12). In other words, they provide a lower protection than that they could get were they to be active and employed in the formal labour market.<sup>24</sup> The different benefits are ordered ranging from those which offer a better coverage to those more limited (in duration and intensity), and more conditioned with the compliance of activities related generally to labour activation. Variations in the awarding of the benefits depend on institutional milieus and civil servants discretionary criteria (at all three state, regional and local levels of government). Somehow the hierarchy of benefits is inversely coherent with the principle of territorial subsidiarity: the 'better quality' benefits are also the more centralised ones. It is also noticeable that access to 'better quality' benefits is independent from the family income,<sup>25</sup> while the lower levels are family benefits *strictu sensu*.

The contributory principle is the main criterion around which all different sub-systems are organised and, thus, a relationship with the formal labour market background of the beneficiaries is established. All of those applicants to low-income benefits who have secured a sufficient contribution to the Social Security can have better contributory benefits (retirement pensions, disability and survivors', as well as unemployment benefits). When the contributory record of the claimant has come to a stop (unemployment), or is insufficient (pensions), means-tested benefits are to be supplemented so that a minimum established legally can be reached.

In the event of no previous contribution to the Social Security, a preferential criterion is set also according to the labour market situation of the claimant (age or degree of invalidity) as happens with contributory benefits. For those workers who are not potentially active (over 65 years and disability over 65%), Social Security non-contributory pensions as well as LISMI and Assistance benefits are also available. Those claimants potentially active (under 65 years and with disability lower than 65%) can also be eligible under the regional programmes of minimum income.

Age is an important protection marker for the grouping of claimants in different categories. The age of 65 years delimits active and non-active status. However, unemployment subsidies also take into account the specific situation of those

---

<sup>24</sup> Note that minimum wage amounts (*salario mínimo interprofesional*) are referred to full-time jobs. In the case of some regional minimum income programmes, and due to added amounts as family supplement s, the total benefit amount can be higher than that of the minimum wage.

<sup>25</sup> This is to be understood as the income of the household, or common unit of residence.

claimants over 45 and 52 years of age in order to allow for a relaxation of the eligibility criteria, the extension of the benefit duration, and other related circumstances. At the other end, for needy claimants under the age of 25 years benefits have the family as unit of reference (exception made of those already in the formal labour market or who have their own family). Note, however, that family benefits for dependent children have as upper limit the age of 18 years (Appendix I reproduces a listing of national legislation on benefits for the low-income).

As regards the regional minimum income schemes it has to be pointed out their residual or subsidiary role with respect to schemes of insertion mainly of the Social Security system. They have taken on board beneficiaries derived to them from programme reduction, changes and insufficiencies of the main protection schemes (contributory and non-contributory). This regards not only income maintenance but also other policies on education, housing or health (Serrano and Arriba, 1998).

### **3.3. The Spanish NAPSI: *Plan Nacional de Acción para la Inclusión Social del Reino de España***

Following the commitment expressed at the Lisbon European Council (June 2000) and the EU objectives agreed at the Nice European Council (December 2000),<sup>26</sup> the Spanish central Government, under the co-ordination of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, prepared the National Action Plan on Social Inclusion for the period 2001-2003.<sup>27</sup> Together with the Plans elaborated by the other EU country members, the European Commission and the Council were commissioned to submit a Joint Report on Social Inclusion for the Brussels-Laeken European Council of December 2001 (Ferrera, Matsaganis and Sacchi, 2002).

The Plan Secretariat was organically located at the General Sub-Directorate of Programmes of Social Services, within the General Directorate for Social Action, Minors and Family of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Thus, responsibility for the co-ordination in the elaboration of the Spanish NAPSI remained with the central administration, which is a layer of government with residual powers concerning social assistance and social services. In fact, it can be said that central institutions play a subsidiary role with respect to the regions in matters of social welfare. Activities of the Plan Secretariat were carried out by five officials of the General Sub-Directorate of Programmes of Social Services. Neither extra budgetary provision was made available to the Secretariat, nor officials from other governmental bodies were involved in the workings.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Four objectives were then established: (1) to facilitate participation in employment and access by all citizens to the resources, rights, goods and services; (2) to prevent the risk of exclusion; (3) to help the most vulnerable; and (4) to mobilise all the relevant bodies.

<sup>27</sup> Data in this section has been collected from the text published as *Plan Nacional para la Inclusión del Reino de España*, as well as information provided *viva voce* in interviews made to two members of the Plan Secretariat in February, 2002. We are grateful for their collaboration.

<sup>28</sup> Nothing that can be compared to the resources devoted in other similar processes, such as those related to Employment Plans. Let us say that some external support was hired for the

The strategy displayed by the Plan Secretariat was to count on the participation and contribution provided by other institutions involved actively in the programmes of fight against poverty and exclusion; (a) public bodies (central, regional and local governments); (b) social partners (trade unions and Economic and Social Council);<sup>29</sup> and (c) NGOs and experts.<sup>30</sup> Liaison activities and working meetings with representatives of the institutions involved were crucial for the preparation of early draft reports. As a matter of fact, and given the lack of executive and political powers of the central government concerning the issues to be dealt with, high-ranked politicians were involved in the launching of the Secretariat activities so that technical intra- and inter-governmental co-ordination could be optimised.<sup>31</sup> The support from the NGOs was channelled through the Spanish Council of Institutions for Social Action (*Consejo Estatal de Entidades de Acción Social*, which was established on February 19, 2001), and by means of bilateral meetings.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, the main task for the institutions involved in the activities of the Secretariat was data collection regarding the four objectives established in EU's Nice Summit.<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, the Spanish NAPSI should not be regarded as a

---

processing of data and information.

<sup>29</sup> The Spanish Economic and Social Council, created by the 1978 Constitution (article 131.2), came into being in 1991, when Parliament passed the Act that set it up. It has the status of a government advisory body, which allows for the economic and social partners to participate in economic and social policy decision-making. The Council is composed of sixty one members, including its Chairman. There are three groups: (1) Twenty members representing labour organisations; (2) Twenty members representing business organisations; and (3) Three members for the farming sector, three for the shipping-fishing sector, four for consumers and users, four for the co-operative sector, and six Government-appointed experts. Members are appointed under the proposal of the organisations which represent for a four-year term and may be re-appointed for similar periods. Note that the Council must issue a mandatory opinion on preliminary drafts of State Acts and draft Royal Statutory Instruments regulating socio-economic and labour issues, as well as draft Royal Decrees considered to be of special importance by the Government. Additionally, it performs an important job in promoting dialogue, which leads organisations that legitimately defend clearly distinct interests to find common points and share growing spheres of opinion.

<sup>30</sup> Among which the Spanish Ombudsman Office (*Defensor del Pueblo*) was also to be included.

<sup>31</sup> These meetings reflected the somewhat subordinate role of those civil servants responsible of social services and assistance *vis-à-vis* other ministerial bodies of the central government. In this context collaboration was sought at the highest levels of the political representation.

<sup>32</sup> There was a previous institutional contact between the General Directorate for Social Action, Minors and Family and several of the NGOs which participated in the process of elaboration of the Spanish NAPSI. Let us remember that those organisations usually participate in programmes financed by general taxation regarding projects of social action. They are funded with 0.5% of those income tax payments so explicitly targeted by taxpayers in their annual income tax statements (the other option is to transfer such moneys to the RC Catholic Church). In the year 1998, 89,9 million € were collected under this 0.5% entry, an amount which is an important source of funding for many of these non-profit organisations.

<sup>33</sup> Data and information were collected by the completion of standardised forms regarding the four objectives established in EU's Nice Summit and with relation to policies and targeted groups. In this way, and for each programme/policy characteristics of the less-favoured groups, number of beneficiaries, human and budgetary resources (for both the past year 2000 and the estimates for 2001-2002) were requested. The collected information was aggregated and systematised into what are the central contents of the NAPSI.

Plan for new strategies or for a reorientation of actions already established by the various governmental bodies involved in the fight against social exclusion. It is rather an exhaustive recompilation of the various policies and programmes implemented at the various layers of government and by the concerned civil society organisations.

Perhaps the most relevant achievement of the Spanish NAPSI has been the active intergovernmental participation and the involvement of social partners and stakeholders. Different perspectives were expressed by the participants, which indicated the difficulties in articulating common institutional grounds in the fight against poverty and social exclusion in Spain. The Secretariat neither had an easy task in securing information provided horizontally by other ministerial bodies of the central governmental, nor by others layers of government (regional, principally), with regard to other sectoral policies (education, employment or housing).<sup>34</sup> Generally speaking, these problems of inter-administrative co-operation are better dealt with once 'informal' relationships are established. Less is to be expected from a spontaneous collaboration among representatives of the various institutional actors premised on a formal common interest. This behaviour may explain why hardly any information could be incorporated in some areas related to the workings of the Spanish NAPSI.

Participation of civil society organisations involved representatives of the Red Cross, Caritas, the Gypsy Secretariat and the CERMI (*Comité Español de Representantes de Minusválidos*, Spanish Committee of Disabled Representatives). These NGOs are equipped with better material infrastructure and human resources. Accordingly, they were able to make not only comprehensive proposals, but could also articulate strong critical views, something which other rank-and-file associations could not afford.<sup>35</sup>

The Spanish NAPSI does not put forward new ideas. It provides with a picture of what is already being carried out by the different social actors and stakeholders involved in programmes of social inclusion. The existing structures of social protection are not scrutinised or even questioned in the NAPSI. The main reason for this continuity rationale has to be found in the general budgetary aim embraced by most PP Government policies: the 'zero deficit'. Consequently, no extra funding or budgetary provision was to be incorporated to the Plan. Others factors to be taken into account have to do with the fragmented nature of the system of social protection in Spain and, above all, with the deep process of decentralisation of welfare competencies (Appendix II reproduces a summary of indicators to monitor the Plan).

---

<sup>34</sup> The task was much easier for those *Comunidades Autónomas* which had elaborated their Integral Plans of Fight against Exclusion (as was the case of the Basque country). These Plans had been carried out prior to the periodical reviews of their own minimum income schemes.

<sup>35</sup> Caritas produced a comprehensive Plan proposal (Cáritas, 2001). This document was highly critical towards the existing policies of social inclusion in Spain, but many of its proposal were incorporated into the final version of the Spanish NAPSI. This lack of comprehensive proposals by the Spanish government greatly explains why ONGs such as Caritas took a leading role in the elaboration of the Plan (Razón y Fé, 2001).

The NAPSI is structured according to four objectives established at the EU Nice Summit. A good deal of actions, measures and proposals makes reference to already existing governmental plans: e.g. Employment Plan (*Plan Nacional de Empleo*) (objective 1.1);<sup>36</sup> reinforcement of the pensions system, according to the agreement on improvement of social protection reached by the employers' associations and the trade union CCOO on April, 2001 (objective 1.2); and access to new technologies (*Plan Info XXI*) (objective 2). The various Sectoral Plans of the General Secretary of Social Affairs (within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) provide the bases for actions targeted on specific groups and related to objective 3 (Gerontology, Equal Opportunities, Voluntary Work, Fight against Domestic Violence, Disability, Youth, or Family and Job Conciliation). Concerning vulnerable collectives an innovative action is included for the homeless.

An improvement in the benefit system for the low-income, along the lines of objective 1.2, is proposed by means of reaching a consensus among the central ministries involved in order to establish a general basic scheme. However the operationalisation of this scheme does not seem easy to achieve as is analysed further below. Eligibility and access to low-income benefits also include access to education, health, housing and social services. Regarding other systems of social protection the collected data is somehow incomplete (with the exception of that of social services). Unfortunately, there are hardly any commitments concerning those other areas of intervention, due mostly to inter-ministerial difficulties of co-ordination. Furthermore, most competencies on social assistance and services rest with regions. Thus, intergovernmental co-operation and agreements are needed, and should be also incorporated to the Regional Plans according to objective 2 set in Nice.

Among the contributions made by the Spanish NAPSI two can be underlined. First, the elaboration of Territorial Action Plans for Social Inclusion (or TAPSIs), a commitment assumed by the 17 Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas*,<sup>37</sup> with a particular reference to Local Plans for Social Inclusion to be developed by municipalities representing up to 40% of the total Spanish population (objective 2). The Spanish NAPSI locates the main responsibility for the fight against exclusion at the regional level and, in so doing, action is delayed until such TAPSIs are accomplished.<sup>38</sup> Once again it has to be pointed out that, given the decentralised structure of the Spanish 'State of Autonomies' (*Estado de las*

---

<sup>36</sup> A workfare priority already included in the Spanish National Action Plan for Employment was labour activation for socially excluded groups. The Employment Plan regarded the implementation of specific policies to facilitate insertion in the labour market.

<sup>37</sup> In some of them, TAPSIs had already been elaborated (Basque Country, Canary Islands, Castille and Leon, Castille-La Mancha, Catalonia, La Rioja and Navarre). Others were in the process of elaboration, such as Madrid. These Plans incorporate as core policy instruments the regional minimum income schemes for insertion (*Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*).

<sup>38</sup> Let us remind that the 'mimesis effect' rule among the *Comunidades Autónomas* made possible the generalisation of an initiative such as the minimum income guaranteed all over Spain during the 1990s. Then, intergovernmental co-operation was feeble, if non-existent, but a bottom-up policy innovation was possible. Now the situation has been somewhat reversed and it remains to be seen whether a top-down initiative achieves a similar degree of efficacy (Arriba, 1999).



*Autonomías*), the active involvement of the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* is to be regarded as crucial for the actual implementation of the Spanish NAPSI.

A second contribution refers to the crucial importance that mobilisation by social actors and stakeholders should have for the future viability of the Spanish NAPSI (objective 4). The Plan foresees the establishment of several multi-level committees and commissions for the optimisation of information exchange and group participation, including NGOs, experts, practitioners and media leaders.

Resource co-ordination and data systematisation in the fight of social exclusion are paramount concerns in a quasi-federal country such as Spain. The unlikeness of having a hierarchical executive leadership responsible for intergovernmental relations, and which could homogenise unilaterally agreements and practices, makes more plausible the goal of achieving efficient consociational practices and joint efforts. These are usually complex, and even tortuous for lineal paradigms of action, but enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy in a plural state as the Kingdom of Spain.

