Institutional design for enforcing Rule of Law compliance in the EU (InDeComply)
Investigador principal: Carlos Closa.
Convocatoria: Proyectos de Generación de Conocimiento 2021.
The InDeComply project examines why the EU's enforcement measures in relation to the rule of law have so far failed to bring offending states into compliance. The topic is of enormous importance: in the last decade, several governments, backed by parliamentary majorities, have triggered processes of "democratic backsliding", i.e. the progressive de-construction of the rule of law. The hypothesis is that the logics that dictate institutional behaviour both within and between EU institutions condition the effective enforcement of the rule of law. This project examines precisely what factors affect the behaviour of each institution: the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Beyond EU enforcement measures, compliance also depends on domestic factors that facilitate or impede it. Some attempts have been made in the literature to address this internal dimension, and this project will also tentatively explore it, with the aim of providing a comprehensive picture of compliance and enforcement of the rule of law in the Union.