Abstract. Data on patent families is used in economic and statistical studies for many purposes, including the analysis of patenting strategies of applicants, the monitoring of the globalization of inventions and the comparison of the inventive performance and stock of technological knowledge of different countries. Most of these studies take family data as given, as a sort of black box, without going into the details of their underlying methodologies and patent linkages. However, different definitions of patent families may lead to different results.

Abstract. This paper reports data from semi-structured interviews on how 26 Australian civil servants, ministers and ministerial advisors find and evaluate researchers with whom they wish to consult or collaborate.

Abstract. This paper presents an optimal control model to analyze reforestations with two different species, including commercial values, carbon sequestration and biodiversity or scenic values. We discuss the implications of partial or total internalization of environmental values, showing that internalizing only carbon sequestration may have negative impacts on biodiversity-scenic values.

Abstract. Considerable research shows the economy matters for voters. But that view has come under attack, with revisionists arguing that it matters little. This dissenting view fits the Spanish case well, where reigning research finds virtually no economic voting exists. We argue against the revisionist view, suggesting that conclusion stems largely from methodological limitations in its supporting cross-sectional survey analyses. Given the causality question these analyses raise, particularly in the context of likely endogeneity, a panel analysis is called for.

Abstract. This paper studies the concept of ‘mutual aid’ developed by Kropotkin, which implies cooperation as a strategic choice. We study this concept in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma in a non-cooperative framework and in an indirect evolution framework (with complete and incomplete information). We systematically compare this game with one that models Kant’s moral. In the non-cooperative framework both moral concepts yield different equilibria according to the parameters.