Finally, and in order to provide with the necessary funding, a formal statement by the central Spanish Government was incorporated in the Spanish NAPSI. It stated that the actual implementation of the Plan was dependent on having available moneys in the 2001/02/03 National Budgets. Financial estimates for the 2001-03 period are reproduced in Table 13. Note that if the commitment by all governmental bodies involved --and very especially the Spanish central ministries-- were to be accomplished, the annual increase of the funding for the fight against exclusion in Spain for the years 2001 and 2002 would be of 8% per year, approximately. As already pointed out, the achievement of 'zero deficit' for purposes of budgetary stability is the overriding economic policy set by the PP Government. Unquestionably this imposes limits for future policy developments.

#### **4. Regional Minimum Incomes Schemes (*Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*)**

The Spanish mesogovernments of the *Comunidades Autónomas* have shown an active interest for policy innovation concerning welfare programmes. Among the various actions taken by them one is to be identified as having far-reaching repercussions for the weaving of 'safety nets' of social protection in Spain: the programmes of minimum income of insertion (*Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*).

The general process started in September of 1988 with the announcement by the Basque Government of a regional *Plan de Lucha contra la Pobreza* (Programme against Poverty). This initiative sparked off a regional mimesis, or 'demonstration effect', on the part of the other 16 *Comunidades Autónomas*. By the end of 1990s, all Spanish mesogovernments were engaged in the implementation of regional programmes of minimum income (Appendix III reproduces a listing of regional legislation on benefits for the low-income).

Some of the programmes of minimum income were established mainly on the initiative of the mesogovernments, and as a result of the combined action by both types of policy-makers (elected politicians and executive officials). In some other cases, the pressure exerted by the opposition parties in the regional

parliaments was the main factor behind the elaboration of these programmes. Finally, a third path of policy-making was due to the mobilisation of the regional branches of the main trade unions (CCOO and UGT), as well as some significant NGOs, such as Caritas.

#### 4.1. Main features of the regional programmes

As a proviso, the lack of comprehensive and systematic information compiled on these programmes should be acknowledged. Within a common framework for the provision of minimum income and the implementation of insertion activities, the regional programmes have their own peculiarities. On the available information there is a temporal mismatch which makes systematic analyses difficult. Regional sources are multiple and not always follow similar patterns of data collection. Thus, analyses will mainly take into account assessments mainly made on the first period of implementation of regional *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción* (1989-94).

The regional programmes of minimum income have distinct characteristics with regard to the intensity of the benefits and the insertion obligations to be complied by the beneficiaries. However, they are quasi-universalistic entitlements, which combine cash benefits with activation policies and programmes of social integration (employment promotion and vocational training courses, primarily). Their main common features can be identified as follows:

- (a) Families are the units of reference even though individuals can be single beneficiaries.
- (b) Means-tested criteria is related to a threshold of household income under which cash benefits are awarded (around two thirds of the minimum wage).
- (c) Residence status of applicants is required (ranging from 1 to 10 years).
- (d) Periods of extension are available provided that beneficiaries have complied with social insertion activities and social needs remain the same.

Indeed, policy outcomes have resulted in some visible differences in the intensity of the benefits and, above all, the nature of the ‘insertion’ programmes to be accomplished by the beneficiaries. According to these differences three groups of the regional programme of *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción* can be identified (Laparra and Aguilar, 1997):

- (a) Those establishing a link between the perception of the subsidy and the aim of insertion;
- (b) Those where insertion takes the form of a job contract, and the benefits are subject to workfare;
- (c) Those discretionary and *ad hoc* social assistance.

According to these criteria a typology of regional minimum income schemes can be established as follows:

Typology of regional programmes of minimum income of insertion		
	<i>Renta mínima de inserción</i>	Protected social employment
<i>Renta mínima</i>	Basque Country	

<i>de inserción</i> (in full)		
<i>Renta mínima de inserción</i> (limited)	Madrid Catalonia	Navarre
Legislated programmes of minimum subsidies	Aragon* Galicia Murcia* La Rioja*	Asturias Castille-La Mancha
Programmes of a lower coverage and intensity	Canaries Cantabria Castille and Leon Valencia Extremadura	Andalusia
* The small amount of the benefits involved are to some extent compensated by other subsidies of family integration		
<i>Source: Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995</i>		

The programme implemented in the Basque country is the one which can be considered as a 'genuine' minimum income scheme of insertion. As reproduced above these lines, there are other programmes which could be regarded as minimum incomes schemes with some limitations, due to restrictive elements mostly of a budgetary nature. The third group refers to minimum subsidies with legal restrictions, and a final one is characterised by a very limited coverage and intensity. Further to this, there are workfare programmes which prioritise temporary job of 'social usefulness', and which residually provide periodical cash benefits. In any case, this classification should be re-assessed as several of the regional programmes have been adjusted and modified in recent years. At current an evaluative exercise taken into account all regional programmes is very much needed.

On explaining the differences in policy outcomes, the variable financial manoeuvrability has been adduced as the main explanatory factor. Certainly, the Basque Country and Navarre with a system of fiscal quasi-independence have been able to fund more generously their programmes of minimum income. Note that as compared with the autonomous public spending in Catalonia, the Basque per capita expenditure is 1,8 higher.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, the setting of political priorities in policy funding appears to be the most compelling explanatory element. After all, the Spanish mesogovernments have the final budgetary say in the running of a type of programmes which are the product of their own initiative.

-Access to programmes and criteria of eligibility

---

<sup>39</sup> According to 1995 data, the mean non-financial per capita autonomous spending carried out by Catalonia and Galicia was Euro 1,373, which compared to Euro 2,509 in the Basque Country.

In the majority of the *Comunidades Autónomas* an annual amount is fixed to cover the expenditure associated to the programme and, once this is exhausted, no more beneficiaries can be accepted. In some other regions, where the entitlement to the minimum income is guaranteed, a set of indicators is established for claimants. In this section, we refer to accessibility and eligibility criteria common to most of the regional programmes: Specific requisites to comply with are as follows:

(a) Nationality and residence. Nationality is not a requirement to have access to minimum income programmes in most of regions (exception made of Cantabria and Canary Islands). However, a certain period of registered residence of the beneficiary in the *Comunidad Autónoma* is required in all programmes. Initially, regional policy-makers feared of some kind of 'welfare tourism' (beneficiaries moving around the country to apply for the most generous subsidies), although this has not proved to be the case later on. In some regions the residence precondition is a clear disincentive for the illegal immigration in a policy domain in which the central administration has adopted a tough 'law-and-order' approach, and there is a clear absence of a comprehensive intergovernmental plan of action. Requirements vary from the obligation for the potential beneficiary of having resided since a concrete date (e.g. 1985 in Cantabria), to long periods of residence (e.g. 10 years in Navarre or 5 years in Galicia). In some *Comunidades* the prerequisite of residence is shorter and ranges from 2 or 3 years in Catalonia and La Rioja, to 1 year in Valencia, or none in the case of Castille-La Mancha.

(b) Household formation and composition. Regional minimum income benefits have families as units of reference. The application is submitted by an individual who, once the benefit is awarded, is responsible for its family distribution. In consequence, all members of the family have access to the subsidy through one direct claimant/beneficiary.<sup>40</sup> There are several definitions of what a 'family unit' is and diverse degrees of lineage are taken into account. The diverse effects of these family definitions are difficult to be measured, but there are two worth mentioning: (a) definitions of a more extended type of family imply the possible inclusion of other relatives' income; and (b) the possibility of receiving two or more subsidies in one single household.<sup>41</sup>

In all regional schemes there is no discrimination concerning single households, although in some *Comunidades* this type of households is considered an

---

<sup>40</sup> In practice, this procedure is rather problematic. On the one hand, the legal beneficiary can make an abusive and personal use of the benefit. On the other, the beneficiary could also be overburdened with insertion obligations signed on accepting the subsidy (NB. In many cases he/she is the only one having contacts with the responsible social workers). In some qualitative studies it has been noted that contacts with social workers is mainly carried out by a woman of the family, despite the fact that the entitlement is generally awarded to 'the man of the family'. In the particular case of Aragon, the entitlement can be shared and the cash benefits can accordingly be divided between adult members of the family. Problems of a practical nature and 'perverse' effects in the implementation of these programmes have been sorted out in many cases in a contingent manner (Serrano and Arriba, 1998).

<sup>41</sup> This is the case, for instance, of some extended families with elderly members entitled to old-age pensions. *Ad hoc* adjustments in these cases have been made together with a certain flexibilisation of legal requirements.

'exception' rather than a rule. As a matter of fact, single households beneficiaries form one of the most sizeable groups of beneficiaries of the regional minimum income schemes.

Regional norms also make provision concerning family formation. Requirements in this respect aim at avoiding 'artificial' family creation in order to qualify for minimum income benefits. Prerequisites range from 6 till 12 months for an 'independent' household to be eligible. In some regions such a requirement is exempted, or in the case that households are the result of family ruptures.

(c) Age. Most regional requirements set age limits between 25 and 65 years. Protection for citizens over 65 years rests mainly with non-contributory pensions. In this way, regional minimum income plays a subsidiary role with respect to social security benefits.<sup>42</sup> On adopting the lower age limit fixed by the French RMI (25 years),<sup>43</sup> it is implicitly acknowledged the supporting role of the family until the young family member is expected to be in a position of economic emancipation, i.e. he/she having entered the formal labour market and being in a position to establish his/her own family (Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995). Implicit in the setting of this age is a certain attitude of 'paternalistic' reluctance towards the kind of uses that youngsters under 25 years could do with these cash benefits.

(d) Economic resources of the beneficiaries. In all *Comunidades Autónomas* access to the benefits is cleared once it is tested that family income is lower to the amount of the *renta mínima* to be perceived. In some *Comunidades Autónomas*, the basic amount is established automatically in reference to the minimum wage. In others, the amount of reference is that of the mean non-contributory pension. However, in most cases the amount is fixed in the annual budget by the regional parliament.

In those programmes associated to 'protected special employment' (see Typology above), various options are arranged to calculate the level of the subsidy (higher, in the case of Navarre, and lower in Andalusia, Asturias, and Castille-La Mancha).

Basic amount supplements are added for each of the family members (according to equivalence scales). In most regional programmes supplements are calculated according to the number of family members with disregard to their composition (e.g. adults, minors or disabled). Supplement amounts diminish as the number of family members increase. In some cases maximum limits have been established according to two modalities: (a) once reached a number of family members there is no further supplement; (b) an aggregate top amount is put as a limit. Let us remind that, in general, equivalence ratios are

---

<sup>42</sup> Note that, despite their non-contributory nature, the Social Security is responsible for the payment of these pensions. Main problems associated to such age limits are: (a) amounts provided by non-contributory pensions can be lower than that of *rentas mínimas*; and (b) non-contributory benefits of citizens over 65 years of age with dependent family members may be clearly insufficient .

<sup>43</sup> Exception made of those cases of under 25-year-of-age beneficiaries with dependent family members who are included.

very flat (NB. Usually the amount for the second family member does not go over 30% of the head of the family). Note that from the final calculated amount of *renta mínima* any available income of the family is detracted.

(e) Means-testing. Programmes of *rentas mínimas* have different methods to take into account family income, particularly that from labour and other social benefits in order to avoid a reduction of protection, or to produce labour disincentives. Accordingly, labour income is subtracted partially in some regional programmes, whereas in others an exempted amount is established. (Aragon). Concerning other low-income benefits, most *Comunidades Autónomas* subtract integrally the amount perceived as non-contributory pension by the beneficiary. Some others do it partially as concerns income from social subsidies perceived by other family members, and in order to prevent unwanted effects of family breakage (e.g. Madrid). Concerning contributory family benefits some regional programmes consider them incompatible with the *renta mínima*, while others subtract them or, conversely, do not take them into account (Madrid, Catalonia). As regards those benefits targeted to cover specific needs (e.g. scholarships, transport allowances, medicine payments, emergency help, etc.) the common procedure is not to take them into account for the calculation of the amount of the minimum income benefit.

Most programmes also refer to patrimonial resources. In some instances they are assessed according to its gains (e.g. Madrid or Asturias). In others, they are used as indicators of sufficient means of standard of living and, in general, are considered to be incompatible with the awarding of the *renta mínima*. In most cases the value of owned houses where beneficiaries live is not taken into account.

While in some *Comunidades Autónomas* the general criteria is to discard an strict regime of incompatibilities, in others these are established in a more contingent manner, and taking into account the type of labour activities of the claimant, the family and social benefits already perceived, and so forth.

(f) Commitments and obligations. All regional programmes establish a number of obligations to be accomplished by the beneficiaries. Basically they refer to the commitment to use the *renta mínima* to cover basic needs of the household, to inform of any variations in the family unit, to reimburse any undue income and to apply to other subsidies to which the beneficiary may be entitled.

The aim of insertion embraced by all regional programmes is articulated in some programmes as a 'double entitlement' and in others as a 'counter-benefit' (*contraprestación*), or reciprocity by the beneficiary towards the community. In some schemes commitments are requested not to refuse to take up a job offer or to carry out activities, either workfare or 'social'. Other requirements include the prohibition of public begging, the compulsory schooling of children, the registration in job centres and the adoption of a 'favourable' attitude towards insertion.

-Programme provision and administration

Matters concerning programme management are also heterogeneous. Claimants need first to make an application in order for the process to be initiated. Usually the application is submitted at the municipal units of community care (*unidades de atención primaria de servicios sociales*), as well as at the regional offices of social services. In Catalonia some non-profit making NGOs are entitled to the management of the programme. On applying claimants must produce a number of documents to support the compliance of programme requirements. In some cases this first step appears to be insurmountable because of the problems of some claimants to fully understand the requested information (Serrano and Arriba, 1998).

The decision process on the applications finalises after a fixed period of assessment (something which not always is accomplished). Since the date of submission until the actual receipt of the first payment the duration of the process oscillates from 4 to 8 months (Ayala, 2001). Programme monitoring and surveillance of the obligations to be accomplished by the beneficiaries are responsibilities of the local social services.

In some *Comunidades Autónomas* the continuation of the programme is simply conditional to the maintenance of the initial circumstances of the beneficiaries (e.g. Basque Country). In others, there is a maximum period of 6 months within a fiscal year. In most cases, however, the awarding of the benefit is for 6 months which can be extended to a similar period, although some regional programmes do not include automatic extension.

#### -Insertion activities

In the mid-1990s<sup>44</sup> only the Basque programme was to be considered a 'genuine' programme guaranteeing simultaneously the 'double entitlement' to cash benefits and insertion. In the rest of the cases both cash benefits and insertion activities appear as differentiated elements. In general, the latter is subordinated to the former in various degrees and manners. This relationship of subordination materialises with the signing of a contract by the beneficiaries.

Insertion activities are usually individualised. In many *Comunidades Autónomas* they are determined at different administrative levels of the regional systems of social services. However, in some instances participation of beneficiaries in working-out the kind of individualised activities of insertion is required.

In most cases social insertion is related to the carrying-out of activities of a productive nature. Classification of activities can be distinguished as follows (Aguilar, Gaviria and Laparra, 1995):

- Area of social services and social work; personal promotion, access to systems of social protection, eradication of begging and occupational, leisure and/or therapeutical activities.

---

<sup>44</sup> Some later reforms have aimed at achieving a minimum income scheme in *sensu strictu*, with no direct linkage to insertion, very much along the lines of late developments of the French RMI.

- Area of education: further adult education and instruction for minors.
- Area of employment: orientation and motivation, professional training, workfare incentives, self-employment and social economy, social employment and insertion companies.
- Area of co-operation: community help and care for the elderly.

A good deal of these insertion activities falls into other department competencies (education, employment, health or housing). Some regional programmes do not take into account --at least explicitly-- any interdepartmental co-ordination or joint committee for this purpose. In other cases, programme administrators have found problems of horizontal co-ordination along the lines of what has been previously commented regarding the elaboration of the Spanish NAPSI.

Minimum income programmes include mechanisms for specific insertion needs. Among them we refer to the so-called 'projects of insertion'. They are programmes with different labels and designs which share some common features: (a) they generally seek to finance targeted non-profit organisations; (b) activities are targeted for excluded groups, usually beneficiaries of minimum income programmes; and (c) insertion activities mainly include professional training and orientation to enter the labour market. Their scope is limited although their main input has been to provide with a space of collaboration with non-profit associations, to carry out intensive work with some collectives especially vulnerable and to allow for the experimentation of new forms of support to social insertion. Among them new companies of insertion have emerged which operate in the 'open market' and have employed workers with a previous record of exclusion.

#### **4.2. Policy implementation**

There have been different actors shaping policy inputs and design of the programmes of *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*. However the mesogovernments of the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* are to be regarded as the main protagonists in their implementation. Let us not forget that, prior to the approval by the regional parliaments, no explicit popular demand was expressed in any of the *Comunidades Autónomas* as to encourage their implementation. The institutional factor making relevant the issue of the minimum income guaranteed was precisely the constitutional entitlement for the regions to exercise their political autonomy. No reactive 'path dependency' could be referred to in this case. This fact validates the assumption that policy innovation concerning social policies developed by sub-state communities with a 'cosmopolitan localism' perspective can be more effective and efficient (Moreno, 2001b).

The central Ministry for Social Affairs showed no little reticence with the implementation of the regional programmes of minimum income. Its main reluctance concerned arguments of poverty dependency and labour disincentives. Allegations that these new regional policies could affect territorial solidarity throughout Spain were among its criticisms (Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales, 1989). However, the then newly-created Ministry had already opted



for making the generalisation of the non-contributory pensions its main priority, exhausting in this ambitious programme most of its political capital within the central government. The initiative taken by the *Comunidades Autónomas* left little room for the institutional manoeuvring of the central Ministry, and was grounded on those constitutional provisions safeguarding regional self-government. Within this context, no action to boycott the implementation of the regional programmes of minimum income was to be expected from the PSOE central Government.

Since the beginning of the process, different arguments in favour or against the implementation of the regional *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción* were neither clear nor sophisticated in their analyses (Aliena, 1991). In this respect, the 'simplicity' of the trend-setting arguments used by the Basque policy-makers is very illustrative:

- (i) The *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción* were to overcome social marginalisation;
- (ii) No labour passivity was to be encouraged;
- (iii) EU recommendations and other European experiences, such as the French *Revenu Minimum d'Insertion*, lent support to the programme;
- (iv) There was a high degree of inter-party consensus and support from various Basque civil institutions.

Probably, among the factors above mentioned, the reference to EU recommendations is of particular importance. There was constant reference to the proposals made by the European Commission encouraging the recasting of the European systems of social protection so that guaranteed income could facilitate social and labour insertion to poor and excluded citizens. This became the main line of argument for the formulation of the regional *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*.

Subsequently, the main trade unions supported these programmes. They pursued a course of action alternative to the traditional negotiation and eventual agreement at the national level. In fact, the climate of national confrontation between the central government and the trade unions induced these negotiations at the regional level. Note that, between the autumn of 1989 and the spring of 1989, all the pacts subscribed between the mesogovernments and the trade unions (CCOO and UGT) included the establishment of programmes of minimum income.

In parallel, a number of NGOs (RC Church institutions, principally) committed themselves to support the *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*, both at regional level (Caritas parish councils), but also nation-wide (Spanish Caritas). They demanded the implementation of the programmes of minimum income but did not participate in the forums where policy design was discussed (with the exception of Catalonia).

Information about the various modalities and characteristics of the regional programmes was circulated among the *Comunidades Autónomas*. Formal and *ad hoc* meetings took place in which policy-makers and experts exchanged views and opinions on different aspects of the programmes to be implemented.

Their main models of reference were the RMI, in France, and the 'Programme against Poverty', in the Basque Country.

The *Comunidades Autónomas* elaborated their programmes of *rentas mínimas* in various manners. In some cases, think-tanks of politicians, officials and experts within the organic structure of the regional departments of social policy prepared the pieces of legislation 'behind-closed-doors'. In others, the process was open to the inputs made by trade unions or NGOs. However, the ultimate decision on the elaboration of the programmes remained with the mesogovernments.

In the phase of actual implementation of the programmes, the *Comunidades Autónomas* had to establish institutional agreements with the local authorities within their territories. The latter were to be the executive cornerstone in the programmes' design. Such agreements, however, brought about some delays in the implementation of the programme due to discrepancies stemming from the often different political colouring of the local and regional administrations involved. This was evident in the case of large cities such as Barcelona controlled by the Left, but with a Centre-right nationalist coalition at the *Generalitat* government, or Madrid, with a Right-to-centre City Hall and a Left regional administration. 'Pretexts' for conflict and institutional warfare referred in most cases to problems of financing, as well as to the lack of infrastructure of social centres for primary assistance and community care.

In the process of policy implementation others criticisms were put forward by the social workers and programme managers. Their initial attitude was one of general consent. Complaints on the excessive paperwork and bureaucratic burden were soon expressed. Likewise, the insufficient material infrastructure for the managing of the *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción* was also criticised. Moreover, the universalistic approach of the social services during the 1980s was confronted with the targeting criteria towards the needy put forward by the programmes of minimum income.

The process of policy implementation also confirmed the institutional leadership of the mesogovernments as main actors in the development of the *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*. This factor was independent, in many cases, of partisan alignments. Let us remember, for instance, that the Socialists were in a government coalition with the Nationalists of the PNV in the Basque Country. They supported the first implemented *Renta Mínima* despite the reluctance of the Socialist Minister for Social Affairs. A similar situation took place in the region of Madrid. Thus, no consistent patterns of ideological standings are to be deduced from the political behaviour of the party organisations in the various institutional arenas of their participation.

The *Comunidades Autónomas* have followed patterns of mobilisation rooted on a self-perceived 'comparative grievance': no region wants to be left behind. These perceptions have interacted in a conflictive manner with the 'differential fact' claimed by the Spanish 'historical nationalities': Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. These are more interested in maintaining a 'differentiated' degree of home rule as compared with the rest of the Spanish *Comunidades*

*Autónomas*. The combination of these processes has resulted in a *de facto* policy equalisation and in an incentive for policy innovation in those Spanish regions which have been traditionally lagging behind the 'modernised' ones.

### 4.3. Assessment of impacts

Unsystematic data on regional minimum income is an obstacle to know in depth the impacts of these programmes in each and everyone of the *Comunidades Autónomas*. However, in recent years the central General Directorate for Social Action has been collecting series of basic data (benefits, amounts and budgets) from which we can have a picture of the general situation (see Tables 14, 15, and 16).<sup>45</sup>

Information about basic amount for the calculation of minima benefits is a good indicator about the protecting intensity of the various regional programmes. As reproduced in Table 14, basic amounts for the year 2000 oscillated between a monthly payment of 238.9 € in the Canary Islands and 318.6 € in Extremadura and Navarre. This corresponded to 48.2% and 64.3% of the legal minimum wage, respectively. As percentage of the legal minimum wage, variations range from 48.2% to 64.3%, and from 82.9% to 110.6%, as percentage of the mean non-contributory pension of the social security (these are prorata gross percentages according to monthly payments).

All programmes offered lower amounts to support a life-style which could be financed were beneficiaries to be in the formal labour market earning the minimum wage, and had a rather similar level of protection as that provided by the contributory Social Security. In general such amounts do not reflect wide regional disparities, although in order to assess the real protecting intensity family and other supplements awarded to cover specific needs should also be taken into account, as is the case of the Basque Country (Sanzo, 2002).

Likewise, the total number of households that received minima benefits in the year 2000 provides a good indicator of coverage.<sup>46</sup> This indicator shows a greater degree of disparities: while in the Basque Country benefits were received by 2.64% of the total Basque households, percentages of between 1% and 1.5% corresponded to Canary Islands, Cantabria, Murcia and Navarre, and the rest of the *Comunidades Autónomas* hardly reached 1% of all households.

---

<sup>45</sup> Data reproduced was directly facilitated to the General Directorate by the *Comunidades Autónomas*. We should point out that interpretations about these data must be carried out cautiously because if in some cases they refer genuinely to minimum income, in some others (e.g. Andalusia and Asturias) they include desegregate figures corresponding to benefits for socially protected employment or for financing insertion projects. In some other cases figures add up the aggregate number of all beneficiaries who have joined the programme in a year (e.g. Basque Country), but other programmes take into account the number of beneficiaries in a given month (e.g. Madrid).

<sup>46</sup> Current data on their incidence on regional poverty rates are not available, something which have prevented us to calculate coverage rates of the targeted population. Further to this, data of the General Directorate for Social Action on minimum income beneficiaries are based on estimations. Consequently, the option taken has been to calculate coverage rates of households in the *Comunidades Autónomas*.

Expenditure figures are also a good measure to assess both regional effort and generosity in financing these programmes. Once again, the special fiscal arrangement in the Basque Country allowed this *Comunidad Autónoma* to afford up to 1.03% (53,2 million €) in its 2000 Budget for funding the minimum income programme. A group of regions including Andalusia, Catalonia and Madrid also devote sizeable amount to these programmes. In some others, however, the budgetary effort is rather modest: 0.86% in the case of Asturias and no more than 0.4% in regions such as Murcia or La Rioja.

Tables 15 and 16 reproduced expenditure patterns and number of beneficiaries in the second half of the 1990s. If we compare figures through this period a sustained increase is noticeable. On observing annual modifications, however, it cannot be inferred a general pattern of change for all of them. Figures of expenditure flows and number of beneficiaries do not show a common pattern either. (e.g. Basque Country and Murcia). Some authors have contrasted these changes with relation to employment rates, demographic transitions and institutional variations regarding these programmes (Ayala, 2001).

Variations concerning institutional and political inputs are the ones which most condition programmes' output and outcomes. Throughout the 1990s a process of adjustment and consolidation for most programmes took place, which was also subject to political volatility. Programmes were implemented for reasons of legitimacy by the new mesogovernments in the general process of decentralisation in Spain. In the future they could also suffer from a certain degree of discretionary politics.

Comparisons between programmes must be carried out according to commensurable criteria. On contrasting the impacts made by regional minimum income programmes those territorial imbalances and disparities prior to their implementation are to be taken into account in the first place. Any evaluative exercise must consider the departing situation of the regions regarding their relative positions concerning poverty and wealth, citizens' purchasing power and spending capacities. In particular, the maintenance or otherwise of traditional practices of family micro-solidarity is to be regarded as a fundamental indicator in the fight against poverty in Mediterranean Spain.

The *Comunidades Autónomas* –and their mesogovernments– have benefited in terms of political legitimisation as a consequence of the implementation of the *Rentas Mínimas de Inserción*. Programmes' visibility was maximised by the fact that, in the beginning of the process of implementation, the financial implications of new minimum income schemes were not too dear for the regional treasuries. Besides, a clear message of policy innovation and political *aggiornamento* underlined their dynamic commitment to carry out the weaving of 'safety nets' of social protection in Spain. However, It remains to be seen whether these programmes will continue to be a priority for the regions. The *Comunidades Autónomas* may face a not-too-distant future situation of either requesting co-funding from the central government or containing the coverage scope of their benefits.

All things considered, the impact of these *ab novo* programmes of minimum income has had a dramatic effect in the debate about the completion of a 'safety net' in Spain. According to estimates provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in 2000 there were 202,221 beneficiaries in the whole of Spain including dependent family members (around 0,5% of the Spanish population) (MTAS, 2001b).

In all future scenarios, the action by the regional and local government will be of decisive importance for the sustainability of the system of social protection in Spain and, in particular, for the maintenance of effective programmes against poverty and social exclusion. Indeed, the three-layer institutional interplay is a structuring variable, which pre-determines to a great extent the diverse nature of welfare outcomes in contemporary Spain.

## 5. Conclusion

The public 'safety net' in Spain is fragmented and compounded mainly by national and regional benefits for the needy. The contributory realm is the main source of income for poor and excluded beneficiaries. But social assistance has gained in importance in the last decades. Despite its fragmentation, an organising rationale can be identified concerning the whole of policies tackling poverty and exclusion in Spain. Of particular interest is the proactive approach taken by the Spanish regions, or *Comunidades Autónomas*, in the implementation of new benefits for low-income citizens.

Regions in Spain have fully exercised their constitutional right to home rule in the general framework of European subsidiarity. The role played by the Spanish mesogovernments of the *Comunidades Autónomas* in the construction of public 'safety nets' has been crucial in terms of policy innovation, and could be used as reference for developments in other Southern European countries.

Nevertheless, future scenarios for the regional programmes are uncertain. If it is true that they have been able to integrate social services and social assistance policies into a common regionally-based network of provision, the lack of financial resources and the ever-latent risk of exacerbating inter-regional inequalities in welfare provision is to be underlined. Up until now, the 'mimesis effect' among the *Comunidades Autónomas* has proved to be an effective barrier against open discrimination amongst them, and a very effective *de facto* equaliser of policy output.

Outcomes of regional policies in the fight against poverty and social exclusion need, in any case, to be assessed on a medium-term perspective. Longer time-series for analyses are, thus, required to validate the Spanish case of welfare decentralisation. The one lesson to be drawn from the Spanish experience is the attempt to make effective both principles of Europeanisation: territorial subsidiarity and democratic accountability.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Let us remind that according to the own views of the European Commission, the new European governance is not considered the 'exclusive' responsibility of European Union institutions. Neither national governments nor national parliaments are regarded as being the

Despite its institutional demotion (from an institutional status as independent Ministry of Social Affairs to an integrated part of a larger Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), ministerial central officials dealing with poverty and social exclusion matters took the initiative in the co-ordination of the workings for establishing the 2001-03 Spanish NAPSI (National Action Plan for Social Inclusion). Problems about its eventual implementation concern mainly its financing. All participants involved in the formulation of the Plan put its wholehearted support behind it. However, it is not clear whether the central government will manage the articulation of 'fresh' funds to accomplish the estimated increases at rate of an annual 8%.

Some doubts have been cast on whether the role of the Spanish central government would be merely that of co-ordinating the aggregation of funds already devoted by public and private institutions (profit and non-profit) to promote social inclusion. Let us remind that in federalised Spain the task of bringing together a wide range of governmental and societal stakeholders cannot be simply achieved by displaying a central, top-down, hierarchical harmonisation of programmes nation-wide. However, the very existence of the NAPSI can be assessed as an important attempt for intergovernmental co-ordination as it provides the very first synthetic overview of the fight against social exclusion in Spain

---

sole actors of European governance. Local authorities and the regions are regarded as decisive emerging actors (Commission, 2000).

## Bibliographical references

Aguilar, M.; Gaviria, M. and Laparra, M. (1995) *La caña y el pez. El salario social en las Comunidades Autónomas 1989-1994*, Madrid: Fundación Foessa.

Agranoff, R. (1993), "Las relaciones intergubernamentales y el Estado de las Autonomías", *Política y Sociedad*, 13: 87-105.

Aliena, R. (1991) 'RMI, le Gouvernement espagnol à contre-courant' in *Revue Française des Affaires Sociales*, 45: 81-97.

Arriba, A. (1999), *Rentas mínimas de inserción en España: Procesos de implantación y dinámicas sociales*, Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

-(2002), 'Procesos de implantación de políticas de rentas mínimas de inserción en España', en Moreno, L. (ed.), *Pobreza y exclusión: la "malla de seguridad" en España*. Madrid: CSIC.

Ayala, L. (1994), 'Social needs, inequality and the welfare state in Spain: trends and prospects', *Journal of European Social Policy* 4(3): 159-79.

--(2001), "El ingreso madrileño de integración: una valoración desde el conjunto de las Comunidades Autónomas" en Aguilar, Laparra y Pérez (coords.) *Investigaciones de base para la elaboración del Plan de Lucha contra la Exclusión Social en la Comunidad de Madrid*, September 2001, mimeo.

Ayala, L., Martínez, R. y Ruíz-Huerta, J. (2001), "La descentralización territorial de las prestaciones asistenciales: Efectos sobre la igualdad", mimeo.

Bazaga, I.; Ramos, J.A. and Tamayo, M. (coords.) (2000), 'Pobreza y desigualdad en España: enfoques, fuentes y acción pública', *Cuadernos de Gobierno y Administración* 2 (special issue). Madrid: Universidad Rey Juan Carlos.

Beltrán, M. (1992), *El régimen jurídico de la acción social pública*. Oñati: IVAP.

Carabaña, J. and Salido, O. (1999): 'Fuentes de renta, desigualdad y pobreza de individuos y hogares (España, 1993)', en Moreno, L. (ed.), *Pobreza y exclusión. La 'malla de seguridad' en España*, pp. 107-152. Madrid: CSIC.

Cáritas (2001), *Plan Nacional para la inclusión social. Propuesta de Cáritas*. Documento de Trabajo, junio 2001. Madrid: Cáritas Española.

Casado, D. (1990), *Sobre la pobreza en España, 1965-1990*. Barcelona: Hacer.

Casado, D. et. al. (1994), 'Acción social y servicios sociales', *FOESSA, V Informe Sociológico sobre la situación en España. Sociedad para todos en el año 2000*, pp. 1735-1880. Madrid: Fundación FOESSA

Castles, F. (2001), 'The Future of the Welfare State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities', Paper presented at the ISA RC19 Conference, 'Old and New Social Inequalities: What Challenges for Welfare States?', 6-9 September, University of Oviedo.

CES (Consejo Económico y Social) (2001), *La pobreza y la exclusión social en España: propuestas de actuación en el marco del plan nacional para la inclusión social*. Madrid: CES (Colección Informes).

Commission of the European Communities (2000) 'Shaping the New Europe'. Strategic Objectives 2000-2005. Brussels: COM(2000) 154 final.

Cruz Roche, I. (1994) 'La dinámica y estructura de la universalización de las pensiones', *V Informe Sociológico sobre la Situación Social en España*, Madrid: Fundación FOESSA.

Cruz Roche, I; Desdentado, A. and Rodríguez Cabrero, G. (1985), *Política Social y Crisis Económica*. Madrid : Siglo XXI.

Del Pino, E. (2001), 'Las expectativas ciudadanas sobre la acción pública: el proceso y los resultados de las políticas de bienestar en España'. Paper presented at the V Spanish Congress of Political Science, September 26-27, 2001.

Eardley, T.; Bradshaw, J.; Ditch, J.; Gough, I. and Whiteford, P. (eds.) (1996) *Social Assistance in OECD Countries: Synthesis Report*. London: HMSO.

EDIS *et al.* (1998), *Las condiciones de vida de la población pobre en España*. Madrid: Fundación FOESSA.

Ferrera, M. (1996) 'The "Southern Model" of Welfare in Social Europe', *Journal of European Social Policy* 6, 1: 17-37.

Ferrera, M., Matsaganis, M. and Sacchi, S. (2002) "Open coordination against poverty: the new EU 'Social inclusion process', *Journal of European Social Policy* (forthcoming).

García Serrano, C.; Malo, M.A. and Toharia, L. (2001) *La pobreza en España. Un análisis crítico basado en el Panel de Hogares de la Unión Europea (PHOGUE)*. Madrid: MTAS.

Guillén, A.M. (1992), 'Social Policy in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy (1939-1982)', in Ferge, Z. and Kolberg, J.E. (eds.), *Social Policy in a Changing Europe*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Laparra, M. and Aguilar, M. (1997), 'Social Exclusion and Minimum Income Programs in Spain', in MIRE *Comparing Social Welfare Systems in Southern Europe*, vol. 3, Florence Conference, pp. 515-535. Paris: Mission Recherche et Expérimentation (MIRE).



MAP (1997) *Estudio sobre reparto del gasto público en 1997 entre los distintos niveles de administración*. Madrid: Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas.

Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales (1989), *Informe sobre diferentes prestaciones sociales en la CEE y España*. Mimeo.

Moreno, L. (2000a), 'The Spanish development of Southern European welfare', in Kuhnle, S. (ed.), *Survival of the European Welfare State*, pp. 146-165, London: Routledge.

--(2000b): *Ciudadanos precarios. La 'última red' de protección social*, Barcelona: Ariel.

--(2001a), 'Spain, a *Via Media* of Welfare Development', in Taylor-Gooby, P. (ed.), *Welfare States Under Pressure*. London: Sage.

--(2001b), 'Europeanisation and Decentralisation of Welfare Safety Nets', in Clasen, J. (ed.), *What Future for Social Security. Debates and Reforms in National and Cross-national Perspective*, pp. 87-100. The Hague: Kluwer.

--(2001c), *The Federalization of Spain*. London: Frank Cass.

--(2002a), *Pobreza y exclusión: la "malla de seguridad" en España*. Madrid: CSIC.

--(2002b), *Mediterranean welfare and superwomen*, Working Paper 02-02, Madrid: UPC-CSIC.

--(2002c), 'Decentralization in Spain', *Regional Studies* 36(4): 399-408.

Moreno, L. and Arriba, A. (1999), *Welfare and Decentralisation*. Working Paper EUF 99/8. Florence: European University Institute.

Moreno, L. and Sarasa, S. (1993) 'Génesis y desarrollo del Estado del Bienestar en España', *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 6: 27-69.

MTAS (2001a), *Plan Nacional de Acción para la Inclusión Social del Reino de España, Junio 2001-Junio 2003*. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.

MTAS (2001b), *Anuario de Estadísticas Laborales y de Asuntos Sociales, 2000*. Madrid: Subdirección General de Estadísticas Sociales y Laborales, MTAS. (available at <http://www.mtas.es/Estadisticas/anuario00>).

Rhodes, M. (ed.)(1996) 'Southern European Welfare States', *South European Society & Politics* 1, 3.

Razón y Fé (2001), "Plan Nacional de Acción para la Inclusión Social", *Razón y Fé*, 1233: 27-32

Rodríguez-Cabrero, G. (1989), 'Orígenes y evolución del Estado del Bienestar español en su perspectiva histórica. Una visión general', *Política y Sociedad* 2: 79-87.

--(1994) 'La política social en España: 1980-92', *V Informe Sociológico sobre la Situación Social en España*, Madrid: Fundación FOESSA.

Sanzo, L. (2002), "La lucha contra la pobreza en Euskadi" en Moreno, L. (ed.), *Pobreza y exclusión: la "malla de seguridad" en España*. Madrid: CSIC.

Sarasa, S. (1993), *El servicio de lo social*. Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales.

Sarasa, S. and Moreno, L. (eds.) (1995): *El Estado del Bienestar en la Europa del Sur*, Madrid: CSIC.

Serrano, A. and Arriba, A. (1998), *¿Pobres o excluidos? El Programa del Ingreso Madrileño de Integración en perspectiva comparada*. Madrid: Fundación Argentaria-Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales-Editorial Visor.

--(2002), "El Ingreso Madrileño de Integración: Revisitando sus características y algunos tópicos", in Moreno, L. (ed.), *Pobreza y exclusión: la "malla de seguridad" en España*. Madrid: CSIC.

Susín, R. (2000), *La regulación de la pobreza. El tratamiento jurídico-político de la pobreza: los ingresos mínimos de inserción*. Logroño: Universidad de La Rioja.

**Table 1: Social Spending Increases as % of GDP, 1984-1997**

	Total state spending			Social spending			Unemployment benefits			Pensions		
	1984	1997	increase	1984	1997	increase	1984	1997	increase	1984	1997	increase
<b><i>Liberal</i></b>												
Australia	36.40	33.20	-3.20	13.8	18.1	4.3	1.37	1.17	-.20	3.28	4.38	1.10
Canada	45.30	42.40	-2.90	16.2	16.9	0.7	2.03	1.04	-.99	3.35	4.40	1.05
Ireland	47.70	33.20	-14.50	17.9	17.9	0.0	3.52	2.22	-1.30	4.50	2.89	-1.61
UK	47.10	40.90	-6.20	21.1	21.6	0.5	1.78	.48	-1.30	5.74	6.43	.69
USA	33.10	31.40	-1.70	14.1	16.0	1.9	.49	.28	-.21	5.75	5.60	-.15
<b>Average</b>	<b>41.9</b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>-5.7</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>18.1</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>-.8</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>.2</b>
<b><i>Nordic</i></b>												
Denmark	62.60	56.80	-5.80	28.9	30.5	1.6	4.95	3.81	-1.14	5.85	6.92	1.07
Finland	40.20	51.80	11.60	22.3	29.3	7.0	.90	3.19	2.29	6.42	7.55	1.13
Norway	42.10	44.10	2.00	19.7*	25.4	5.7	.48*	.70	.22	4.77*	5.58	.81
Sweden	59.20	59.00	-.20	30.0	33.3	3.3	.94	2.20	1.26	7.20	8.05	.85
<b>Average</b>	<b>51.0</b>	<b>52.9</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>29.6</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>.7</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>
<b><i>Corporatist</i></b>												
Austria	49.30	49.80	.50	24.3*	25.4	1.1	.84*	.92	.08	9.47*	10.11	.64
Belgium	60.70	51.40	-9.30	26.7	23.6	-3.1	3.62	2.67	-.95	6.84	7.44	.60
France	51.50	52.60	1.10	26.4	29.6	3.2	2.34	1.85	-.49	8.66	10.73	2.07
Germany	47.40	48.10	.70	23.6	26.6	3.0	1.05	1.49	.44	10.18	10.49	.31
Netherlands	49.40	50.00	.60	30.2	25.1	-5.1	3.98	3.30	-.68	6.81	6.58	-.23
<b>Average</b>	<b>52.5</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>-3.2</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>26.1</b>	<b>-.2</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>-.3</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>.7</b>
<b><i>Mediterranean</i></b>												
Greece	53.80	44.60	-9.20	16.9	22.2	5.3	.35	.50	.15	7.70	9.39	1.69
Italy	43.10	50.40	7.30	21.0	26.8	5.8	1.39	.79	-.60	8.90	13.24	4.34
Portugal	41.10	43.50	2.40	11.4	18.7	7.3	.27	.87	.60	3.78	6.54	2.76
Spain	35.20	39.90	4.70	17.8	20.9	3.1	2.25	1.89	-.36	5.81	8.60	2.79
<b>Average</b>	<b>42.2</b>	<b>46.0</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>-.1</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>2.9</b>
Japan	32.30	35.00	2.70	11.4	14.4	3.0	.52	.54	.02	3.65	5.50	1.85
<b>Average</b>	<b>46.2</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>-1.00</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>23.3</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>-.2</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>1.1</b>

Note: \*1985 data: 1984 unavailable. Countries are divided up into a conventional regime categorisation.

Source: cols. 2-7: Castles, 2001, updated by OECD 2001.



**Table 2: The public support to welfare in Spain (1985-1995) (%)**

	1985	1986	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
The State is responsible of the welfare of each and every one of the Spanish citizens and has the duty to help them to solve their problems	68	64	67	58	59	55	58	61	60	62
The State is only responsible for the welfare of the least-favoured citizens and has the duty to help them to solve their problems.	-*	-*	-*	21	17	19	17	18	18	15
The citizens are responsible themselves for their own well-being and have the duty to sort out their own problems.	18	21	20	5	16	18	18	16	16	16
Don't knows/ No answer	13	15	13	16	8	8	7	5	11	8

*Note:* \* This option was not included in the questionnaire.

*Source:* Del Pino, E (2001). Elaboration from CIS (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Spanish Sociological Research Centre): *Estudios*: no. 1465 (1985), no 1535 (1986), no. 1 752 (1988), no. 1849 (1989), nos. 1880 & 1910 (1.990), no. 1971 (1.991), no. 2.017 (1992), no. 2063 (1.993), no. 2111 (1994), no. 2154 & 2187 (1.995 (CIS).

**Table 3: Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (%)**

	1981 <sup>1</sup>	1984	1987	1990	1992	1997	2000 <sup>2</sup>
CENTRAL	87.3	75.6	72.6	66.2	63.0	59.5	54
REGIONAL	3.0	12.2	14.6	20.5	23.2	26.9	33
LOCAL	9.7	12.1	12.8	13.3	13.8	13.6	13

<sup>1</sup> Beginning of the process of devolution

<sup>2</sup> Government's estimates

*Source:* Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations (MAP, 1997).

**Table 4: Primary institutions of reference by least-favoured families (according to type of poverty) (%)**

	<b>Extreme</b>	<b>Grave</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Precarious</b>
<i>Comunidades Autónomas</i>	12.2	14.8	13.8	13.8
Municipalities	33.0	31.3	35.3	39.5
Red Cross	30.0	29.2	24.8	21.0
Caritas	22.8	22.5	22.3	20.6
Others	2.0	2.2	3.8	5.1
<i>Total</i>	100	100	100	100

*Note:* Diverse types of poverty are defined according to income percentages regarding the average national disposable income: extreme, lower than 15%; grave, between 16% and 25%; moderate, from 26% to 35%; precarious, between 36% and 50%.

*Source:* EDIS *et al.*, 1998.

**Table 5: Poor population in Spain**

Variable of reference	Year 2000	Sources/Observations
<b>Population:</b> Poor citizens	7,265,008	ECHP 1996 (60% of the income mean).
<b>Targeted population:</b> 1. Extreme poor (under 15% of the total average income)	528,200	FOESSA, Madrid, 1998.
2. Households in dire straits to reach the end of the month	1,908,800	ECHP 1996
<b>Covered population:</b> 1. Beneficiaries of regional <i>Rentas Mínimas de Inserción</i>	202,000	MTAS, according to information by <i>Comunidades Autónomas</i>
2. Beneficiaries of Contributory Supplementary Benefits	2,401,000	Report by Secretary of State for Social Security, 2001.
3. Beneficiaries of non-contributory pensions	476,202	Report by Secretary of State for Social Security, 2001.

Source: MTAS, 2001a, p. 22.



**Table 6: Territorial distribution of poverty in Spain\***

	Share of total population	Share of total poor population	Difference total-poor population	Difference in percentage
Andalusia	17.9	24.4	+6.5	+36.3
Aragon	3.0	3.1	+0.1	+3.3
Asturias	2.8	2.1	-0.7	-25.0
Balearics	1.8	1.5	-0.3	-16.6
Basque Country	5.4	3.1	-2.3	-42.5
Canaries	3.8	4.6	+0.8	+21.0
Cantabria	1.3	1.1	-0.2	-15.3
Castille-La Mancha	4.2	6.0	+1.8	+42.8
Castille and Leon	6.6	7.6	+1.0	+15.1
Catalonia	15.6	11.3	-4.3	-27.5
Extremadura	2.8	5.6	+2.8	+100.0
Galicia	7.1	6.8	-0.3	-4.2
La Rioja	0.6	0.5	-0.1	-16.6
Madrid	12.6	6.4	-6.2	-49.2
Murcia	2.6	3.7	+1.1	+42.3
Navarre	1.3	0.7	-0.6	-46.1
Valencia	10.0	11.0	+1.0	+10.0

\* According to EPF data (*Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares*, 1991).

Source: EDIS *et al.*, 1998, p.170.

**Table 7: Poverty rates in Spain (ECHIP 1994-1996)**

	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>
<b>Monthly equivalised income* mean</b>	<b>436.46€</b>	<b>448.58€</b>	<b>496.93€</b>
Threshold: 50%	18%	17.6%	17.5%
Threshold: 25%	2.6%	3%	2.7%
<b>Monthly equivalised income median</b>	<b>360.61€</b>	<b>375.63€</b>	<b>413.64€</b>
Threshold: 60%	17.8%	17.7%	17.5%
Threshold: 25%	1.6%	1.9%	1.5%

\* Equivalised income is the disposable income adjusted, using equivalence scales, to allow comparison between different types of income units.

*Source:* Elaboration on ECHIP data (1994, 1995, 1996) by García Serrano, Malo and Toharia (2001)

**Table 8: Poverty rates by individual and household characteristics ECHP 1996**

	Poverty risk by groups %	% Poor Population (Distribution by individual and household character.)	%Total Population (Distribution by individual and household character.)
<b>Sex of individual</b>			
Male	17.5	48	48
Female	17.6	52	52
<b>Age of individual</b>			
16-24	24.4	22,9	16,5
25-34	16.6	18,2	19,2
35-44	17.5	17,3	17,2
45-54	20.1	16,2	14,1
55-64	18.4	13,8	13,2
≥65	10.2	11,6	19,8
<b>Marital status</b>			
Married	17.0	58,1	60,1
Separated/Divorced	24.9	2,5	1,7
Widow	10.6	4,9	8,1
Single	20.1	34,5	30,1
<b>Educational level</b>			
High	5.9	4,7	14,1
Middle	12.3	13,1	18,6
Low	21.4	82,1	67,2
<b>Household size</b>			
1	4.2	1,2	4,9
2	10.6	10,2	16,9
3	14.7	18,3	21,9
4	16.2	26,9	29,0
5	26.4	25,5	16,9
≥6	30.6	17,9	19,4
<b>Household type</b>			
Single16-64	7.9	0,7	1,5
Single≥65	2.7	0,5	3,5
Couple no child. <65	13.8	5,0	6,3
Couple no child. ≥65	7.9	4,7	10,3
Other no child.	15.4	21,7	24,6
Single with child.	24.7	1,2	0,9
Couple 1-2 child.	14.5	18,5	22,5
Couple ≥3 child.	32.2	6,8	3,7
Other with dep. child.	27	35,7	23,2
<b>Labour market position</b>			
Working	11.7	26,0	39,1
Unemployed	38.3	24,2	11,1
Inactive	17.5	49,8	49,8
<b>Workers by form of employment</b>			
Wage earner /salaried worker	8.6	55,8	75,6
Trainee	26	2,9	1,3
Self-employed	20	36,3	20,9
Working with family	27	5,0	2,2
<b>Working day (working population)</b>			
1-14 hours	20.5	4,6	2,6
15-29 hours	14.8	8,4	6,5
≥30 hours	11.0	87,0	90,9
<b>Main household incomes 1995</b>			
Wage and salary	13.3	41,5	54,6
Self-employed	21.7	13,4	10,8
Pension	14.3	19,4	23,7
Unemployment subsidy	64.4	10,4	2,8
Other social benefits	36.6	11,2	5,3
Capital gain	20.7	1,9	1,6

Source: Elaboration from García Serrano, Malo and Toharia, (2001) Data ECHP 1994, 1995, 1996  
 Note: Poverty threshold: 50% mean of monthly equivalised income : 496.93 €



**Table 9: Amount of minimum income schemes and other 'safety net' benefits, minimum wage and income tax individual/family minimum, 2000 (€ per person/month)\***

Comunidades Autónomas (year and month of implementation)	Renta mínima (1)	Minimum wage	Income tax: Personal/family minimum (2)		Unemployment contributor y benefit	Unemployment non-contributor y benefit	S.G.I.M. & assistance pensions	Benefits per dependent child	Minimum S.O.V.I. pensions	Contributory minimum pensions					
			Individual Minimum	Family minimum (3)						With spouse	Without spouse				
Andalusia	263.4	427.79 (14 times per year)	3.305.56 per year	601.01 Per year Head	369.53 (4) Bottom threshold:	318.71 75% Minimum wage = 75% de 424.79	149.83 for the Subsidy for Guaranteeing	234.75 1. Disability higher than 65% and 18 years or older	254.82 (14 payments) SOVI -	Retirement 65 years: 424.61	Retirement 65 years: 360.24				
Aragon	254.8	5.947.13 per year (14 times)	3.906.57 per year <65 years	<65 years and income <Minimum wage	1. Without children: (75% minimum wage + 1/6= 495.59 x 75= 371.69)	Agrarian unemployment Subsidy for temporary	Minimum Income (S.G.I.M.), disabled according to LISMI Act (phasing out)	352.13 2. Disability equal/higher 75% and 18 years or older	Disability and Old-age Obligation Insurance (3.564 per year)	Disability: Major Invalidity: 639.92 (4.27%)	Disability: Major: 540.82				
Asturias	282.3		5.108.60 per year disability between 33% and 65%	1.202.02 per year 1st & 2nd child	3° and successive children	2 With children: (minimum wage + 1/6= 424.79 + 70.79= 495.58)				10.61 per day (10.61 x 30= 318.30) (75% of Minimum wage per day)	48.08 3. Younger than 18 years and disability of 33%	Disability: Major Invalidity: 639.92 (4.27%)	Disability: Major: 540.82	Absolute: 360.54	
Balearics	282.1		6.911.63 per year disability equal to or higher than 65%	150.25 supplement for school material between 3 and 16 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Basque Country	305.4		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Canaries	238.9		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Cantabria	249.4		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Castille-La Mancha	297.5		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Castille and Leon	260.3		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Catalonia	285.5		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Extremadura	318.6		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Galicia	242.0		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
La Rioja	298.1		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Madrid	249.0		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Murcia	240.4		6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%				1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54
Navarre	318.6	6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%	1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54				
Valencia	298.0	6.010.12 single-parent family <65 years	300.50 supplement for each descendent <3 years	7.212.14 disability between 33% and 65%	9.015.18 disability equal to or higher than 65%	1.803.03 per year 3° and successive children	24.25 4. No disability and older than 18 years	Absolute: 424.61	Absolute: 424.61	Total with 65 years 360.54	Total with 65 years 360.54				

(1) Basic amount (2) Established by Income Tax Law 40/1998 (3) Provided that income is not higher than the minimum threshold established of 6,010,12 exempted the amounts regulated in art. 48 of the Income Tax normative (4) It refers to the minimum which could be perceived (5) Per beneficiary (6) One beneficiary.

\* Source: Elaboration from CES, 2001, p.66 and administrative data from DGASMF of MTAS.

**Table 10: Low-income cash benefits (non-contributory)**

	<b>Monthly amount (annual amount apportioned in 12 payments) €/month</b>	<b>% MW/monthly MW (year 2000)= 495.5 €/month (annual amount apportioned in 12 payments)</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Notes</b>
<b>Minimum contributory pensions supplement (Minimum pension)</b>	429.33	<b>86.6</b>	2,402,321	<i>Referred to the contributory minimum pension WITHOUT spouse and &gt;65 years Beneficiaries up to 31/12/2000: 31,4% of pensions</i>
<b>Unemployment subsidy</b>	318.60	<b>64.3</b>	367,851	
<b>Agrarian unemployment subsidy</b>	318.60	<b>64.3</b>	224,170	
<b>Active income for occupational insertion</b>	318.60	<b>64.3</b>	3,966	<i>Maximum: 10 payments</i>
<b>Assistance pensions</b>	174.83	<b>35.3</b>	68,058	<i>'Frozen' amount since 1991 (phasing out) Beneficiaries: data from the Basque Country unavailable</i>
<b>Minimum income guarantee (disability-LISMI)</b>	174.83	<b>35.3</b>	83,471	<i>'Frozen' amount since 1991 (phasing out) Beneficiaries: data from the Basque Country and Navarre unavailable</i>
<b>Non-contributory pensions for disabled and old-age</b>	288.10	<b>58.1</b>	471,275	
<b>Differences in regional minimum income schemes</b>	Maximum: 318.60 Minimum: 238.92	Maximum: 64.3 Minimum: <b>48.2</b>	78,445*	<i>*Number of households</i>

Source: Elaboration from MTAS (2001b) and data provided by General Directorate for Social Action, Minors and Family (*Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de la Familia*).

**Table11: Cash benefits for family protection (2000)**

Benefits per dependent child	Annual amount	Monthly amount (12 payments)	% MW (495.5 €/month, (annual amount apportioned in 12 payments)
No disability and younger than 18 years	291.01	24.25	4.9
Younger than 18 years and disability > 33%	582.20	48.47	9.8
Older than 18 years and disability > 65%	2,817.06	234.76	47.4
Older than 18 years and disability > 75%	4,255.65	352.13	71.1
Third child birth	450.76	-----	-----
Maximum Income for family protection	7439.92 (+ 15% per year 2nd and successive children)	619.99	125.1

Source: Elaboration from MTAS (2001b)

**Table X: Main features of “Safety net” benefits (2000)**


*Contributory Access*

<b>BENEFITS</b>		<b>Access</b>	<b>Means test</b>	<b>Length</b>	<b>Administrative agency</b>	<b>Activation measures</b>	<b>Estimated amount</b>	<b>Requirements for Beneficiaries</b>
<b>Minimum pensions supplements</b>		Contributory	Maximum: individual incomes	Indefinite	INSS (Social Security National Institute) (Centrally-run)	----	Differential amount up to the minimum pension (yearly fixed according to age, family situation and kind of pension)	Pensioners whose basic pension is lower than the minimum Income lower than the maximum amount (fixed yearly)
<b>Family protection supplements</b>	<18 years	Contributory	Maximum for household	Indefinite while access conditions remain	INSS	----	Total amount	Affiliated workers and pensioners Child with no disability and younger than 18 years Income lower than the fixed amount yearly (+15% for the 2 <sup>nd</sup> child and successive)
							Reduced amount (differential)	Affiliated workers and pensioners Child with no disability and younger than 18 years Income lower than the maximum amount (yearly fixed) + benefit
	Disability		No access to a non-contributory pension				----	Total amount
<b>Unemployment subsidy</b>		Contributory	Maximum for household	Variable depending on the contribution, age and family charges	INEM (Employment National Institute) (Management transferred to regions)	Conditions: Do not refuse right job offers neither training or labour restructuring programmes	Total amount	Unemployed person (1 month registered) Do not refuse job offers or training, labour promotion or restructuring programmes Exhausted benefit or insufficient contribution and other situations Low-incomes Contribution: 3 months+family resp.; 6 months; +52 years with access to cont. pension +6 years of contributions Older than 45 with exhausted benefit
<b>Agrarian unemployment subsidy and Extremadura)</b>		Contributory	Maximum for household	Variable depending on the contribution, age and family charges	INEM	Conditions: It depends on ages (16, 25, 52 and 60 years), access, amounts and length	Total amount	Unemployed people Eventual employee registered in the REASS, Andalusia and Extremadura Low-incomes Contribution: minimum number of working days (35); +52 years with access to cont. pension +6 years of contributions
<b>INEM Active income</b>		Contributory	Maximum for household	10 months	INEM-CCAA (Regional Autonomous Communities)	Labour insertion programme and workfare commitment	Total amount	Long-term unemployed people (12 months) ≥45 years Family responsibility Low-incomes End of the contributory benefit Signing of workfare commitment (benefit is provided 3 months later)



BENEFITS		Access	Means test	Length	Administrative agency	Activation measures	Estimated amount	Requirements for Beneficiaries
Assistance pensions (disappearing)		Non-contributory	Maximum household for	Indefinite	CCAA	-----	Total amount	Disabled and old-age ≥66 years Helplessness Income lower than the benefit and no property
Minimum income guarantee (disability-LISMI) (disappearing)		Non-contributory	Maximum: individual incomes	Indefinite	IMSERSO-CCAA (Institute of Migrations and Social Services ) (Management transferred to regions)	-----	Differential amount	Disability Personal income lower than 70% MW
Non-contributory pensions for disabled and old-age		Non-contributory	Maximum household for	Indefinite	IMSERSO-CCAA	-----	Differential amount between incomes or beneficiary benefits/household and the 2 <sup>nd</sup> beneficiary pension and successive: 70% Minimum: 25% of the pension	Invalidity: 18-64 years, ≥65% disability, low-incomes
								Retirement: 65 years, insufficient incomes
Non-contributory family protection	<18 years	Non-contributory	Maximum household for	Indefinite while access conditions exist	INSS	-----	Total amount	Child with no disability and younger than 18 years Income lower than the fixed amount yearly (+15% for the 2 <sup>nd</sup> child and successive)
								Reduced amount (differential)
	Disability		No access to a non-contributory pension				-----	Total amount
Minimum income schemes of the Autonomous Communities		Non-contributory	Maximum household for	Variable depending on the autonomous legislation	CCAA	Commitments and social and labour insertion programmes	Differential amount	Variable

**Figure 1: The Spanish public 'safety net': scale and itineraries of protection**



**Table 13: Estimates of the Spanish NAPSI (NAP/incl.) (€ million )**

<b>Objective/Area of action</b>	<b>Year 2000 Million of Euro</b>	<b>Years 2001-2003 (<b>**</b>) Million of Euro</b>
<b>Objective 1.1.:</b>	<b>957.09</b>	<b>2,896.93</b>
* Access to employment	957.09	2,896.93
<b>Objective 1.2.:</b>	<b>9,408.60</b>	<b>19,470.59</b>
* Benefits resources	6,236.29	12,699.16
* Social Services (primary)	548.24	1,203.16
* Access to housing	446.76	922.41
* Education	1,103.86	2,340.17
* Health	1,073.46	2,305.69
<b>Objective 2:</b>	<b>526.36</b>	<b>1,136.45</b>
* Support family solidarity	513.74	1,109.67
* Access to new technologies	12.62	26.78
<b>Objective 3:</b>	<b>866.25</b>	<b>1,809.90</b>
* Elderly	178.27	375.48
* Women	61.33	126.63
* Youth	41.96	85.92
* Children and family	189.34	401.58
* Gypsy population	9.14	18.38
* Disabled	176.05	369.59
* Homeless	6,98	14.03
* Immigrants	200.06	412.36
* Former inmates	3.13	5.92
<b>Objective 4:</b>	<b>51.93</b>	<b>110.30</b>
* Mobilisation of agents and partners	51.93	110.30
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11,810.23</b>	<b>25,424.16</b>

(\*) Estimates according to information provided by public institutions and supporting bodies.

(\*\*) Note that the estimates for 2001-03 are biannual (i.e. the aggregation of both 2001 and 2002 financial years).

Source: MTAS, 2001a: 48.

**Table 14: Regional expenditure and coverage of the programmes of minimum income schemes, 2000**

	Regional Expenditure		Population coverage		Protective Intensity		
	Actual spending (million of €) <sup>1</sup>	% Budgetary effort <sup>2</sup>	Number of households <sup>3</sup>	% of households <sup>4</sup>	Basic Amount <sup>5</sup> (€/month)	% M.W. <sup>6</sup>	% N.C.P. <sup>7</sup>
Andalusia	27,532	0.17	15,962	0.74	263.4	53.1	91.4
Aragon	2.596	0.12	1,396	0.36	254.8	51.4	88.5
Asturias	10.632	0.86	1,512	0.44	282.3	57.0	98.0
Balearics	1.082	0.12	570	0.21	282.1	56.9	97.9
Basque Country	53.238	1.03	16,550	2.64	305.4	61.6	106.0
Canaries	8.024	0.21	5,358	1.12	238.9	48.2	82.9
Cantabria	3.456	0.39	2,340	1.43	249.4	50.3	86.6
Castille-La Mancha	1.947	0.07	813	0.15	297.5	60.0	103.3
Castille and Leon	8.763	0.20	2,814	0.34	260.3	52.5	90.3
Catalonia	36.632	0.28	9,726	0.47	285.5	57.6	99.1
Extremadura	3.119	0.18	1,351	0.40	318.6	64.3	110.6
Galicia	12.699	0.20	4,156	0.51	242.0	48.8	84.0
La Rioja	0.337	0.08	179	0.22	289.1	58.3	100.3
Madrid	24.912	0.38	7,855	0.49	249.0	50.2	86.4
Murcia	0.950	0.06	3,478	1.02	240.4	48.5	83.4
Navarre	4.075	0.19	1,820	1.04	318.6	64.3	110.6
Valencia	10.019	0.14	2,565	0.20	298.0	60.1	103.4

Source: Elaboration from data provided by the General Directorate for Social Action, Minors and Family (*Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de la Familia*).

Note: Budget expenditure amount corresponds to the expenditure of the minimum income payments, except for Asturias which also includes social wage expenditure and training.

<sup>1</sup> Spending data corresponds to the Budget related to minimum income benefit payments.

<sup>2</sup> Percentage of Expenditure related to Minimum Income Schemes/Initial consolidated Budget of the CCAA, Ministry of Public Administration (<http://www.map.es>)

<sup>3</sup> The number of households corresponds to the number of benefits. In some cases, data corresponds to the number of households with access to the programme at any moment (ex. during December in Madrid), in some others, data corresponds to the number of households with access to the benefits throughout the year (ex. Basque Country).

<sup>4</sup> Total number of households of the Autonomous Communities comes from the Continuous Survey on Family Budgets, 2nd Trimester, 2001, INE.

<sup>5</sup> Basic amount corresponds to the basic amount which comes out of adding family supplements (depending on family size and on each CCAA) and of subtracting the incomes received by the family.

<sup>6</sup> Percentage of the basic amount of the minimum income with regard to the Minimum wage, 2000: 495.5 €/month (annual amount apportioned in 12 payments)

<sup>7</sup> Percentage of the basic amount of the minimum income with regard to Non-Contributory pensions for Disability and Old-Age, year 2000: 288.10 (for 12 months: annual amount apportioned in 14 payments) .

**Table 15: Evolution of expenditure on minimum income schemes**

	Actual spending (million of €)				
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Andalusia	24,431	11,756	17,760	17,760	27,532
Aragon	2,885	2,843	2,614	2,560	2,596
Asturias	8,072	9,129	9,857	9,568	10,632
Balearics	--	-	1,587	0,974	1,082
Basque Country	41,320	42,437	42,197	44,817	53,238
Canaries	7,212	6,653	6,888	8,186	8,024
Cantabria	445	1,833	2,831	3,780	3,456
Castille-La Mancha	4,375	2,416	2,777	2,476	1,947
Castille and Leon	8,132	8,198	8,114	8,468	8,763
Catalonia	25,531	30,297	34,143	34,143	36,632
Extremadura	1,262	908	3,666	2,386	3,119
Galicia	9,604	10,578	11,696	13,150	12,699
Rioja	319	343	379	325	337
Madrid	20,777	22,832	24,936	24,966	24,912
Murcia	1,346	1,160	1,004	0,962	950
Navarre	2,458	2,747	3,005	3,486	4,075
Valencia	6,924	7,633	9,226	10,115	10,019
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>165,092</b>	<b>161,762</b>	<b>182,678</b>	<b>188,123</b>	<b>210,012</b>

*Source:* Elaboration from data provided by the General Directorate for Social Action, Minors and Family (Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de la Familia).

*Note:* Budget expenditure amount corresponds to the expenditure of the minimum income payments, except for Asturias which also includes social wage expenditure and training.

**Table 16: Evolution of beneficiaries on minimum income schemes (households)**

	Number of households				
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Andalusia	10,603	7,907	7,284	9,914	15,962
Aragon	1,112	951	793	968	1,396
Asturias	1,511	1,761	1,067	1,022	1,512
Balearics			758	604	570
Basque Country	16,052	16,472	16,190	15,804	16,550
Canaries	3,096	3,153	5,690	6,689	5,358
Cantabria	490	320	1491	2,173	2,340
Castille-La Mancha	2,116	1,619	1,027	920	813
Castille and Leon	3,306	3,052	2,957	2,937	2,814
Catalonia	8,372	9,678	9,677	9,672	9,726
Extremadura	671	443	2365	946	1,351
Galicia	5,003	5,353	5,647	4,292	4,156
Madrid	7,815	7,878	8,934	8,304	7,855
Murcia	532	571	379	327	3,478
Navarre	1,503	1,646	1,770	1,264	1,820
Rioja	282	266	233	197	179
Valencia	3,713	2,644	4,404	3,470	2,565
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>66,177</b>	<b>63,714</b>	<b>70,666</b>	<b>69,503</b>	<b>78,445</b>

*Source:* Elaboration from data provided by the General Directorate for Social Action, Minors and Family (*Dirección General de Acción Social, del Menor y de la Familia*).

*Note:* The number of households in the Programme corresponds to the number of households with access to minimum income schemes except for Asturias which also includes social employment expenditure and training and Andalusia (year 1996) which includes training.

## Appendix I. National Legislation on benefits for the low-income

1962	Decree No. 1315/1962 of June 14 on Assistance for Elderly and Disabled people (assistance pensions). <i>Decreto 1315/1962, de 14 de junio, de Auxilios a Ancianos y Enfermos (pensiones asistenciales).</i>	<b>Assistance Pensions</b>
1963	Law No. 163/1963 of December 23, Basic Law of the Social Security (in force since 1967). <i>Ley 163/1963, de 23 de diciembre, de Bases de la Seguridad Social (en vigor a partir de 1967).</i>	<b>Social Security (S.S.) Regulation</b>
1972	Law No. 24/1972, June 21, on the Social Security Benefits. <i>Ley 24/1972, de 21 de junio, en materia de Prestaciones de la Seguridad Social (BOE de 28 de junio).</i>	<b>Contributive Pensions (S.S.)</b>
1974	Decree No. 2065/1974, May 30, General Law of Social Security. <i>Decreto 2065/1974, de 30 de mayo, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley General de la Seguridad Social (BOE de 20 y 22 de julio).</i>	<b>Social Security Regulation</b>
1978	Spanish Constitution, 27 <sup>th</sup> of December. <i>Constitución española, de 27 de diciembre (BOE de 29 de diciembre).</i>	
	Decree-Law No. 36/1978, November 16, on Social Security Management, Health and Employment. <i>Real Decreto-Ley 36/1978, de 16 de noviembre, sobre Gestión Institucional de la Seguridad Social, la Salud y el Empleo (BOE de 18 de noviembre).</i>	<b>Social Security Management</b>
1980	Law No. 51/1980, October 8, Basic Employment Law. <i>Ley 51/1980, de 8 de octubre, Ley Básica de Empleo (BOE de 17 de octubre).</i>	<b>Employment (including Unemployment Benefits)</b>
1981	Decree No. 2620/1981, July 24, on Economic aid Management from the National Fund of Social Assistance for old-age, disabled or invalid people incapacitated for work. <i>Real Decreto 2620/1981, de 24 de julio, por el que se regula la Concesión de Ayudas del Fondo Nacional de Asistencia Social a ancianos y a enfermos o inválidos incapacitados para el trabajo. (BOE de 6 de noviembre).</i>	<b>Assistance Pensions</b>
1982	Law No. 13/1982, April 7, on Social Integration of Disabled People. <i>Ley 13/1982, de 7 de abril, Ley de Integración Social de Minusválidos (LISMI) (BOE de 30 de abril).</i>	<b>Disable People Policies (including Minimum Guaranteed Income)</b>
	Beginning of the National Act of Social Services: - Basque Country: Law 6/1982, May 20, on Social Security. <i>Comienzo de Leyes Autonómicas de Servicios Sociales:</i> - País Vasco: Ley 6/1982, de 20 de mayo, sobre Seguridad Social (BOPV, 2 de junio).	<b>Regional Social Services</b>
1983	Decree No. 3237/1983, December 28, on Unemployment subsidy for eventual employees registered in the Special Agrarian Regime of the Social Security. <i>Real Decreto 3237/1983, de 28 de diciembre, de subsidio por desempleo en favor de los trabajadores eventuales incluidos en el Régimen Especial Agrario de la Seguridad Social.</i>	<b>Agrarian Unemployment Subsidy</b>
1984	Law No. 31/1984, August 2, on Unemployment Protection. <i>Ley 31/1984, de 2 de agosto, de Protección por Desempleo (BOE de</i>	<b>Unemployment Benefits</b>

- 4 de agosto). **(Contributory and Subsidy)**  
**Minimum Income Guarantee (LISMI)**
- Decree No. 383/1984, February 1, on Special System of social and economic Benefits for Disabled People.  
*Real Decreto 383/1984, de 1 de febrero, de Sistema especial de Prestaciones sociales y económicas para Minusválidos (BOE de 22 de marzo).*
- Decree No. 2298/1984, December 26, modifying the Decree 3237/1883. **Agrarian Unemployment Subsidy**  
*Real Decreto 2298/1984, de 26 de diciembre, modificación del Real Decreto 3237/1983.*
- 1985 Law No. 7/1985, April 2, on the regulation of the Local Government rules. **Local Administration**  
*Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, reguladora de las bases de Régimen local (BOE de 3 de abril).*
- Decree No. 625/1985, April 2, implementing Law 31/1984, August 2, on Unemployment Protection. **Unemployment (Contributory and Subsidy)**  
*Real Decreto 625/1985, de 2 de abril, que desarrolla la Ley 31/1984, de 2 de agosto, de Protección por Desempleo (BOE de 7 de mayo).*
- 1986 Law No. 14/1986, April 25, General Law of Health. **Health System**  
*Ley 14/1986, de 25 de abril, General de Sanidad (BOE de 29 de abril).*
- 1987 Concerted plan for the development of the basic provision of social services by the Local Authorities. **Social Services**  
*Plan Concertado para el desarrollo de prestaciones básicas de servicios sociales de las Corporaciones Locales.*
- 1989 Decree No. 1088/1989, September 8, Social Security health care coverage extension to people with insufficient incomes. **Health Care Universalization**  
*Real Decreto 1088/1989, de 8 de septiembre, por el que se extiende la cobertura de la asistencia sanitaria de la Seguridad Social a personas sin recursos económicos suficientes (BOE de 9 de septiembre).*
- 1990 Law No. 26/1990, September 20, Law of Non-Contributory Benefits of the Social Security (at present, it is abolished and integrated in the General Law of the Social Security, approved by Legislative Decree No. 1/1994, June 2). **Non-Contributory Pensions (S.S.) and Non-Contributory Family Protection (S.S.)**  
*Ley 26/1990, de 20 de diciembre, por la que se establecen en la Seguridad Social prestaciones no contributivas (actualmente derogada e integrada en el Texto Refundido de la Ley General de la Seguridad Social, aprobado por Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1994, de 20 de junio) (BOE de 22 de diciembre).*
- 1991 Decree No. 356/1991, March 15, on benefits for dependent children, implementing Law 26/1990, December 20, Law of Non-Contributory Benefits. **Non-Contributory Family Protection (S.S.)**  
*Real Decreto 356/1991, de 15 de marzo, por el que se desarrolla, en materia de prestaciones por hijo a cargo, la Ley 26/1990, de 20 de diciembre, por la que se establecen en la Seguridad Social prestaciones no contributivas, (BOE de 21 de marzo).*
- Decree No. 357/1991, March 15, on non-contributory pensions, invalidity and retirement, implementing Law 26/1990, December 20, Law of Non-Contributory Benefits. **Non-Contributory Pensions (S.S.)**  
*Real Decreto 357/1991, de 15 de marzo, por el que se desarrolla, en materia de pensiones no contributivas, invalidez y jubilación, la Ley*



- 26/1990, de 20 de diciembre, por la que se establecen en la Seguridad Social prestaciones no contributivas (BOE de 21 de marzo).
- 1992 Law No. 22/1992, July 39, on Urgent Measures for Employment Promotion and Unemployment Protection. **Unemployment Benefits (Contributory and Subsidy)**  
*Ley 22/1992, de 30 de julio, de Medidas urgentes sobre Fomento del Empleo y Protección por Desempleo (BOE de 4 de agosto).*
- Law No. 28/1992, November 24, on Urgent Budget Measures, it abolishes decree 1315/1962, on assistance pensions.  
*Ley 28/1992, de 24 de noviembre, de Medidas Presupuestarias Urgentes, que deroga las pensiones asistenciales del Decreto 1315/1962 (BOE de 25 de noviembre).*
- 1994 Legislative Decree No. 1/1994, June 20, General Law of the Social Security. **Social Security**  
*Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1994, de 20 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley General de la Seguridad Social (BOE de 29 de junio).*
- 1995 Legislative Decree No. 1/1995, March 24, Workers' Statute. **Labour Market**  
*Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1995, de 24 de marzo, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido del Estatuto de los Trabajadores (BOE de 29 de marzo).*
- Communication Report of the analysis of the structural problems of the system of the Social Security and the main reforms that will have to be undertaken (Toledo Pact) (approved by the Congress, 6<sup>th</sup> of April). **Social Security Reform**  
*Informe de la Ponencia para el análisis de los problemas estructurales del sistema de la Seguridad Social y de las principales reformas que deberán acometerse (Pacto de Toledo) (aprobado el por el pleno del Congreso de los Diputados 6 de abril).*
- 1996 *Agreement for the Consolidation and Rationalization of the Social Security System (signed by the Government and the trade unions: Comisiones Obreras and UGT, 9<sup>th</sup> of October).* **Social Security Reform**  
*Acuerdo para la consolidación y racionalización del sistema de la seguridad social (firmado por el Gobierno y los sindicatos Comisiones Obreras y UGT el 9 de octubre).*
- 1997 Law No. 24/1997, July 15, on Consolidation and Rationalization of the Social Security System. **Social Security Reform**  
*Ley 24/1997, de 15 de julio, de Consolidación y Racionalización del Sistema de la Seguridad Social (BOE de 16 de julio).*
- Decree No. 5/1997, January 10, on Unemployment subsidy for eventual employees registered in the Special Agrarian Regime of the Social Security. **Agrarian Unemployment Subsidy**  
*Real Decreto 5/1997, de 10 de enero, por el que se regula el subsidio por desempleo a favor de los trabajadores eventuales incluidos en el Régimen Especial Agrario de la Seguridad Social. (BOE de 11 de enero).*
- Decree No. 140/1997, January 31, modifying to some extent the basic organic structure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and converting the National Institute of Social Services into the Institute of Migrations and Social Services. **Social Services**  
*Real Decreto 140/1997, de 31 de enero, por el que se modifica parcialmente la estructura orgánica básica del Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales y transforma el Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales en Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales (BOE de 6 de febrero).*

- Decree No. 1647/1997, October 31, implementing some aspects of the Law No. 24/1997, July 25, on Consolidation and Rationalization of the System of the Social Security.  
*Real Decreto 1647/1997, de 31 de octubre, por el que se desarrollan determinados aspectos de la Ley 24/1997, de 15 de julio, de consolidación y racionalización del sistema de la seguridad social (BOE de 13 de noviembre).* **Social Security Reform**
- 1999 Law No. 39/1999, November 5, Family and Labour Life Conciliation Law.  
*Ley 39/1999, de 5 de noviembre, para promover la conciliación de la vida familiar y laboral de las personas trabajadoras (BOE de 6 de noviembre).* **Family Policy**
- 2000 Decree-Law No. 1/2000, January 14, on measures to improve family protection of the Social Security.  
*Real Decreto-Ley 1/2000, de 14 de enero, sobre determinadas medidas de mejora de la protección familiar de la Seguridad Social (BOE de 17 de enero).* **Non-contributory Family Protection**
- Decree-Law No. 1368/2000, July 19, on the development of the Economic Benefits of single payment for the 3<sup>rd</sup> child birth and successive and multiple birth.  
*Real Decreto-Ley 1368/2000, de 19 de julio, de desarrollo de las prestaciones económicas de pago único por nacimiento de tercer o sucesivos hijos y por parto múltiple (BOE de 29 de julio).* **Non-contributory Family Protection**
- Decree No. 236/2000, February 18, Insertion Programme for year 2000, for long-term unemployed people, older than 45 years (Active Income for Insertion) (extended yearly).  
*Real Decreto 236/2000, de 18 de febrero, por el que se regula un programa, para el año 2000, de inserción laboral para trabajadores desempleados de larga duración en situación de necesidad, mayores de 45 años. (Renta Activa de Inserción) (prorrogado anualmente) (BOE de 10 de marzo).* **Active Income for Insertion**
- Decree No. 73/2000, January 21, modifying section 4 of article 3 of Decree No. 5/1997, January 10 on Unemployment subsidy for eventual employees registered in the Special Agrarian Regime of the Social Security, and extending its provisional orders.  
*Real Decreto 73/2000, de 21 de enero, por el que se modifica el apartado 4 del artículo 3 del Real Decreto 5/1997, de 10 de enero, por el que se regula el subsidio por desempleo a favor de los trabajadores eventuales incluidos en el Régimen Especial Agrario de la Seguridad Social y se proroga la vigencia de sus disposiciones transitorias (BOE de 22 de enero).* **Agrarian Unemployment Subsidy**
- 2001 Agreement for the improvement and development of the social protection system (signed by the Government, the employers' association (CEOE and CEPYME) and Comisiones Obreras, 9<sup>th</sup> of April).  
*Acuerdo para la mejora y el desarrollo del sistema de protección social (firmado por el Gobierno, la Patronal (CEOE y CEPYME) y Comisiones Obreras el 9 de abril).* **Social Security Reform**
- National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (june 2001-june 2003) (approved by the Ministers Council).  
*Plan Nacional de Acción para la Inclusión Social del Reino de España (junio 2001-junio 2003) (aprobado por el Consejo de Ministros el 29 de mayo).* **Spanish NAPSI (NAP/inc)**

## Appendix II: Summary of indicators to monitor the Spanish NAPSI (NAP/incl.)

Area	Indicators (a)
Access to employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of unemployed with 1 year or longer out of work</li> <li>* Number of long-term unemployed &gt;45 and level of formal education lower than secondary</li> <li>* Number of long-term unemployed &lt;25 and level of formal education no higher than secondary</li> <li>* Sub-employed workers</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Primary social services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of citizens in situation of need</li> <li>* Number of gypsies without regular employment</li> <li>* Number of illiterate older than 16 years</li> <li>* Number of youngsters between 6-15 without out of school</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Income guaranteed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of citizens below the 60% of the median</li> <li>* Number of citizens below the 15% of average disposable income</li> <li>* Number of households in dire straits</li> <li>* Number of beneficiaries</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Access to housing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of new built houses</li> <li>* Number of houses with rental subvention</li> <li>* Number of houses without minimum conditions</li> <li>* Number of houses in very bad conditions</li> <li>* Number of shanty houses</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Access to education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of unemployed illiterate of 16 years</li> <li>* Number of children and youngsters of 6-15 years out of school</li> <li>* Number of youngsters in courses lower than their corresponding level of education</li> <li>* Number of youngsters without working experience and without formal education lower than secondary level</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Access to health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of disabled citizens</li> <li>* Number with limited personal autonomy (long-term care)</li> <li>* Number of citizens with AIDS disease</li> <li>* Number of disabled &lt;65 years</li> <li>* Number of disabled &gt;65 years</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Access to new technologies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of schools with access to Internet</li> <li>* Number of youngsters in courses lower than their corresponding level of education</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Policies for family solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of citizens eligible for these actions</li> <li>* Number of citizens living on their own</li> <li>* Number of unemployed single-parent families with dependent children</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Programmes for the poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of poor below the 60% mean</li> <li>* Number of poor below the 15% of the average disposable income</li> <li>* Number of disabled and citizens with severe restrictions of personal autonomy (long-term care)</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Programmes for the gypsy population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of excluded gypsy citizens</li> <li>* Number of gypsy citizens with no regular employment</li> <li>* Expenditure</li> </ul>
Programmes for the immigrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of immigrants in the process of legal regularisation</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Disabled citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of poor with disability</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of poor households</li> <li>* Number of citizens with a high degree of disability or with severe restrictions of personal autonomy (long-term care)</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Public information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of interventions</li> <li>* Number of poor households</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Participation of social partners in the development of social capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of jobs in NGOs (associations and foundations)</li> <li>* Number of voluntary workers registered in NGOs</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Communication interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Number of targeted people</li> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>
Establishment of co-ordinating institutions	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of public bodies involved</li> <li>2. Number of roundtables under this theme</li> <li>3. Number of involved beneficiary associations</li> <li>4. Number of collaborating NGOs</li> <li>5. Number of participating social partners <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5.1. Number of business organisations</li> <li>5.2. Number of trade unions</li> </ol> </li> <li>6. Number of direct voluntary participants or working in NGOs</li> <li>7. Number of participants in seminars or Master courses on Social Inclusion</li> <li>8. Training courses developed <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8.1. Number of participants in training courses</li> <li>8.2. Number of agreements with collaborating institutions</li> <li>8.3. Number of participants from governmental bodies</li> </ol> </li> <li>9. Public campaigns <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9.1. Number of conferences and meetings</li> </ol> </li> <li>10. Number of reported best practices</li> </ol> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Expenditure made</li> </ul>

(a) In all monitoring indicators the variable of gender should be taken into account whenever possible

Source: MTAS, 2001a: 49-51

## Appendix III: Regional Legislation on Minimum Income Programmes

- Andalusia**
- Decree. No. 400/1990, September 27, on the creation of the Andalusian Solidarity Programme for eradicating exclusion and inequality.  
*Decreto 400/1990, de 27 de noviembre. Creación del Programa de Solidaridad de los Andaluces para la erradicación de la marginación y la desigualdad (BOJA núm. 99, 30 de noviembre).*
- Decree No. 113/1998, June 2, on creation of the Committee for reforming of Decree No. 400/1990, November 27.  
*Decreto 113/1998, de 2 de junio. Creación de la Comisión para la reforma del Decreto 400/1990, de 27 de noviembre (BOJA núm. 66, 16 de junio).*
- Decree No. 284/1998, December 29, on economic aid supplements (extra) for retired pensioners and disabled pensioners, (non-contributory access).  
*Decreto 284/1998, de 29 de diciembre, por el que se establecen ayudas económicas complementarias de carácter extraordinario a favor de los pensionistas por jubilación e invalidez, en sus modalidades no contributivas (BOJA núm. 149, 31 de diciembre de 1998).*
- Decree No. 2/1999, January 12, on the regulation of the creation of the Andalusian Solidarity Programme for eradicating exclusion and inequality.  
*Decreto 2/1999, de 12 de enero, por el que se regula la creación del Programa de Solidaridad de los andaluces para la erradicación de la marginación y la desigualdad (BOJA núm. 16, 6 de febrero).*
- Aragon**
- Law No. 1/1993, February 19, Basic Measures of Insertion and Social Normalization.  
*Ley 1/1993, de 19 de febrero. Medidas Básicas de Inserción y Normalización Social (BOA núm. 24, 1 de marzo).*
- Decree No. 57/1994, March 23, on the regulation of the Aragonese Insertion Income, developing of Law 1/1993.  
*Decreto 57/1994, de 23 de marzo. Regulación del Ingreso Aragonés de Inserción de desarrollo de la Ley 1/1993 (BOA núm. 43, 8 de abril).*
- Asturias**
- Decree No. 28/1990, March 8, on Aids for Situations of Extreme Poverty.  
*Decreto 28/1990, de 8 de marzo. Ayudas para Situaciones de Extrema Necesidad (ASEN).*
- Law No. 6/1991, April 5, on the regulation of the Minimum Insertion Income.  
*Ley 6/1991, de 5 de abril. Regulación del Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción (BOPA núm. 87, 17 de abril).*
- Decree No. 158/1991, December 2. Minimum Insertion Income rules.  
*Decreto 158/1991, de 2 de diciembre. Reglamento del Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción (BOPA núm. 294, 21 de diciembre).*
- Pact for regulating the working conditions stemmed from Minimum Insertion Income start-up. Trade unions: DRAS, UGT. CCOO. 22<sup>nd</sup> of January.  
*Pacto por el que se regulan las condiciones laborales y profesionales derivadas de la aplicación del Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción en la Comunidad del Principado de Asturias. DRAS, UGT. CCOO, 22 de enero de 1993.*
- General Insertion Plan, year 1993.  
*Plan general de inserción año 1993.*

<b>Balearics</b>	<p>Decree No. 36/1995, April 6, on the regulation of the Community Provisional Support.- Mallorca Council modifies the Community Provisional Support rules the 17<sup>th</sup> of June. <i>Decreto 36/1995, de 6 de abril. Regulación del Soporte Transitorio Comunitario (BOIB núm. 19, 20 de abril) – Modificación de las bases reguladoras del Soporte Transitorio Comunitario. Consejo Insular de Mallorca (BOIB núm. 74, 17 de junio).</i></p>
<b>Basque Country</b>	<p>Decree No. 39/1989, February 28. Minimum Family Income. <i>Decreto 39/1989, de 28 de febrero. Ingreso Mínimo Familiar (BOPV núm. 44, 6 de marzo).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 64/1989, March 21, on Economic Aid for Situations of Extreme Poverty. <i>Decreto 64/1989, de 21 de marzo. Ayudas Económicas a Situaciones de Emergencia Social. (BOPV núm. 60, 30 de marzo).</i></p> <p>Law No. 2/1990, May 3, Minimum Insertion Income. <i>Ley 2/1990, de 3 de mayo. Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción. (BOPV núm. 106, 30 de mayo).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 193/1990, July 17, on the Minimum Insertion Income rules. <i>Decreto 193/1990, de 17 de julio. Reglamento de Aplicación del Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción (BOPV núm. 166, 20 de agosto).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 26/1993, February 9. Economic Aid for Situations of Extreme Poverty. <i>Decreto 26/1993, de 9 de febrero, por el que se establecen las Ayudas Económicas a Situaciones de Emergencia Social. (BOPV núm. 38, 25 de febrero).</i></p> <p>Law No. 12/1998, May 22. Law Against Social Exclusion. <i>Ley 12/1998, de 22 de mayo. Contra la Exclusión Social (BOPV núm. 105, 8 de junio).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 198/1999 and Decree No. 199/1999, April 20, on Special Need Aids. <i>Decreto 198/1999 y Decreto 199/1999, de 20 de abril. Ayudas de Emergencia Social (BOPV núm. 94, 20 de mayo).</i></p> <p>Law No. 8/2000 and Law No. 9/2000, November 10, modifying the Law Against Social Exclusion. <i>Ley 8/2000 y Ley 9/2000, de 10 de noviembre. Modificación de la Ley Contra la Exclusión Social. (BOPV núm. 1, 2 de enero).</i></p> <p>Law 10/2000, December 27. Social Rights Letter. <i>Ley 10/2000, de 27 de diciembre. Carta de Derechos Sociales. (BOPV núm. 249, 30 de diciembre).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 1/2000, January 11, on the regulation of the Insertion Agreements. <i>Decreto 1/2000, de 11 de enero, por el que se regulan los Convenios de Inserción (BOPV núm. 20, 31 de enero).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 182/2000, September 19, Programme AUZOLAN for the occupational insertion of people in at-risk situations or in exclusion. <i>Decreto 182/2000, de 19 de septiembre, por el que se articula el programa AUZOLAN, para la Inserción Laboral de las personas en situación de riesgo o exclusión (BOPV núm. 218, 14 de noviembre).</i></p> <p>Order 14-02-2001 from the Councillor of Justice, Work and Social Security, establishing employment incentives for Basic Income and Special Need Aids beneficiaries. It abolished the Order 3-02-2000 that introduced the model. <i>Orden de 14-02-2001, del Consejero de Justicia, Trabajo y Seguridad Social, por la que se establecen los estímulos al empleo de los titulares de la Renta Básica y de los beneficiarios de las Ayudas de Emergencia Social. Deroga la orden 3-02-2000, que implanta inicialmente el modelo (BOPV núm. 37, 21 de febrero).</i></p>

- Canaries** Decree No. 79/1991, April 16. on Urgent Measures for Social Inclusion (PER: Regulated Cash Benefits, Access Programme, Integration Programme).  
*Decreto 79/1991, de 16 de abril. Medidas Urgentes de Inserción Social (PER: Prestaciones Económicas Regladas, Programa de Accesibilidad y Programa de Integración) (BOC núm. 60, 8 de mayo).*
- Decree No. 133/1992, July 30. Basic Economic Aids.  
*Decreto 133/1992, de 30 de julio. Ayudas Económicas Básicas (BOC núm. 125, 4 de septiembre).*
- Decree No. 13/1998, February 5, on the regulation of the Basic Economic Aids.  
*Decreto 13/1998, de 5 de febrero. Regulación de las Ayudas Económicas Básicas (BOC núm. 27, 2 de marzo).*
- Report No. 1/1998. Social Integration Plan against poverty and social exclusion in Canaries. (Approved in the plenary session of the Council the 19<sup>th</sup> of March).  
*Dictamen 1/1998, Plan de Integración Social contra la pobreza y la exclusión social en Canarias. (Aprobado en sesión del Pleno del Consejo de fecha 19 de marzo de 1998).*
- Cantabria** Decree No. 40/1989, May 17. Cantabrian Plan for Family Assistance: Minimum Family Income.  
*Decreto 40/1989, de 17 de mayo. Plan Cántabro de Ayuda a la Necesidad Familiar: Ingreso Mínimo Familiar*
- Decree No. 75/1995, March 23. Cantabrian Plan of Minimum Insertion Income.  
*Decreto 75/1996, de 7 de agosto. Plan Cántabro de Ingresos Mínimos de Inserción (IMI) (BOC núm. 164, 15 de agosto).*
- Castille-La Mancha** Decree No. 141/1990, December 18. Regional Solidarity Plan: Additional Aid, Ordinary Aid and Insertion Aid.  
*Decreto 141/1990, de 18 de diciembre. Plan Regional de Solidaridad: Ayuda Extraordinaria, Ayuda Ordinaria, Ayuda de Inserción (DOCM núm. 95, 26 de diciembre).*
- Law 5/1995, March 23. Solidarity Plan in Castille-La Mancha.  
*Ley 5/1995, de 23 de marzo. Plan de Solidaridad en Castilla-La Mancha (DOCM núm. 29, 19 de abril).*
- Decree No. 143/1996, December 17, on the regulation of the Solidarity Minimum Income and of the Special Need Aids.  
*Decreto 143/1996, de 17 de diciembre. Regulación del Ingreso Mínimo de Solidaridad y de las Ayudas de Emergencia Social (DOCM núm. 57, 20 de diciembre).*
- Decree No. 144/1996, December 17, on the development of the Programme for Personal Support and Individual Attention, of the Programme for Insertion and of the Collaboration and Cooperation on Social Services.  
*Decreto 144/1996, de 17 de diciembre, del desarrollo del Programa de Apoyo Personal y Atención Individualizada, del Programa de Inserción y de la Colaboración y Cooperación en Materia de Servicios Sociales (DOCM núm. 57, 20 de diciembre).*
- Decree No. 12/2002, January 15, modifying Decree No. 143/1996, December 17, on the development of the Solidarity Minimum Income and of the Special Need Aids.  
*Decreto 12/2002, de 15 de enero, por el que se modifica el decreto 143/1996, de 17 de diciembre, de desarrollo del ingreso mínimo de solidaridad y de las ayudas de emergencia social (DOCM núm. 6, 18 de enero).*

<b>Castille and Leon</b>	<p>Decree No. 132/1990, July 12, Minimum Insertion Income. <i>Decreto 132/1990, de 12 de julio 1990, Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción.</i></p> <p>Decree No. 164/1997, August 22, on the Minimum Insertion Income rules. <i>Decreto 164/1997, de 22 de agosto. Reglamento de Ingresos Mínimos de Inserción (BOCyL núm. 264, 28 de agosto).</i></p>
<b>Catalonia</b>	<p>Decree No. 144/1990, May 28, on the regulation of the Interdepartmental Programme for Minimum Insertion Income. <i>Decreto 144/1990, de 28 de mayo, regulador del Programa Interdepartamental de la Renta Mínima de Inserción (PIRMI) (DOGC núm. 1309, 25 de junio).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 228/1995, July 25, on the regulation of the Interdepartmental Programme for Minimum Insertion Income. <i>Decreto 228/1995, de 25 de julio. Regulación del Programa Interdepartamental de la Renta Mínima de Inserción (DOGC núm. 2087, 11 de agosto).</i></p> <p>Law No. 10/1997, July 3. Minimum Insertion Income. <i>Ley 10/1997, de 3 de julio. Renta Mínima de Inserción (RMI) (BOE núm. 198, 18 de agosto).</i></p>
<b>Extremadura</b>	<p>Decree No. 66/1990, July 31, on Integration Assistance in Situations of Extreme Poverty. <i>Decreto 66/1990, de 31 de julio 1990. Ayudas para la Integración en Situaciones de Emergencia Social (AISES) (DOE núm. 65, 16 de agosto).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 2/1997, January 9, on the regulation of the Integration Assistance in Situations of Extreme Poverty. <i>Decreto 2/1997, de 9 de enero. Regulación de las Ayudas para la Integración en Situaciones de Emergencia Social (DOE núm. 7, 16 de enero).</i></p>
<b>Galicia</b>	<p>Law No. 9/1991, October 2, on Basic Measures for Social Insertion. <i>Ley 9/1991, de 2 de octubre. Medidas Básicas para la Inserción Social (DOG núm. 191, 3 de octubre).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 374/1991, October 24, on the development of the Law No. 9/1991. <i>Decreto 374/1991, de 24 de octubre. Desarrollo de la ley 9/1991 (DOG núm. 214, 5 de noviembre).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 375/1991, October 24, on the development of the Special Need Aids. <i>Decreto 375/1991, de 24 de octubre. Desarrolla la Ayuda de Emergencia Social (AES).</i></p> <p>Law No. 1/1999, February 5, modifying Law 9/1991, October 2, on Basic Measures for Social Insertion. <i>Ley 1/1999, de 5 de febrero, por la que se modifica la Ley 9/1991, de 2 de octubre, de medidas básicas para la inserción social. (DOG num.35, de 22 de febrero).</i></p>
<b>Madrid</b>	<p>Decree No. 73/1990, July 19. Integration Income of Madrid. (Modified by Decrees No. 80/1990, 21/1992 and 75/1993). <i>Decreto 73/1990, de 19 de julio. Ingreso Madrileño de Integración (BOCM núm. 175, 25 de julio). (Modificado por los decretos 80/1990, 21/1992 y 75/1993).</i></p> <p>Law No. 15/2001, December 27, on Minimum Insertion Income of Madrid. <i>Ley 15/2001, de 27 de diciembre, de Renta Mínima de Inserción de la Comunidad de Madrid (BOCM núm.310, 31 de diciembre).</i></p>
<b>Murcia</b>	<p>Decree No. 1/1991, January 10, Regional Plan for Social Inclusion: Minimum Inclusion Income. <i>Decreto 1/1991, de 10 de enero. Plan Regional de Inserción Social: Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción (BOM núm. 9, 12 de enero).</i></p> <p>Decree No. 39/1992, April 30. Regional Plan for Inclusion and Social Protection.</p>



*Decreto 39/1992, de 30 de abril. Plan Regional de Inserción y Protección Social (BOM núm. 108, 11 de mayo).*

**Navarre**

Decreets No. 168, 169 and 170/1990, June 28, on the regulation of the Benefits and Individual/Family Aids, of the Labour Counter-benefits as a measure for Insertion, and of the Basic Income Counter-benefits as Social Protected Employment.

*Decretos 168, 169 y 170/1990, de 28 de junio. Regulación de las Prestaciones y Ayudas Individuales y Familiares, las Contraprestaciones Laborales como medidas de Inserción y las Contraprestaciones de Renta Básica en la modalidad de Empleo Social Protegido (BON núm. 87, 20 de julio).*

Law No. 9/1999, April 6. Social Rights Letter.

*Ley Foral 9/1999, de 6 de abril. Carta de Derechos Sociales (BON núm. 43, 9 de abril).*

Decree No. 120/1999, April 19. Basic Income.

*Decreto Foral 120/1999, de 19 de abril. Renta Básica (BON núm. 54, 3 de mayo).*

**Rioja (La)**

Decree No. 68/1990, June 5. Minimum Insertion Income.

*Decreto 68/1990, de 5 de junio. Ingreso Mínimo de Inserción (BOLR núm. 71, 9 de junio).*

Action Plan against social exclusion of La Rioja

*Plan de Acción contra la exclusión social de La Rioja (1998-2002).*

**Valencia**

Decree No. 132/1990, July 23. Measures Plan for Social Insertion.

*Decreto 132/1990, de 23 de julio. Plan de Medidas de Inserción Social (BOV núm. 1376, 7 de septiembre).*